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This study examines U.S. servicewomen’s experiences that distinctly revolve 
around their bodies—those of rape, abortion, and pregnancy—and how these 
experiences are represented and understood. Following other feminists, I label these 
“embodied experiences” as they involve an overlapping of the lived physical body and 
how it is discursively defined and valued. My dissertation is guided by two main 
research questions: How are various female embodied experiences influenced by and 
communicated via public discourses—media, policies, laws, doctrines, culture, and 
practices—and how do servicewomen talk about them? And, how does the U.S. military 
utilize representations of servicewomen’s bodies to define gender, and what are the 
biopolitical implications? To answer these questions, I analyze three case studies. First, 
I examine the epidemic of sexual assault in the military through an analysis of the 2012 
documentary The Invisible War (TIW). My study of this film reveals that in the wake of 
TIW, historically utilized containment strategies were employed by the military in order 
to remove systemic blame from the military and place responsibility on women and 
their bodily comportment. Second, I look at the 2013 Military Abortion Amendment 
and the ways it restricts and enables women’s access to abortion and agency over 
reproductive decisions pertaining to their own bodies. I find that although the 
amendment appears at first blush to be quite progressive, when placed within the larger 




positions of women in terms of abortion rights. Finally, I study servicewomen’s 
pregnancy experiences while on active duty in the military, utilizing personal 
interviews, as well as analyses of policies, procedures, and culture. As a bodily 
experience that is quite visible, I discover that the military constitutes the pregnant 
soldier’s body as a significant problem that inhibits military readiness and mission. 
Ultimately, each chapter argues that despite the many policies and procedures put in 
place to promote progress in gender equality, the armed forces’ deep-seated cultural 
beliefs about sex and gender counteract many significant forms of progress. Instead, the 
hypermasculine culture of the military continues the biopolitical regulation of and 
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The female soldier undoubtedly remains a contradiction in terms. 
– Yvonne Tasker (2011, p. 280)  
 
Traditional gender scripts reinforce the binary that women will act feminine and 
men will act masculine (Butler, 1993, 2006; Southard, 2007). These expectations, which 
conflate sex and gender, extend beyond personal performances of gender to include what 
careers and public places are more suited for men and which are more suited for women. 
For example, because of the seemingly significant differences between biological males 
and females, servicewomen in the U.S. military have often found themselves primarily 
defined as different (read: inferior) and out of place based on their bodies. This is most 
likely due to the difficulty of reconciling servicewomen as simultaneously effective 
soldiers and appropriately feminine women in an historically and traditionally masculine 
institution (Tasker, 2011). Therefore, due to strict understandings of sex and gender, 
women in the military have been viewed as contradictory figures as long as they have 
been associated with the armed forces. This has made the integration of women into the 
military more difficult, for so-called gender equality has often only come to women who 
have attempted to assimilate to the patriarchal, hypermasculine culture of the U.S. 
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military (C. Burke, 1999; Taber, 2011; Tasker, 2011). Indeed, Tasker (2011) explained 
that the “incorporation of military women” into the patriarchal culture of the U.S. 
military is a “particularly acute site of contest over gender and power” (p. 17). Moreover, 
it is significant that the struggle for gender equality has often been conducted in relation 
to understandings of the biologically sexed body. 
In this dissertation, I explore the relationship between servicewomen and the U.S. 
military. Specifically, I examine servicewomen’s bodily experiences—those having do to 
with rape, abortion, and pregnancy—and how these experiences are represented and 
understood. Following other feminists, I label these “embodied experiences” as they 
involve an overlapping of the lived physical body and how it is discursively defined and 
valued (Braidotti, 2013; Young, 2005). I argue that many of the policies in the U.S. 
military regarding servicewomen are not as supportive as the military promotes them to 
be and in some cases are misguided. This project draws from feminist theories of the 
body, critical rhetoric, the concept of biopolitics, and analyses of military 
(hyper)masculinity to analyze military policies, procedures, culture, and legislation and 
reveals that the lack of progress and, in some cases, regression, is rooted in the military’s 
hypermasculine culture.  
The ways the military constitutes the embodied female soldier obviously has 
effects beyond servicewomen. Recruitment and retention are affected by the way the 
military defines the female soldier since women are more likely to volunteer and remain 
in the military if they are treated well. There is a mutual influence between military and 
public policies, so military policies influence public policies and vice versa. Therefore, 
policies within the military should be of interest to the general public since they may 
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eventually impact the larger society as well. Finally, these constructions impact society at 
large because military understandings of servicewomen contribute to public 
understandings of the differences between men and women, masculinity, femininity, 
bodies, and equality.   
My research examines how the embodied female soldier is constituted across 
multiple sites, with chapters focusing on policies, popular culture, and/or self-
understanding. More particularly, I am interested in investigating the interplay of 
hypermasculinity, biopolitics, and equality as they relate to discursive understandings of 
servicewomen’s experiences. To examine these issues, my overarching research 
questions ask, 
(a) How are the various female embodied experiences influenced by and 
communicated via public discourses—media, policies, laws, doctrines, culture, 
and practices—and how do servicewomen talk about them? 
(b) How does the U.S. military utilize representations of servicewomen’s bodies to 
define gender, and what are the biopolitical implications? 
Answers to these questions lie predominantly in the rhetorical discourses that frame 
public perception of servicewomen’s experiences—policies, visual images, news media, 
and popular culture—as well as in the perception and narratives of the servicewomen 
themselves. Indeed, following Butler (1993, 2006), I argue one cannot separate 
servicewomen’s lived, physiological bodies and the discourses that perpetuate particular 
understandings about their bodies. 
Ultimately, I argue that many of the military’s policies and procedures said to 
promote progress in gender equality still fall short due to deep-seated cultural beliefs 
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about sex and gender. To be sure, legislative change is needed. However, I argue that the 
ongoing problem with current and past legislation is that it does not seriously address the 
culture of hypermasculinity within the military, nor does it take into consideration 
servicewomen’s actual experiences and suggestions. Referring to the U.S. military, Burke 
(1999) argued that, “cultures are not determined, nor do they determine” (p. 62). This 
means that the hypermasculine culture is not inevitable, and change is possible. However, 
if the cause of the problems that servicewomen face is not addressed, efficacious policies 
will continue to be elusive. 
 
Justification of Study 
Servicewomen are a growing presence and force within the U.S. military. 
Approximately 215,000 women currently serve in the U.S. military, composing roughly 
15% of the troops. The U.S. possesses one of the higher percentages of women serving in 
national militaries worldwide (Enloe, 2007; Yarrow, 2013). To date, much research has 
focused on military masculinity and its perpetuation despite the increasing numbers of 
women serving in militaries (Brown, 2012; Connell, 2005; Duncanson, 2009; Enloe, 
1983, 2000, 2007; Hinojosa, 2010; Katz, 2010; Kimmel, 2003; Morgan, 1994; Schneider, 
1997; Sjoberg, 2007; Taber, 2011). Yet, with an increasing percentage of females serving 
in the armed forces, lawmakers, military members, and the media have become more 
cognizant of matters that affect women, particularly those revolving around women’s 
healthcare. For example, there has been an increased awareness of sexual assault in the 
military through media like The Invisible War, as well as discussions by politicians such 
as Kirsten Gillibrand and Claire McCaskill. Additionally, the Navy established an Office 
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of Women’s Policy to monitor gender trends, which include attrition, recruitment, 
pregnancy, parenthood, promotions, and career development (see www.public.navy.mil). 
By examining the female body within the military, this project will contribute to these 
ongoing public conversations about women in the military.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
My project asks what it means to be a female sexed body in the U.S. military. In 
an effort to critically interrogate the relationship between rhetoric and servicewomen’s 
embodied experiences, representations, policies, and practices, this dissertation draws on 
existing theoretical scholarship in critical rhetoric, feminist body theory, military 
(hyper)masculinity, biopolitics, and their intersections. 
To be sure, there is a “blurred character” to these areas of scholarship (Mumby, 
1997); they are not completely discrete, especially in the ways they draw from 
Foucauldian notions of discourse and power. However, each of these theoretical 
perspectives offers a unique angle from which to see the world and, when applied in 
relationship to one another, can offer a more nuanced understanding of what it means for 
servicewomen to live in a crossroads of lived, embodied experiences and the discursive 
understandings of these experiences. 
My goal in this dissertation is neither to promote a positivist, modernist project of 
biological determinism, nor a purely social constructivist, postmodern analysis. Instead, 
like Mumby (1997), I believe that drawing a distinct line between modernist and 
postmodernist thought relies on an artificial binary; instead the concepts lie on a 
continuum. For example, many modernist, essentialist understandings primarily rely on 
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biological distinctions and often problematically assume maternity is the defining aspect 
of women’s lives (Gilligan, 1997; Ruddick, 2006). Contrastingly, a social constructivist 
approach taken to its most extreme ignores the materiality of the body and argues biology 
does not matter because everyone is the “same.” This can make it difficult to make any 
claims on behalf of inequality (Grosz, 1994). Instead of taking one side, I walk a line 
between the approaches and argue that, while biology is not destiny, it significantly 
impacts our lived experiences and social relations. Therefore, I utilize the following 
theoretical perspectives (which are often used in more postmodern/poststructuralist 
senses) throughout this dissertation to understand how the “material facts” of the lived 
body (Young, 2005, p. 16) correspond to, interact with, and are defined by various 
discourses circulating around women in the military.   
 
Critical Rhetoric 
Critical rhetoric lays the perspectival foundation of this dissertation. McKerrow 
(1989) explained that critical rhetoric asserts that discourse is the basis for all social 
power and that rhetoric is always politically and ideologically invested. This perspective 
also acknowledges the subjective nature of rhetoric. Additionally, a critical rhetoric 
perspective emerges from the idea that text and context are intertwined and inseparable. 
Therefore, scholars utilizing critical rhetoric frameworks embrace different notions of 
what constitutes a “text,” accepting that various discursive constructions work together as 
fragments to constitute how we understand the world (Charland, 1987; McGee, 1990). 
This means that rhetoric can no longer be considered a product, but rather a process 
(McKerrow, 1989; McGee, 1990). Texts are always in process, always unfinished, and 
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the rhetor is not located at the seat of origin, but rather at the intersection of many 
different fragments (Gaonkar, 1993; Pezzullo, 2001). As McGee (1990) asserted, what 
we have come to consider the “apparently finished text” is actually just a collection of 
fragments. In this dissertation, I analyze various discursive fragments to gain a better 
conception of the rhetorical force in the independent situations related to rape and sexual 
assault, abortion legislation, and pregnancy experiences in the military, as well as when 
they are all articulated in relationship with one another (DeLuca, 1999b).  
I also seek to critically interrogate power in the military as it pertains to 
servicewomen’s bodies and agency. Critical rhetoric follows Foucault (1976) in 
advocating that power is everywhere and that power shapes bodies and societies because 
institutions (schools, work, hospitals, military, etc.) organize people and bring certain 
kinds of subjects into being. If power is everywhere, then those who are not traditionally 
associated with power (in this case, servicewomen) still have the ability to reconfigure or 
uphold the grid of intelligibility. This is where critical rhetoric provides feminists with 
tools for studying power in the military. It also allows for a critique of not just the 
rhetoric of the traditionally powerful—elites such as political and military leaders—but 
also the rhetoric of marginalized and historically ignored groups (Ono & Sloop, 1995)—
in the case of this dissertation, servicewomen. In this way, critical rhetoric works against 
“writing out” particular groups of people from our historical understandings of our nation 
and the military (Ono & Sloop, 1995). 
Specifically, in this dissertation I not only examine discourses of elites, such as 
law makers who make policies, but also analyze interviews with servicewomen, from 
both primary and secondary sources, blogs by servicewomen and feminists, and 
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servicewomen’s stories as retold by others.  
 
Feminist Theories of the Body 
 American feminism helped develop a political understanding of the body as a site 
that has historically been the locus of contestations and assertions of power (Bordo, 1993). 
Similar to critical rhetoricians, many feminists draw from Foucauldian understandings of 
bodies and power and believe that the discursive ways that the body is defined and 
shaped constitute “the focal point for struggles over the shape of power” (Johnson as 
cited in Bordo, 1993, p. 17). One of oldest understandings about bodies is that men’s 
bodies are considered the “neutral” or normative body, and women’s bodies—which 
deviate from the male model—are viewed as inferior (Braidotti, 1997). As a result, 
women are “measured and judged against the norm of man, the essential human subject” 
and viewed as deviating biologically, rendering them inferior (King, 2004, p. 31).  
This understanding has carried over to the military, a hypermasculine institution 
that often assumes a “neutral” (read: male) soldier (Brown, 2012; Enloe, 2007). Many of 
the difficulties servicewomen face within the masculine military culture revolve around 
the ways their (reproductive) biological bodies differ from the generic soldier’s body. 
Understandings of the “neutral” man have allowed for essentialist claims to be made 
about servicewomen due to their reproductive physiology. With men as the “ideal 
biological standard,” female deviations from this standard have been medicalized and 
classified as “conditions” (King, 2004, p. 31). Women’s bodies have been considered 
deviant simply because they do not conform to generic male physiology. 
 The male body as neutral is a topic feminists have discussed at length. Feminist 
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scholars have also considered how the body’s anatomy has been used to socially 
construct an understanding of gender such that female bodies equal femininity (Bordo, 
1993; Butler, 1993, 2003, 2006, 2009; Haslanger, 2006; Steinem, 1978). The social 
construction of gender has relied on both binary and hierarchal notions of bodies in order. 
This foundational understanding in Western thought is based in a dualistic understanding 
of the necessity to have an “other,” who is often viewed as inferior, to which to compare 
oneself. This binary has aided in the perpetuation of gender inequalities and sexist 
reasoning.  
 To be sure, the significance and meaning of bodies depends on their relations with 
others and other bodies (Wilcox, 2011). Anatomy and biology are always interacting with 
culture, making bodies “cultural forms,” surfaces “on which the central rules, hierarchies, 
and even metaphysical commitments of a culture are inscribed and thus reinforced 
through the concrete language of the body” (Bordo, 1993, pp. 16, 165). Benhabib and 
Cornell (1987) further explained that gender identity is defined not by the (prediscursive) 
body itself, but rather by the social views of anatomy. The dominant conventions of 
society determine and shape bodily expressions of sex and gender, and in turn, the body 
has become the primary way that perceptions of gender are communicated and realized 
(Butterworth, 2008). And, despite being “contestable constructs,” gender norms are so 
closely associated with anatomic sex that deviations are widely disdained (Butterworth, 
2008, p. 262).  
 Many feminist scholars have drawn from Foucault in order to understand the 
social construction of gender (Bordo, 1993; Butler, 1993, 2006; King, 2004). Foucault 
noted that bodies are ‘‘invested with relations of power and domination’’ (Foucault, 1995, 
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p. 26) because modern biopower, as opposed to sovereign power, “produces and 
normalizes bodies to serve prevailing relations of dominance and subordination” (Bordo, 
1993, p. 26). When discussing bodies, Foucault often drew from understandings of 
modern biopower, docile bodies, and micropractices. (I will address biopower in more 
length shortly.) Foucault explained that docile bodies are produced through discipline, yet 
this discipline does not come from one main top-down source, but rather from 
micropractices in society. Foucault argued that power was not something that one group 
possessed, but it “is a network of practices, institutions, and technologies that sustain 
positions of dominance and subordination” (Bordo, 1993, p. 167). It is through the 
constant discursive reiterations of micropractices that bodies are disciplined to be docile, 
and that social identity based on bodies is determined (King, 2004). Understanding 
Foucault’s notion of micropractices helps illuminate his understanding that power is 
constitutive, constructing what is considered normal and deviant for bodies (Foucault, 
1976b, pp. 136, 94). 
Furthermore, Foucault stressed that there were no “natural” or prediscursive, 
essential bodies or subjects who were “amputated, repressed, altered by our social order,” 
but instead that “the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole 
technique of forces and bodies” (Foucault, 1995, p. 217). Yet, although Foucault 
addressed essentialism, he did not address gender and the “techniques of gender” that 
work to constantly “reiterate the polarization of the sexes” (King, 2004, p. 33). It has 
been argued that women’s bodies are disciplined even more than the seemingly neutral 
body Foucault discusses (Bartky, 1997; Bordo, 1993; King, 2004; Wilcox, 2011; Young, 
2005). As a technology of the body, and an apparatus of biopower, a gender system 
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constructs the body as an intelligible object, using disciplinary techniques to discursively 
create, contain, and control women’s physical bodies (King, 2004). Bartky (1997) 
explained that these techniques and technologies have disciplined the female body to act, 
look, and move in particular ways, just as in the military micropractices revolving around 
the uniform, physical fitness tests, discipline, control, and hierarchy aim to shape service 
members into uniform soldiers. 
 Young (2005) further argued that what is considered feminine is often part of 
“normatively disciplined expectations imposed on female bodies by male-dominated 
society” (p. 5). In terms of the military, notions of what a soldier is often revolve around 
traits associated with male bodies and masculinity. This image is normalized and 
therefore becomes the standard.  
 Indeed, the symbolic and representational attributes of bodies in society make 
them rhetorical. Instead of being neutral, natural objects that are unencumbered by 
ideology, Stormer (2002) averred that, “the moment the body gains a cultural purpose, it 
becomes rhetorical” (p. 41). In recent decades, many rhetorical scholars have given 
increased attention to the “rhetoricity of the body” (Butterworth, 2008, p. 259), and many 
have studied the link between rhetoric and the body (Alemán, 2010; Alley-Young, 2008; 
Butterworth, 2008; DeLuca, 1999; Enck-Wanzer, 2009; Hawhee, 2005; Selzer & 
Crowley, 1999; Shugart, 2003). In fact, Selzer (1999) argued that seeing bodies as 
rhetorical reminds us that there is “a material dimension in rhetoric” (p. 9). It could be 
argued that part of the material dimension involves how the body is used to define gender 
and therefore political and social relations and rights (Stormer, 2002).  
In the case of this dissertation, I propose that servicewomen’s bodies may be 
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“productive sites of rhetorical invention and judgment because they have the capacity to 
contest the assumed values too often taken for granted when bodies are visible and 
observed” (Butterworth, 2008, p. 260). Because the femaleness of women’s bodies in 
some of the case studies in this dissertation is difficult to deny or ignore—especially in 
terms of pregnancy, for example—examining the ways women’s bodies are rhetorically 
disciplined and regulated may lend insight into the ways the military attempts to maintain 
a rigid distinction between male and female bodies (Butterworth, 2008). Physicality is 
important to the military, so it makes studying bodies within the military context even 
more incumbent upon rhetorical scholars (McKerrow, 1992). The study of women’s 
material bodies and how they are discursively constituted in the military reveals “some 
ways in which reified and naturalized conceptions of gender might be understood as 
constituted and, hence, capable of being constituted differently” (Butler, 1997, p. 402). 
Thus, it is imperative to rhetorically engage with servicewomen’s bodies in order to 
visualize more inclusive representations and understandings of sex and gender.  
 
Military (Hyper)Masculinity 
Closely related to feminist theories of the body and critical rhetoric is scholarship 
engaging the concept of military (hyper)masculinity, which often relies on biology and 
bodies to define difference and power. In its simplest form, masculinity “is the traits, 
behaviors, images, values, and interests associated with being a man within a given 
culture. It is not a natural consequence of male biology, but a set of socially constructed 
practices” (Brown, 2012, p. 18). Masculinity is often defined in the negative, by what it is 
not. For example, Kimmel (2003) explained that dominant definitions of masculinity in 
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mainstream America depend on the exclusion of others such as women, non-White men, 
and homosexual men. Exclusion, difference, and contrast have been the primary ways to 
make meaning in the Western philosophical tradition and the male-female binary has 
been used to “encode a hierarchal relationship or indicate a distribution of power” 
(Brown, 2012, p. 19). Masculinity and masculine roles depend on femininity and roles 
defined as feminine for their meaning (Goldstein, 2001).  
This binary relationship is even more extreme in the military, which has 
historically and traditionally been linked to masculinity (Barrett, 1996; Brown, 2012; 
Connell, 1985, 2005; Dubbert, 1979; Enloe, 1989; Higate, 2003; Jarvis, 2010; 
Katzenstein & Reppy, 1999; Morgan, 1994; Whitworth, 2008). In fact, Katzenstein and 
Reppy (1999) argued that in the military,  
masculine traits are specifically constructed to be exclusionary features of 
maleness instead of desirable characteristics that are applicable to all uniformed 
military members, who happen to be both men and women, heterosexual and 
homosexual, people of color as well as White. (p. 8)  
 
Indeed, many scholars have contended that the culture in the military revolves around and 
depends upon problematic assumptions about masculinity, therefore creating a culture of 
military masculinity (C. Burke, 1999; Dunivan, 1994; Guenter-Schlesinger, 1999; 
Katzenstein & Reppy, 1999; Morris, 1999; Roush, 1999).  
Connell (2005) further explained that the military has played a significant role in 
defining notions of hegemonic masculinity. Pateman elaborated, “Of all the male clubs 
and associations, it is in the military and on the battlefield that fraternity finds its most 
complete expression” (Pateman, 1990, p. 49). And Hinojosa (2010) claimed, “For men, 
one distinct benefit [of joining the military] is access to the resources of a hegemonic 
masculinity” (p. 180). Military masculinity has come to be associated with 
 14 
“European/American” armed forces and the traits of aggression, strength, toughness, 
heterosexuality, and violence (Connell, 2005; Duncanson, 2009). Whereas the normative 
definition of femininity is passivity, the dominant definition of masculinity is the 
opposite—aggression, competition, violence, power, and anger—traits often associated 
with the military (Katz, 2010, p. 263; Kimmel, 2003, p. 122). Because beliefs about 
military masculinity are so widespread, it is normalized and becomes exclusionary and 
discriminatory against those who deviate (socially or biologically) from the norm.  
The association between certain understandings of gender and soldiering 
perpetuates the gendering, or the “masculinizing and feminizing of certain roles and 
symbols” (Enloe, 1989, p. 119), of the military (Brown, 2012). Gendering has historically 
associated men with paid work, or production, and women with private, unpaid work, or 
reproduction (Herbert, 1998). Therefore, in a “gendered institution” (Acker, 1992) where 
soldiering is not only associated with war, but also with becoming a man, the presence of 
servicewomen may add complications and lead to the discrimination against women 
(Brown, 2012; Herbert, 1998).  
Yet masculinity is not a monolith and can encompass multiple definitions (M. T. 
Brown, 2012; Katzenstein & Reppy, 1999). This is the strength of hegemonic masculinity 
(Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) and what allows it to perpetuate over time, persisting 
in culture because of what Enloe (2000) called “its facile adaptiveness” (p. 285). Brown 
(2012) argued that changes in the political, economic, and social environments; advances 
in technology; and shifts in military functions (such as peacekeeping missions and 
humanitarian aid) “may change what types of masculinity are associated with soldiering” 
(pp. 21–22). The recurring modification of military masculinity is one of the reasons why 
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patriarchal values have retained their power over time within the institution. As Braudy 
(2005) argued, the consistent thread that has determined conceptions of masculinity as it 
has morphed over time has been war and its association with the military. I would add to 
this, following others like Kimmell (2003), Connell (1985), and Duncanson (2009), that it 
has also consistently been defined as “not feminine,” which includes traits—physical, 
emotional, and more—often associated with women. 
The relationship between masculinity and femininity is complicated. The 
inclusion of women in the armed forces in increasing numbers and roles not only makes 
the link between masculinity and the military more complex, it also complicates it 
(Brown, 2012). Part of the complication is due to the belief that increased numbers of 
women correlate with progress in gender equality. Enloe explained that even with the 
high ratios of women serving in militaries around the world—such as in Israel, Libya, 
Japan, and Sweden, to name a few—these high percentages must be treated “with caution. 
They might not be evidence of contemporary ‘postsexist’ enlightenment” (Enloe, 2007, p. 
71). Quantity does not always mean quality, and equality is much more complex.  
This is because strong ties between masculinity and the military still exist, to the 
point of what many have asserted is an environment that fosters hypermasculinity, or an 
exaggerated “superior masculine” gender script that is not just about being labeled male, 
and not just about appearing masculine, but about being exceedingly masculine (Hunter, 
2007; Mosher & Tomkins, 1988). Hypermasculinity, “an extreme form of masculinity 
based on beliefs of polarized gender roles, the endorsement of stereotypical gender roles, 
a high value placed on control, power, and competition, toleration of pain, and mandatory 
heterosexuality” (Turchik & Wilson, 2010, p. 271). Because hypermasculinity promotes 
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rigid sex roles, organizations that endorse this type of stereotypical masculinity have been 
found to have increased rates of sexual harassment and assault due to a greater tolerance 
toward such behaviors (Ilies, Hauserman, Schwochau, & Stibal, 2003; Turchik & Wilson, 
2010; Vogt, Bruce, Street, & Stafford, 2007). In fact, Ilies et al. (2003) found that 
organizations with large power differentials, such as the military, are more prone to 
sexual harassment and assault. At its most extreme, Turchik and Wilson (2010) explained 
that men who report adhering to hypermasculine values are likely to not only have a 
“rape-supportive attitude” but also to “commit more acts of sexual aggression” than men 
with less extreme masculine values (p. 271). In light of this research, if the military has a 
hypermasculine culture, it would be very difficult to imagine that simply an increase in 
the number of women serving has resulted in their equal treatment.  
The association of the military with (hyper)masculinity affects those in the armed 
forces as well as the general public (Barrett, 1996). Enloe (1989) explained that the 
military’s subscription to hypermasculinity affects “men and women who have nothing to 
do with the military,” reaching beyond the government and military personnel and 
influencing civilian perceptions of masculinity and femininity (p. 119). Brown (2012) 
also argued that, “how we see our military can affect how we see ourselves as men and 
women” because it “serves as the standard-bearer of masculinity,” and “both reflects and 
shapes socially dominant ideas about gender” (M. T. Brown, 2012, p. 185). Often these 
perceptions of gender are rooted in simple understandings of men and women’s  
biological bodies, not taking into account the diversity of bodies in general and within 
each sex.  
Controlling notions of gender can have material consequences for servicewomen, 
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often in terms of agency, access, and autonomy. Although U.S. women have been 
allowed to enlist and participate in military operations for decades, and in 2013 were 
allowed to serve in combat positions for the first time, women only compose 
approximately 15% of the predominantly male armed forces. Furthermore, although 
women are permitted to join the armed forces, they are still “typically characterized as 
different from men” (Taber, 2011, p. 334). This was evidenced in the debates 
surrounding women serving in combat positions. For example, debate over President 
Obama’s appointment of Chuck Hagel to Secretary of Defense, frequently focused on 
whether or not Hagel would deem it “safe” for women to serve in combat roles, further 
perpetuating a norm according to which men protect women and decide whether or not 
they can serve in combat positions (Jennings, 2013). Additionally, as women are allowed 
to serve in combat roles, increased attention will likely be given to how specific functions 
of women’s bodies, particularly menstruation, are to be handled in combat zones, where 
there can be extreme heat, limited access to hygienic toilets, and increased overall 
discomfort, a discussion that only serves to further highlight women’s hyperembodiment 
and distinction from their male counterparts, whose bodily functions are not framed as 
hard to deal with in the same way. 
Due to the military’s high regard for masculine traits, many female soldiers find 
serving in the armed forces an uphill battle. As Taber (2011) argued, “the way to be a 
woman in the military is to conform” to militarized masculinity or to become as 
“masculine” as possible, disguising or hiding any hints of embodied difference (Taber, 
2011, p. 344). This is problematic because increasing the number of women serving in 
the military seems to be a sign of feminist progress, yet their acceptance therein may 
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nonetheless perpetuate and affirm dominant masculinity. If the only way for women to 
succeed is to conform to the hegemonic standard of (hyper)masculinity, they can never 
truly succeed. Unless militarized masculinity is challenged, real gender equality and a 
decrease in discrimination in the military will remain elusive. As MacKinnon (1987) 
argued, “to require that one be the same as those who set the standard—those which one 
is already socially defined as different from—simply means that sex equality is 
conceptually designed never to be achieved” (p. 44). The achievement of masculinity for 
female soldiers appears to be an impossible goal, since the (hyper)masculine military 
culture relentlessly reduces women to their different bodies. 
If radical progress for women in the military is to happen, the close association of 
masculinity and soldiering must be severed. The basic understanding of a soldier needs to 
be more inclusive, recognizing that female soldiers are not contradicitons and that the 
idea of the monolithic masculine soldier does not really exist. 
 
Biopolitics  
Finally, although I briefly alluded to Foucault’s theoretical notions of biopower 
and biopolitics earlier, in this section I will explain concepts that inform my research for 
this dissertation, including biopower, normalization, and the body as a machine.  
In “Society Must be Defended” and in History of Sexuality, Foucault explained 
that biopower referred to the new mechanism that emerged as a result of the demographic 
explosion due to industrialization, with a focus on “making live.” Biopower functions in 
two ways: first controlling people at the detailed, disciplinary individual level (what he 
called “anatamo-politics”—that of schools, prisons, and the army) and then at the level of 
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regulation of the masses (what he called “bio-politics”—that of insurance, mortality rates, 
fertility rates, etc.). Foucault explained that the disciplinary function, or anatamo-politics, 
focused on individuals, on their pregnancies, births, and individuals with sexually 
transmitted diseases. The goal is controlling individuals through discipline and 
surveillance, with each person eventually internalizing the ideology of the State so as to 
do their own self-surveillance. The regulatory function—that of biopolitics—moves from 
the individual discipline to a focus on the population, which has the effect of focusing on 
“life” as an independent, autonomous variable, distinct from actual living beings (Lemke, 
2011). Therefore instead of individual births and deaths, the focus is on norms and 
statistics. For example, biopolitics looks at birthrates, mortality rates, rates of the 
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, averages, and so on.  
 Yet biopower is not only about proliferating and preserving life and “making live,” 
but about telling people “how to live” (Stormer, 2002, p. 25). Biopower normalizes how 
to live, and the norms function as arguments about “what is desirable” and how people 
should act (Britt, 2001, p. 11). At the heart of these norms is the goal of human 
productivity focused on “making life more efficient, more productive, and more useful” 
(Britt, 2001, p. 51; Foucault, 1995). One of the most prominent regimes of biopower in 
the U.S. is the military, with its focus on disciplining and regulating soldiers’ bodies. In 
the armed forces, the regulatory apparatuses that govern servicewomen’s embodied 
experiences include policies, laws, doctrines, culture, and practices. These apparatuses 
function to perpetuate a specific understanding of what is considered normal and 
acceptable when it comes to gendered experiences in the military.   
 This makes sense because normalization has “centered on the body as a machine: 
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its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel 
increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and 
economic controls” (Foucault, 1976b, p. 139). In focusing on the body as a machine, 
instead of as an unpredictable, untamable, living organism, Britt averred that “the 
techniques of normalization do not so much identify and correct the abnormal as they 
create and perpetuate the distinction between the normal and the abnormal” (Britt, 2001, 
p. 9). Under the label of “normal,” certain ideologies are maintained, like the belief in a 
“neutral” ideal soldier who is the referent for what is considered normal, but in all 
actuality is based on understandings and standards that are male (M. T. Brown, 2012; de 
Beauvoire, 1989b; Enloe, 2007; MacKinnon, 1987). 
 Focusing on the body as a machine is problematic, especially because the female 
body has been found to be “decidedly indocile . . . in terms of [its] bodily cycles and 
fluctuating rates of fertility” (Duke & Ames, 2008, p. 245). It is likely because of this 
indocility of the female body that institutions like the military seek to implement strict 
regulatory apparatuses in order to gain increased control and limit the possibility of any 
aleatory events. In fact, Foucault asserted that within a biopolitical framework arose the 
“hysterization of women” because women are “saturated with sexuality” (read: 
embodiment) and also birth the future population. Miller (2007) referred to this intense 
focus on women’s (reproductive) bodies as the emergence of the “vaginal search warrant,” 
where what is public and what is private becomes blurred. Therefore it has been justified 
that women’s bodies must be closely examined, monitored, disciplined, and regulated, 
with the implicit understanding that they can ultimately be controlled.  
 This close focus on women’s sexed bodies as a means to proliferate healthy 
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populations highlights the dual focus of biopolitics on life and sex. Indeed, Deutscher 
(2012) averred that biopolitics are about both life and sex because the state can control 
life through controlling sex. It is not surprising, then, that in the biopolitical regime of the 
military, many of the issues servicewomen face revolve around their bodies and 
(consensual and nonconsensual) sex and its consequences.  
 
Methods 
Similar to Condit (1990), my methods draw from critical rhetoric and the idea that 
meaning is found in context. In the case of this dissertation the contexts are sexual assault, 
abortion, and pregnancy in the U.S. military. I start with a main text and establish the 
(con)text by looking at the intersection of multiple fragments and the power dynamics 
and rhetorical force generated (McGee, 1990). Put another way, I engage in “‘creating’ a 
text from cultural ‘fragments’ of discourse that necessarily collapse text into context” 
(Shugart, 2011, p. 39). I employ this framework differently in each chapter, as the main 
texts are distinct. 
In every chapter, I follow other scholars and push back against texts, looking for 
alternative ways to read them (Dow, 1996; McKerrow, 1989; Projansky, 2014; Shohat, 
2006; Shugart, 2001). In these instances, resisting the normative reading (Projansky, 
2014) not only challenges taken-for-granted assumptions, but can also lend valuable 
insights. Using a critical lens to push back and question normative assumptions can 
problematize ideologies and call for much-needed social change. In all of the chapters, 
the methods are approached through a feminist lens, with a particular focus on the body, 
and further guided by the literature on military (hyper)masculinity and biopolitics. 
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It should also be noted that my chapters partially rely on statistical evidence, 
which may seem inconsistent given my desire to critique the biopolitical concept of 
normalization, which depends on statistics (Britt, 2001). When using statistics, I follow 
Haraway (1997) who argued,  
Feminists have high stakes in the speculum of statistical knowledge for opening 
up otherwise invisible, singular experience to reconfigure public, widely lived 
reality. . . . Providing powerful statistic data is essential to effective public 
representations of what feminist and other progressive freedom and justice 
projects mean. (p. 199) 
 
In the case of this dissertation, statistics are not used primarily for their objectivity, but 
for their use in cultural critique of seemingly one-dimensional understandings of the 
topics under analysis (Britt, 2001).  
 Finally, all three chapters give histories of the topics as they relate to the military. 
To be sure, these are not offered as comprehensive histories or as “the” history of each 
topic, but rather as a version of history for each (Projansky, 2001). The histories serve to 
help situate the present day discourses within a larger historical context. 
 
Parameters of Study 
I have chosen to limit my inquiry to 21st century U.S. military culture, for a few 
specific reasons. First, experiences in the military for servicewomen have changed 
significantly over the years. For example, in the 1970s, servicewomen were often 
involuntarily discharged if they were pregnant (whether married or not; Jacobson & 
Jensen, 2011). Today, pregnancy is not a reason for automatic dismissal from military 
service. Additionally, women are now allowed to serve in the senior most ranks, 
something that was not initially granted to them. In the 21st century, and specifically in 
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the past few years, there have been significant policy changes for women serving in the 
military. These policies, which for the most part seek to help women realize “equality” 
with their male counterparts serving in the military as well as civilian federal employees, 
have a tremendous impact on the experience and understanding of women’s embodied 
experiences in the military.  
Finally, the number of women serving in the armed forces continues to grow, and 
recruiters continue to push for more women in efforts to increase the number of troops. 
This increase in number will likely (hopefully?) mean that matters affecting women, such 
as those of sexual assault, abortion, and pregnancy, will gain increased attention and 
bring much-needed transformation to military policies. Instead of using the “neutral” 
male-solider as the standard for policies and procedures, perhaps the increase in female 
soldiers, as well their additional military roles, will highlight the biological diversity of 
all soldiers and the myth of the “uniform” soldier.   
 
Overview of Chapters 
 In the next chapter, I analyze The Invisible War (TIW), a documentary about 
military sexual assault. The film illuminated the epidemic of sexual assault in the military 
in 2012, placing it in public conversation and at the forefront of military policy debates. 
In addition to TIW, I also look at policies, debates, laws, and histories surrounding sexual 
assault in the military in an effort to understand the role of TIW in fighting sexual assault 
in the military, as well as the rhetorical strategies utilized by U.S. political leaders, 
military leaders, and the media to manage the revelations of sexual assault exposed by 
TIW. In this chapter, I discuss past military sexual assault scandals of Tailhook (1991), 
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Aberdeen Proving Ground (1996), and the Air Force Academy (2003) and compare the 
containment strategies utilized after each of these scandals to those employed following 
TIW. I discovered three strategies from my analysis of TIW in conjunction with the other 
three scandals: conflating sex and gender, victim-blaming, and red herrings. I argue that 
conflating sex and gender problematically supports that biology is destiny, by equating 
women’s biological difference with women’s innate (social and physical) inferiority to 
men, therefore rendering women unsuitable to serve in the armed forces. Victim-blaming 
is a version of the age-old tactic of scapegoating, in which the blame shifts to victims and 
their behavior (such as drinking), and the victims are punished. This strategy allows the 
solution to the problem of sexual assault to rest with victim behavior instead of systemic 
change. Finally, red herrings are a type of fallacy that divert attention away from the 
problem in order to contain the situation. In the case of military sexual assault, a separate 
and unrelated problem (such as fraternization or increased reporting) is introduced that 
takes precedence and removes the focus from the epidemic of sexual assault. I argue that 
despite the proactive nature of TIW compared to the reactive nature of the other scandals, 
in the wake of the release of The Invisible War, various U.S. political, military, and media 
leaders still employed these historically utilized rhetorical strategies in efforts to contain 
the problem of sexual assault in the military and simultaneously relieve the military of 
any responsibility instead of making significant strides to fix the broken system.  
The third chapter examines the controversial Military Abortion Amendment 
(MAA) passed in January 2013 and its surrounding discourse. What interested me the 
most about this text was not only the controversy, but also the multiple times this 
amendment was referred to as bringing equality to military members and hailed as a 
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major step in the progress of military women’s rights. I interrogate the narratives of 
progress and equality surrounding the amendment, and the ways that the media and 
political leaders have shaped the discursive understandings and perceptions of the MAA. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is a rhetorical history of military 
abortion policies and the second is an analysis of the discourse circulating around the 
MAA. The examination of the rhetorical history of abortion policies in the military in 
ways draws from Foucault’s (1995) genealogical approach in his study of systems of 
punishment in Discipline and Punish, where he explained that the system of disciplining 
today is no more humane than the torture in the mid-1700s. His account questions 
whether prisons are actually gentler and/or better than torture and suggests that the 
microphysics of power have changed from the crudeness of torture to the prison system 
where not just the human body, but also the human soul, is controlled and disciplined. 
Similarly, in the third chapter, I contend that the various fragmented discourses 
circulating around the MAA served to support abortion policies that are restrictive and in 
some ways regressive. By looking at the history of military abortion policies and the 
rhetoric surrounding them, as well as their interaction and influence on and by public 
abortion policies, this chapter argues that, while the MAA may grant more rights and 
agency to servicewomen than recent legislation, it ultimately continues to limit 
servicewomen’s access to abortion services. 
Finally, Chapter 4 focuses on the issue of pregnancy in the armed forces. This 
chapter includes interviews with servicewomen who have been pregnant while on active 
duty in the U.S. military since in the 21st century in combination with rhetorical analyses 
of policies, laws, doctrine, and practices. While others have conducted interviews with 
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military personnel (Barrett, 1996; Herbert, 1998; Skaine, 1999; Taber, 2011; Turner & 
Hao, 1999), this chapter combines interview research with rhetorical analysis to provide a 
more nuanced picture of servicewomen’s experiences and contribute to the field of other 
works that have combined rhetorical analysis and interviews (Britt, 2001; Condit, 1999; 
Dubriwny, 2005; Koerber, 2013). To analyze everything but servicewomen’s own 
accounts would be to contribute to their misrepresentation and to the pattern of devaluing 
their voices. Pregnancy in the military as the phenomenon under study for this chapter is 
especially well suited for interview research because it is a topic that women are more 
likely to be willing to discuss. It is difficult to recruit interview participants from the 
military, especially for difficult topics like sexual assault and abortion. Fortunately, The 
Invisible War offered interviews with sexual assault victims. Although interviews tend to 
carry an air of authenticity and truth, it must be noted that even interviews are a 
representation, another cultural fragment that has been mediated. This is another reason 
why it is important to analyze multiple fragments in order to create a more nuanced 
cultural (con)text.  
The collection and analysis of interviews, in conjunction with the rhetorical 
analysis of other documents and discourses, reveals that the military’s rhetorical 
strategies of stigmatizing, hyperplanning, macho maternity, and medicalization serve to 
cultivate a difficult environment for pregnant soldiers. Specifically, servicewomen are 
stigmatized for getting pregnant because many still assume women become pregnant in 
order to avoid deployment or to be restationed. Additionally, because the military relies 
on predictability, discipline, and readiness, hyperplanning of pregnancies is encouraged 
and expected so that servicewomen’s pregnancies do not impede on the military’s 
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mission. Hyperplanning treats women’s bodies as controllable docile machines instead of 
the living, breathing, indocile bodies they really are. Furthermore, in order to negotiate 
the tension between the reality of their biological differences from men and their desire 
for complete social equality within the armed forces, many women enact macho 
maternity, or working like men during pregnancy, in order to continue to succeed 
(Smithson & Stokoe, 2005). Often, the women who enact macho maternity have the least 
discriminatory pregnancy experiences in the military because their behavior reinforces 
dominant cultural understandings of soldiering. Lastly, I argue that the military 
medicalizes servicewomen’s pregnancies, which devalues women’s experiential 
knowledge. Ultimately, in this chapter I contend that each of these strategies positions 
pregnancy in the armed forces as a problem, which further perpetuates gender 
discrimination in the institution.   
These three chapters use case studies to look at servicewomen’s embodiment in 
practice, and how these sectors of society map military policies, interviews, visual images, 
news media, and popular culture in order to address and produce gender difference. This 
dissertation examines embodiment in different situations, yet I do not claim that this 
research will settle the debates about embodiment. Instead, I seek to contribute to the 
conversation about embodiment by showing how the female soldier is constituted and 
produced through policies, material conditions, and linguistic influence. Indeed, the 
embodied subject is created through complex, complicated, contested, and competing 
processes and discourses.  
 One aspect of the military that has puzzled scholars when it comes to topics 
related to its female members is how incidents and discrimination continue to happen in 
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“an institution well-recognized for the strengths of its rules and regulations” (Katzenstein 
& Reppy, 1999, p. 3). Guenter-Schlesinger (1999) questioned how sexual harassment can 
still be such a widespread problem in the military, which “has been a forerunner in 
dealing with racial and gender discrimination issues” and has been on the vanguard in 
dealing with race and gender issues and has put substatntial resources toward these issues 
of discrimination (p. 195). The problem, I argue, along with others, is that even if an 
organization has rules and policies, they are only “as effective as the culture that supports 
them” (Katzenstein & Reppy, 1999, p. 3). In these cases, lip service will not suffice or 
result in culture change. This dissertation is an effort to expose ongoing deep-seated 
gender problems within the military that negatively affect servicewomen and open the 







INVISIBLE ONCE AGAIN: DISCURSIVE ATTEMPTS TO CONTAIN  
THE U.S. MILITARY’S SEXUAL ASSAULT EPIDEMIC 
 
Being so enamored with serving your country, and then being so desperately 
betrayed.       
– Paula Coughlin, former U.S. Navy Lieutenant (Winerip, 2013) 
 
On March 20, 2014, U.S. Army Brigadier General Jeffrey Sinclair reached a plea 
bargain where he pleaded guilty to adultery with one subordinate, misconduct with two 
others, and was sentenced with a reprimand and a $20,000 fine (Bowman, 2014; Collins 
& Biesecker, 2014; Memmott, 2014). Sinclair was the first general officer ever to have 
been court martialed for sexual assault, and only the third general who has faced 
prosecution. Originally charged with sexual assault, as well as death threats to the Army 
captain who accused him, Sinclair had faced the possibility of at least 20 years in prison 
and the loss of his job and military benefits. Yet this case, which was “considered exhibit 
A of the problem of sexual assault” in the military, began to unravel when there were 
questions about the victim’s credibility as well as consent (Bowman, 2014, para. 5; 
Memmott, 2014). As a result, the aforementioned plea bargain was reached in which the 
general pleaded guilty to adultery (adultery is a crime in the military) and sexual 
misconduct, but not to rape.  
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Despite issues with the accuser’s credibility, most people were still shocked by 
the mild sentence, including Sinclair’s own defense attorney, who was heard to say “wow” 
when the judge read the sentence (Bowman, 2014; Collins & Biesecker, 2014). Women’s 
groups, as well as legal experts and members of Congress publicly denounced the 
sentence as “shockingly light” (Collins & Biesecker, 2014, para. 1). In fact, 
Representative Jackie Speier called the sentence “laughable,” concluding that “even 
when the world is watching” the military revealed its incompetence in justice and 
reinforced that the system is very broken (Collins & Biesecker, 2014, para. 7–8). She 
further claimed that Sinclair’s sentence is a “mockery of military justice, a slap on the 
wrist nowhere close to being proportional to Sinclair’s offenses” (para. 8). Many others 
agreed with Speier’s sentiments, claiming that the “Army is shooting itself in the foot 
when it comes to sexual harassment” and that the “general made out like a bandit” 
(Bowman, 2014, para. 11). Still others remained skeptical about the system that appears 
to be “all about cronyism” (para. 11).  
This broken military system has come under much fire recently, primarily due to 
the release of the documentary film The Invisible War (Dick, 2012). The film revealed 
that disturbing and offensive behaviors permeate the entire military system, one of the 
most prestigious and patriotic sectors of American society. Through the use of interviews 
with servicemen and women who were sexually assaulted, as well as with military and 
government officials, TIW challenged gendered assumptions and showcased the “good ol’ 
boys” culture of the military sexual assault epidemic. The interviews revealed that the 
military’s strict organizational power hierarchy extends to situations of sexual assault, 
where the victims, who are almost always lower in rank, are often punished or ignored 
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and do not see justice realized.  
In this chapter, I examine the ways The Invisible War (TIW) rhetorically 
intervened in the epidemic of sexual assault in the military and the discourses 
surrounding both the film and the topic it addresses. Thus, this chapter is guided by the 
following questions: How have U.S. political leaders, military leaders, and the media 
rhetorically managed the revelations of sexual assault historically, as well as recently, as 
revealed by The Invisible War? In what ways have these societal entities worked to 
discursively contain the problem? Why does the problem of sexual assault continue to be 
so widespread in the military, despite the seemingly powerful rhetorical force of The 
Invisible War? In order to answer these questions, this chapter looks at discourse 
circulating around TIW, the history of military sexual assault scandals, and current 
legislative debates. Analyzing past and current public debates about sexual assault in the 
military creates a larger (con)text in which to understand the current situation. 
Comparatively analyzing these texts reveals themes in the ongoing problem and debates 
over sexual assault in the military.  
Rape is a complex and important biopolitical issue that reverts back to what 
Foucault (2003) called the time of the sovereign, which was a time of seizure—of things, 
time, and bodies. Although Foucault discussed sovereignty and biopower, he did not 
draw a solid line between the two eras, but juxtaposed them (Foucault, 1976a). Therefore, 
it would make sense to look at rape as an act of sovereignty in a time of biopower. In fact, 
Diken and Laustsen (2005) contended that the act of rape can be interpreted as an event 
where “the mark of sovereignty is stamped directly on the body” (p. 111).  This argument 
aligned with Foucault’s (1976/2003) description of the sovereign as a process in which, 
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“power . . . was essentially a right of seizure . . . it culminated in the privilege to seize 
hold of life in order to suppress it” (Foucault, 1976b, p. 136). As it will be argued 
throughout this chapter, rape is not an act of sexual desire, but one of power. 
Rape involves the seizure and violation of bodily integrity. Mbembe (2003) and 
Murray (2006) hold that the sovereign’s power is exercised through the seizure and 
suppression of life.  Rape causes “psychic, physical, reputational, relational, existential, 
economic” (Pether, 2010, p. 239) damage, and, in fact, is such a violent violation of the 
body that when used as a sovereign tool in war, the United Nations has deemed rape a 
“crime against humanity” (Depatment of Public Information, 2012, para. 8). Yet, despite 
being considered a crime against humanity in terms of international subjects, it has yet to 
receive this type of censure and punishment when domestic subjects are involved, 
especially within the U.S. military. 
In light of the biopolitical implications of rape, in this chapter I draw from TIW 
and victims’ voices and contend that in the wake of the release of TIW, various U.S. 
political and military leaders, as well as those in the media, have employed the 
historically utilized related, but distinct, rhetorical strategies of conflating sex and gender, 
victim-blaming, and red herrings in order to avoid making substantive change. These 
tactics function not only to contain the problem of sexual assault, but place the solution to 
the problem on the shoulders of the victims, which simultaneously relieves the military of 
responsibility.  
 First, many arguments about sexual assault in the military conflate sex and gender, 
which problematically situates women as innately different than and inferior to men 
based on their biology, and therefore as unsuitable to serve in the armed forces. This 
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strategy is not new. Rubin (1975) discussed what she called the “sex/gender” system, 
which she argued allowed for the discrimination of women because it regulated sexuality, 
gender, and procreation. Her main argument was that biology was being used to 
determine the social structure of society, assuming that there was no difference between 
sex and gender, and that sex determined gender, a point that Butler (1993, 2006) would 
later interrogate and oppose. Valdes (1996) argued that this conflation helped achieve 
“particular results” such as oppression of women and sexual minorities through 
manipulatory tactics that made gender seem immutable (p. 162). In fact, this 
“conflationary status quo” (Valdes, 1996, p. 211) reduces the “social to the biological” 
(Carr, 2005, p. 119) and becomes a systemized source of subordination for women and 
minorities in the “hetero-patriarchal culture” (“Notes on Conflation: Foreward,” 1995, p. 
12). In a culture with a conflationary status quo, Butler (1993) argued that the repetition 
of norms makes them seem inevitable and is a way to discipline, regulate, and punish 
bodies so that they continue to perform in ways that support the status quo. In the U.S. 
military, relying on the conflation of sex and gender serves its culture of 
hypermasculinity by highlighting the seemingly immutable characteristics that make up 
all women. 
 Second, much of the discourse surrounding military sexual assault blames the 
victims, which correspondingly situates the solutions with victim behavior instead of 
institutional change. Victim-blaming is a version of the age-old tactic of scapegoating 
(Roush, 1999). Burke (1984) explained the rhetorical strategy of scapegoating, calling it 
the “scapegoat mechanism” that was “a technique of purification” used for the “ritual 
unburdening of one’s sins” (p. 16). As he further elaborated, “the scapegoat gave 
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prominence to certain sins and suggested an appropriate homeopathic technique for 
castigating them” (p. 16). Indeed, Jasinski (2001) explained that the impetus for 
scapegoating is some sort of evil or sin, which, in the case of this chapter, is sexual 
assault in the military. For example, in the 2003 Air Force Academy scandal, it quickly 
became apparent that instead of punishing the assaulters, survivors, like Beth Davis, were 
blamed and charged with infractions such as fraternization and sex in the dorms. Sexual 
assault, as was presented in The Invisible War, is a systemic evil, which implicates an 
entire institution. By using the rhetorical strategy of victim-blaming, the victims—not the 
system—are vilified and accused of violating the social order’s ideals, such as decency 
and normalcy (Blain, 2005). In the case of sexual assault in the military, at times the 
victims’ actions violated military codes of conduct, and that became the focus instead of 
how rape is not only a felony but, at the very least, a major violation of military decency. 
Furthermore, victim-blaming plays into the age-old skepticism and cynicism that women 
lie about rape, a belief that feminists and advocates for rape victims have had to fight for 
a long time (Cuklanz & Moorti, 2006). 
 Third, through the use of diversionary arguments, or red herrings, U.S. political 
and military leaders have displaced the focus from substantive cultural change to other, 
less impactful areas, thus engaging in containment policies. As a rhetorical device, the 
red herring is a type of fallacy, or an error in reasoning, that introduces an irrelevant issue 
in order to divert attention away from the main subject being considered. Eemeren and 
Houtlosser (2009) explained that such fallacies are distractions, coining them 
“derailments of strategic maneuvering” (p. 205). Discussing the tactic of red herrings, 
Morris (2002) explained that they are a “deflection that protects a silent subject avoiding 
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exposure” (p. 241). In the case of this chapter, the deflection protects major systemic 
change, such as removing the commanders from making decisions on sexual assault cases. 
Drawing from Burke (1969, pp. 3–20), Rushing (1986) explained that deflective 
strategies like this work to contain the agency of some agents. For example, through the 
use of red herrings not only is the problem contained, but so is the victim’s agency 
because other issues not necessarily related to the victim are highlighted as more 
important and relevant. 
 The rest of this chapter is divided into four major sections. First, I give a brief 
description of The Invisible War. Second, I discuss three prominent military sex 
scandals—Tailhook, Aberdeen Proving Ground, and the Air Force Academy scandal—
for two reasons: to put the sexual assault revealed in TIW in context, as well as to display 
how many interventions in military policy and culture in the past have been ineffective at 
eradicating sexual assault. Third, I analyze how the three rhetorical strategies of 
conflating sex/gender, victim-blaming, and red herrings not only were utilized during 
past scandals, but continue to be used by military and political leaders as well as the 
media in order to rhetorically manage and contain the systemic nature of sexual assault 
revealed in TIW. Finally, I conclude by discussing recent legislative battles over military 
sexual assault policy and how my redefinition of understandings of the problem could 
lead to potential legal changes that could actually make a difference for the victims.  
 
The Invisible War 
Winning nine awards and nominated for four others, The Invisible War, directed 
by Kirby Dick, originally debuted at Sundance Film Festival in January 2012 with goals 
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of appealing to the American public and elected officials (“About: The Movie,” 2012; 
“British film continues to shine at Sundance,” 2012; “HBO Audience Awards,” 2012; 
Kilday, 2013; Lee, 2013; Lévesque, 2013, p. 50; Riskind, 2012; “The Invisible War,” n.d., 
“The Invisible War,” 2013; Waxman, 2013). The documentary brought issues of sexual 
assault in the military into the larger, more public civilian sphere, exposing the “epidemic 
of rape” in the military, including the routine sexual assaults that take place in the most 
prestigious Marine base in the U.S., the Marine Barracks Washington (Honeycutt, 2012, 
para. 3).  
The documentary featured interviews with sexual assault victims as well as with 
military officials. The entire film revolved around these interviews, which are emotional, 
heart-wrenching, and damning. To find interviewees for the film, co-producer Amy 
Ziering pre-interviewed over 100 victims of sexual assault in the military. TIW focused 
on a handful of these interviews, with quick clips from many others (Waxman, 2013). 
The individual stories functioned to concretize the material effects of sexual assault, 
while the suturing of multiple stories served to illuminate how widespread the epidemic 
is, reinforcing that it does not just impact a few individuals. Although many may have 
believed that rape victims are mostly beautiful, young—perhaps naïve—heterosexual 
women, the film featured victims who are women and men of various ages, sizes, and 
sexual orientations (Pond, 2012). This diversity works to break common stereotypes and 
complicate historical beliefs about victims of sexual assault, especially in the 
hypermasculine military.  
 For example, between interviews the film is peppered with statistics which 
explain that approximately 16,000 women and 20,000 men are assaulted each year in the 
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military (Dick, 2012; Pacatte, 2013). Although this amounts to 1% of all male troops—
compared to 20% of female troops (Jenkins, 2012)—that the number of male victims is 
actually higher than the number of female victims further points to the pervasiveness of 
the problem, and that it is not just a “women’s issue” but rather one of power and control.  
The Invisible War painted a picture of how rape in the military perpetuates power 
and violence, instead of being based in sexuality (Jenkins, 2012). Each of the stories 
carried a consistent theme of how service members were intimidated by their superiors or 
peers and forcibly assaulted. Through the telling and retelling of the same storyline, the 
film “implicitly asserts the truth that rape is not about sexual desire, but rather violence 
and domination” and power (Bealer, 2012, para. 4).  
 This culture of intimidation within the military is portrayed in the film as 
something that is widespread across the organization, and not just limited to the stresses 
and pressures that are associated with combat or particular locations (Jenkins, 2012). 
Despite being about power, violence, and domination, the film also revealed stubborn 
gender politics in the military. As Myla Haider, a former Army sergeant who worked in 
the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), explained in the documentary, if a sexual 
assault case came to CID, they would never let a woman take the case, for fear that she 
might sympathize too much with the (female) victim. Ironically, no one considered how 
males might sympathize with alleged male assaulters, reinforcing the long-held belief in 
men as neutral, objective, and rational and women as emotional (W. Brown, 1987; de 
Beauvoire, 1989a; Irigaray, 2000). 
In the film, almost all of the women interviewed claim that they joined the 
military out of idealism and the desire to serve their country (Pacatte, 2013, para. 12). Yet 
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the stories they share in the documentary are far from ideal, as they recount their horrific 
experiences of sexual assault by their own colleagues. For example, the primary story 
threaded throughout the entire film is that of Coast Guard veteran Kori Cioca. When she 
was a little girl, Cioca saw movies about the military and knew that was the career she 
wanted one day (Dick, 2012). Little did she know that following that dream would land 
her with a broken jaw from a violent rape by her commander. To make a traumatic 
situation even worse, the film depicted her “Kafka-esque battle with the VA for approval 
of desperately needed surgery, which it continues to deny” because her service in the 
Coast Guard was 2 months shy of qualifying her for benefits (Honeycutt, 2012, para. 9). 
The description of Cioca’s situation as “Kafkaesque” is appropriate, as it draws on Czech 
novelist Franz Kafka’s work about pussling and nightmarish situations where the 
protagonists struggled endlessly to no avail. Cioca’s situation quickly turned into a 
nightmare in which no one could or would help her, and no doctors or officials seemingly 
listened, as one time she was given orders to have her back x-rayed though her jaw was 
injured. 
 Juxtaposed to the traumatic interviews with sexual assault victims were interviews 
with military and government officials. Compared to the emotional, appalling, and 
unbelievable accounts told by service members, the officials appear to be matter-of-fact, 
naïve, or dishonest. Honeycutt (2012) aptly stated that the military interviews just added 
“more nails in the coffin” (para. 11). The interviews with the high-ranking military 
officers and members of Congress “reveal the perfect storm conditions that exist for rape 
in the military, its history of cover-up, and what can be done to bring about much needed 
change” instead of showing that proper steps were being taken to address the situation 
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(“The Invisible War,” 2012, para. 1).  
 The film asserted that most problematic is that the commanders continue to decide 
what steps are taken in sexual assault investigations—they have what is called disposition 
authority—yet they are not legally trained and often do not have higher education 
(Pacatte, 2013). Oftentimes the commanding officers are drinking buddies with the 
accused, making it even more complicated. The answer, the film and the interviewees 
argue, is to move the investigation outside of the chain of command altogether. This 
belief is so strong that the release of the film coincided with a class-action lawsuit that 
was filed by 25 women and three men to fix the process of prosecuting offenders in the 
military, claiming “failure of the U.S. Secretaries of Defense to uphold the Constitutional 
right to be protected by the law” (Lévesque, 2013, p. 48).  
 In addition to the interviews with seemingly clueless military higher-ups and 
members of Congress—who discussed canned responses about the superficial attempts 
being made to fix the massive problem of sexual assault in the military—the film 
revealed damning statistics about how little is being done to actually punish perpetrators. 
Most assailants are not punished, so they are not listed in any criminal databases and are 
known to reoffend. For example, in fiscal year 2010 (abbreviated FY2010, which was 
October 1, 2009–September 30, 2010), it was estimated that only 13.5% (about 2,600) of 
the 19,000 rapes were reported, and that only 245 of those reported cases resulted in 
convictions (Schager, 2012, pp. 97, 76). Furthermore, Pond (2012) explained that in 
FY2011 less than half of sexual assaults that were reported were referred for disciplinary 
action, and that “only 191 perpetrators—less than six percent of those accused—were 
convicted or court-martialed” (para. 8). This means that the percentage of convictions 
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actually dropped by 3%. These numbers are problematic and point to a larger systemic 
issue related to hypermasculinity and power. Many survivors have either seen other 
survivors punished for reporting and/or will not report because their assaulter was their 
commander or one of their commander’s friends (Dick, 2012; Protect Our Defenders). 
 Indeed, one of the most troubling aspects of these statistics revolves around 
convictions. As Ellison (2012) explained, only 2% of all reported sexual assaults in the 
military result in a conviction. And, to be clear, these convictions include “being 
convicted not [italics added] of rape, but of other things, like indecent language and 
adultery” (Ellison, 2012, para. 10). Therefore, if a person is charged with rape and 
convicted, that person may not end up being convicted of rape, but rather adultery or 
some other lesser charge (like the discussion of General Sinclair in the introduction of 
this chapter). Furthermore, once charged assaulters are out of the military, they have no 
criminal record, and return to America’s neighborhoods, a “horrifying situation” (Pacatte, 
2013, para. 6). Unless the rapists and assailants are given more than 1 year’s punishment 
for a crime, they are not tracked, and likely not held accountable (Pacatte, 2013).  
Ultimately, what the film revealed in troubling fashion was “the way misogyny 
and sexual violence have become institutionalized into military culture” (Bealer, 2012, 
para. 5). And, given the interviews by not only the victims, but also high-ranking military 
members and members of Congress, at the time of the film there were no substantial steps 
being taken to change this military culture. The Invisible War was an attempt to intervene 
and help victims so that their stories would no longer be about women and men who 
risked their lives for an organization and a country that would not defend them (Ellison, 
2012).  
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For example, two of the interviewees in the film are a father and daughter, 
Sergeant Major Jerry Sewell and Hannah Sewell. Hannah went into the military because 
both her father and her brother had served. When she left to serve, her father told her 
“You are going to be taken care of” (Dick, 2012). In TIW Jerry shared that saying those 
words is one of the hardest things he has to accept about the situation because shortly 
after Hannah joined, she was violently raped by a classmate. To make matters worse, 
Hannah’s case went through three investigations in 18 months, and no one was ever 
convicted. Both of the Sewells explained that the military did not genuinely attempt to 
investigate the situation, but rather gave lip service. 
One of the boldest aspects of the film was that it tackled a major problem in the 
military as it was still happening. Instead of retrospectively reflecting on issues in the 
past, the film dove into a messy and controversial ongoing situation with one of the most 
influential and powerful institutions in American culture. This was a risky move. It is one 
thing to look back at issues in the past, “but it’s quite another for a film to be caught up in 
an unfolding policy debate, helping to drive it forward—and also becoming part of the 
solution” (Rosenberg, 2013, para. 6). As Kirby Dick, the director of the film, explained, 
his goal was to get the military to take on the epidemic of sexual assault “with the force 
they use to fight a war” (Pond, 2012, para. 24).  
The goal to influence policy was initially quite promising. In fact, Pond (2012) 
explained that before the film debuted, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced 
changes in military policies and how rapes were reported, partially crediting the film as 
impetus. The policies that he made in April 2012 moved decisions to investigate sexual 
assaults to higher levels so that those closely associated with the accused attackers would 
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not be decision-makers, a major emphasis in the film. Director Kirby Dick said that the 
film put the issue of sexual assault on the map, becoming “a reference point for the 
military, the government and the public” because victims’ voices were heard, and the 
story was made more complete and concrete, instead of existing as abstract statistics 
(Waxman, 2013, para. 4). For example, Cioca experienced a tremendous outpouring of 
support from audiences who saw the film and were outraged by her jaw injury and lack of 
support to fix it. In response, many sent money to help pay to get her jaw fixed, 7 years 
after she was injured (Cioca, 2012).  
Yet, others voiced skepticism about the claims made in TIW, believing that the 
film lacked credibility and was very one-sided in its presentation of the stories and facts 
(Cave, 2012; Sullivan, 2012a, 2012b). Spilman (2014) even went as far as to call the TIW 
a “propaganda film” endorsed by Congress (para. 3). Supporting this claim, Sullivan 
(2013) explained that the reason TIW can be viewed as propaganda is because it involves 
the “politicization of the military’s response to sexual assault” (para. 3). Indeed, Cave 
(2012) disagreed with the classification of TIW as a “non-fiction film” because he, too, 
believed the film was highly politicized and therefore biased, instead of presenting 
neutral facts (para. 8). What these critics, and others like them, found fault with was what 
they viewed as the film’s lack of balance because it revolved around the stories of abused 
service members and implicitly assumed—and wanted the audience to assume—their 
stories were true. Instead, Sullivan explained that while, “no one can seriously doubt that 
[sexual assault] is a real problem,” the film needed a more balanced approach. As he 
argued, even Cioca’s story, which was moving and heart-wrenching, likely has another 
side to it that the audience is not given (Sullivan, 2012a). He further explained, “A 
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balanced approach would have at least discussed the evidence that led the military judge 
to acquit 1stLt Kaye’s [sic] alleged rapist. Yet that perspective appeared nowhere in the 
film” (Sullivan, 2013, para. 5). However, despite criticisms of the film, even critics like 
Sullivan admit that it has been “effective propaganda” (para. 7). 
 
Military Sexual Assault Histories 
Rape of female soldiers in the military is not a new problem. Indeed, rape and 
military/war have historically been associated, and rape of servicewomen by servicemen 
has been problematic likely since the integration of women into the military, which was 
officially in 1948 with the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act (although women 
had been serving in auxiliary and undercover roles before then). In fact, psychologist Dr. 
Mic Hunter explained that intramilitary sexual assault has been going on “forever” and 
that “we have records of it in the Civil War” (Botti, 2007, para. 2). Benedict (2007) also 
argued that rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment were a “serious problem for the 
Women’s Army Corps in Vietnam” (Benedict, 2007, para. 16). Furthermore, in an 
analysis of media portrayals of rape in military culture, Jeffords (1991) discussed 
statistics from 1978, where nearly 44% of women expressed concern about entering 
combat for fear of “possible sexual abuse by their own troops” (p. 105). Jeffords further 
cited statistics from 1982 that reported women were twice as likely to be raped in the 
military than in civilian life, and that in 1988 over 64% of female troops reported 
experiences of attempted or actual rape (p. 105). Yet, despite the high prevalence of 
intramilitary rape, it has only recently been given significant attention.  
Since World War II it has been documented that “occupation armies have a higher 
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incidence of sexual assault than do active invading armies” (Botti, 2007, para. 5). Rape is 
a gendered topic and this has strongly influenced how the hypermasculine organization 
that is the U.S. military has handled the problem internally. The following section will 
walk through three of the more recent sex scandals in the U.S. military and the rhetorical 
contexts in which these scandals occurred. Although not a comprehensive overview of 
the history of military sexual assault, this section will examine the three highest profile 
scandals over the past quarter century that initially brought public attention to the grave 
internal affairs of the U.S. military system: the Navy and Marine Corps Tailhook 
Convention, the Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, and the Air Force Academy scandals. 
The reason these scandals and a bit of the history is necessary for this chapter is twofold: 
first, to give more context to TIW and show that sexual assault in the military is a deep-
seated, ongoing, systemic problem that exists across all branches of the military and 
second, to exemplify how, despite making some internal changes in military policy and 
culture in response to the scandals, these changes have been ineffective at eradicating the 
epidemic of sexual assault in the military. In the following sections, I will give a brief 
overview of each of the scandals and discuss how each reflects problems rooted in 
hypermasculinity, biology, and/or biopolitics.  
 
Trouble at Tailhook 
In September of 1991, what came to be known as the worst sexual harassment 
case in the Navy’s history occurred at the annual Tailhook Convention in Las Vegas 
(Winerip, 2013). This scandal put a spotlight on some of the ways the hypermasculine 
military was using biology—both men’s and women’s—as a means to define difference 
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and power. The witnesses and investigative report explained that during the 3 days of the 
convention, Navy and Marine aviators congregated on the third floor of the convention 
hotel—which reeked of beer, urine, and vomit—exposing their genitals and preparing for 
the traditional “gauntlet” (Kempster, 1993; Winerip, 2013). This tradition involved 
servicemen lining both sides of the hallway and using the aircraft carrier flight operation 
terms “clear deck” and “wave off” to indicate whether approaching women were 
“attractive enough to molest” (Kempster, 1993, para. 16). If the scout at the beginning of 
the hallway found an approaching woman attractive, he would yell, “clear deck” and all 
the men would close in on her, pulling at her clothing, and groping her breasts, buttocks, 
and legs. Kempster (1993) explained that it was at this point that “the military’s cult of 
the ‘young warrior’ moved beyond coarse, fraternity-style hi-jinks to public indecency 
and alleged assaults” (para. 3). Through these instances the stark discrimination and 
maltreatment of women in the military became evident. As was discussed in the 
introductory chapter, research has found that organizations with large power differentials, 
such as the U.S. military, are more prone to problems with sexual assault, violence, and 
acts of sexual aggression (Ilies, et al., 2003; Turchick, 2010). 
 Therefore, it should not have been surprising that in addition to the gauntlet, it 
was reported that within the “hospitality suites” there was much pornography and 
consensual sex between military personnel and strippers and prostitutes. By the end of the 
convention, dozens of women, including Naval officers, were assaulted at the convention 
hotel. This atmosphere of sexual indecency and harassment had become part of the 
tradition of the Tailhook convention that dated back to 1956. As Kempster (1993) 
explained, what happened at the 1991 convention was “far from unprecedented,” and in 
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fact, many officers had come to believe that type of behavior was acceptable at Tailhook 
because it was part of the convention’s culture (para. 4). However, one officer, Paula 
Coughlin did not accept the behavior and decided to report the incidents after being 
assaulted in the gauntlet. What Coughlin and others soon discovered, however, was that 
the hypermasculine culture in the Navy ran deep, to the point that Naval investigators 
protected those involved.     
Because the Navy’s report did not come to any significant conclusions or 
punishments for servicemen involved—no one would talk in order to protect themselves 
and their comrades (Winerip, 2013)—Coughlin brought the case to the media, which 
prompted an investigation by the Pentagon. In the Pentagon’s report, more than 100 top 
gun officers and pilots were accused of conduct unbecoming to officers and gentlemen 
for their participation in sexual harassment of female military members and civilians 
(Kempster, 1993; Winerip, 2013). Promotions were frozen during the investigation. The 
Pentagon report, which was more detailed and sensational than the Navy’s initial report, 
revealed the hypermasculine atmosphere and the attitudes that led to the Tailhook scandal, 
despite claims by some Navy higher ups that the report was inaccurate and flawed (Healy, 
1992). 
In response to the Pentagon’s investigation, the Navy made institutional changes. 
It started gender sensitivity training, closed officer drinking clubs, and looked in to 
whether or not women should be allowed to serve in combat aboard ships and on planes 
(Winerip, 2013). Additionally, Admiral Kelso, who took over efforts to end sexual 
harassment by officers and sailors, stated that longstanding practices such as “painting 
suggestive names and pictures on aircraft, and . . . using terms like ‘sweetie’ in 
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addressing female air traffic controllers” would no longer be allowed (Schmitt, 1992, 
para. 4). The goal was to make the Navy’s existing “zero tolerance” policy for sexual 
harassment less of a paper policy.  
The Tailhook scandal made a problem that was contained within military—the 
culturally accepted assault of women during the convention—a visible problem. 
Increasing the visibility meant that important changes were made. However, even if an 
organization makes rules and policies to discipline and regulate such behaviors, they are 
only “as effective as the culture that supports them” (Katzenstein & Reppy, 1999, p. 3). 
For example, in the aftermath of Tailhook, former Secretary of the Navy, James Webb 
(1996), argued that Tailhook was not about the larger context of the convention, but 
rather about the misconduct of a few drunken soldiers. Comments like Webb’s worked to 
contain the problem of sexual assault and attempted to make only a small aspect of the 
problem visible (sexual assault did happen, but only in the cases of a few soldiers) while 
keeping the larger issue invisible (it is actually a larger systemic problem that permeated 
the Navy culture). Additionally, statements like Webb’s only further supported the 
argument that the continued problem of sexual assault in the military may be evidence of 
a culture that makes policies but does not necessarily take them seriously.  
 
Abuse at Aberdeen Proving Ground 
Five years later, an Army scandal showcased another branch’s deep-seated 
hypermasculine culture and its biopolitical implications. On November 8, 1996, three 
Army training officers were charged with raping or sexually harassing 17 female 
soldiers—whose average age was 21—during training at Aberdeen Proving Ground 
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(APG), an Army base in Maryland (Washintonpost.com Staff, 1997). This scandal 
revealed that the issue of sexual assault in the military was not limited to just the Navy, 
but existed in other branches, as well. The problem was once again one of power 
differentials based on biology—male superiors assaulting female subordinates. It also 
exemplified that other branches either did not implement the same policy changes as the 
Navy after the Tailhook incident, or had policies that were ineffective, similar to how the 
Navy’s “zero tolerance” policy had been more of a paper policy before Tailhook. 
The initial three male trainers accused in the APG scandal had been charged with 
rape, abuse, and harassment of female soldiers under their supervision, and “the Army 
soon found itself in the middle of a scandal exposing rampant sex and abuse of authority 
among male drill sergeants and the female soldiers whose lives they virtually controlled” 
(Spinner, 1997, para. 2). The abuse of power was overwhelmingly evident. Quickly 
accusations against other soldiers followed, and after the initial investigation began, the 
scandal ended up involving 30 trainee women who “filed complaints of sexual advances 
ranging from unwanted touching to rape and forcible sodomy” (Dick, 2012). It became 
the “Army’s biggest sex abuse scandal on record” (“Three soldiers arraigned in U.S. 
Army sex scandal: Judge bars prospective jurors from following case,” 1996, para. 2). 
The scandal became much more complicated as the investigation continued, involving 
many more soldiers than it initially did, more bases than just APG, and issues of power, 
fraternization, and the legal definition of rape. In other words, the scandal exposed that 
sexual assault was a systemic, not an individual, problem, similar to the discoveries with 
Tailhook. 
 The original three officers accused were Captain Derrick Robertson and Sergeants 
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Delmar Simpson and Nathanael Beech. As the investigation continued, six drill sergeants 
were found to be acting in concert, despite earlier claims to the contrary (Clines, 1997; 
“Three soldiers arraigned in U.S. Army sex scandal: Judge bars prospective jurors from 
following case,” 1996). It was discovered that a ring of trainers at APG had a so-called 
“game” of sexual conquest where they circulated lists of women on base with whom they 
had had sex, assaulted, and/or raped so that other officers could do the same (Dick, 2012; 
Spinner, 1997; Wilson & Bowman, 1997).  
 In the end, one company commander and three drill sergeants went to prison, and 
the other eight defendants were either administratively punished or discharged (Spinner, 
1997; Wilson & Bowman, 1997). Many of the rape charges were changed to charges of 
adultery or sodomy without explanation, which lessened the punishment and acted to 
contain the problem by making it appear to be more benign than was originally suspected 
(Clines, 1997). This type of military action would be one of the main military justice 
system issues illuminated in TIW, such as when Ariana Klay’s assaulter was not charged 
with rape, but rather with adultery and indecent language (Dick, 2012). 
 The APG scandal prompted a “militarywide [sic] search for sexual misconduct in 
the ranks” (Wilson & Bowman, 1997, para. 10) and gave “new visibility to issues 
emerging from the gender integration of the military” (Holman, 1997, para. 6). Two years 
prior, in 1994, the Army integrated women into basic training groups with men, instead 
of being trained in all-female units, so, for the first time their drill sergeants were men 
(Holman, 1997). The argument was that if men and women were expected to serve 
together, they should train together, as well. Yet, in an effort to contain the problem 
revealed by the APG scandal, the integration of women was blamed, implying that the 
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way to eradicate sexual assault would be to once again segregate the sexes for training. In 
these arguments, women and their bodies were being blamed for the larger systemic 
problems related to the hypermasculine culture of the military and its tolerance for the 
maltreatment of women. Instead of looking at the system, women’s social and biological 
differences were blamed as the main impetus. Without directly saying it, female soldiers 
were implicitly blamed for the APG scandal.  
 Yet not everyone believed the integration of women was the problem. Instead, it 
was argued that the presence of women unearthed larger issues of hierarchy and power in 
the Army, which manifested in the form of sexual assault at APG. Although many people 
viewed the events at APG as sexual in nature, many others believed they were related to 
abuse of power. As Holman (1997) explained, “in the chain of command the drill 
sergeant is the recruit’s symbol of discipline, with almost unquestioned authority” (para. 
7). It was believed that the abuse of this authority led to the multiple cases of sexual 
harassment, abuse, and rape that were reported.  
 The issue of power abuse played a significant role in the understanding of the 
definition of rape and its biopolitical consequences. Often revolving around the concept 
of consent, the idea of consensual sex between subordinates and superiors in the military 
is an oxymoron since subordinates are required to follow their superiors’ orders (Holman, 
1997). Whereas in the civilian sphere, rape is often correlated with coercion in the form 
of brutality or physical force, the APG trials had a different understanding of rape. The 
trials focused on the phrase, “constructive force,” which refers to the power relationship 
between a commander and his subordinates. In the military, a commander is the boss, and 
the subordinates should be afraid to do anything other than what the commander asks. 
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The power relationship was all that was needed—not violence or the force of weapons—
to make the female subordinates have sex with senior officers (Holman, 1997).  
Indeed, Miller (2007) argued that rape is a biopolitical issue, with a particular 
focus on consent. As she explained, “rape is a crime not because there is an absence of 
consent, but because sex is an assault on politically defined biological boundaries” 
(Miller, 2007, p. 114). She asserted that both consent and lack of consent simultaneously 
invoke a violation of bodily integrity since consenting “effectively transfers sovereign 
power—transfers the sovereign’s unique ability to waive a citizen’s rights—to his or her 
sexual or reproductive partner” (Miller, 2007, p. 8). She further averred that,  
The only choice on the part of individuals engaging in sexual activity has 
therefore become a criminal one: 1) an individual can violate another individual’s 
right to bodily integrity without his or her consent and thereby commit the 
traditional liberal crime that is rape, or 2) an individual can violate another 
individual’s right to bodily integrity with his or her consent, usurp the sovereign 
prerogative, and thus commit a biopolitical act of treason. (Miller, 2007, p. 8) 
 
In these cases, Miller explained that even if a woman consents, it can be considered rape, 
because consent is not and should not be the only way to determine if rape occurred. This 
is especially valid in the military, where victims might consent out of fear of disobeying 
their superiors who are their assaulters. Oftentimes the offenders are commanding 
officers, which makes a situation where a victim has to report such incidents to 
commanding officers very problematic. It also calls into question the issue of consent, 
since commanders often claim that the sexual intercourse was consensual, but victims’ 
advocates argue that sexual contact between a senior commander (who has absolute 
authority and power) and a subordinate can never be consensual (MacPherson, 2014). As 
such, rape still “undermines an individual’s (biopolitical) dignity,” and is in many ways 
analogous to torture because “regardless of consent it is a crime against bodily integrity, 
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autonomy, and therefore humanity” (Miller, 2007, p. 113).  
As a result of this definitional battle came the need to understand the legal 
definition of rape and if resistance and/or actual physical force is what constituted rape. 
Ultimately the jury in the APG trials sided with those arguing for constructive force. 
Although the Army’s definition of constructive force made it appear that the Army’s 
organizational culture was changing and displayed the military’s awareness that rape is 
more about power than about sex, TIW revealed in 2012 that these changes were not 
enough to change the culture and, in fact, the Army was not much safer for women and 
victims of sexual assault.  
 
Assault at the Air Force Academy 
 In addition to the scandals in the active duty branches, military academies 
suffered from rampant sexual assault, as well. In January 2003, an email was sent under 
the pseudonym Renee Trindle and asserted that the AFA had a significant sexual assault 
problem that was being ignored by the AFA’s leadership (Polk, 2004). Immediately 
following the email, according to then-USAF Inspector General Lieutenant General 
Steven R. Polk, an investigation by the Air Force was put in place. As the investigation 
was underway, what started as a handful of female cadets quickly turned into many more 
stories by women who were assaulted but had been afraid to come forward for fear that 
they would either not be taken seriously, or they would be targets of victim-blaming, 
“punished for minor transgressions of academy rules” (Bingham, 2003, para. 4). By 
September 2003, 61 AFA women had told Colorado Senator Wayne Allard’s office that 
they had either been raped or assaulted, and the Pentagon launched three investigations 
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under the close scrutiny of Congress. Bingham (2003) commented that, “As revelations 
mushroomed, the Air Force Academy's problems began to make Tailhook . . . look like a 
case of mere high jinks” (para. 4).  
However, despite the large number of women coming forward and the continual 
revelations about military culture, the Air Force’s investigation came to rather mild 
conclusions, apparently attempting to keep the problem out of the public’s eye (similar to 
what happened with the Navy’s initial investigation of Tailhook). After looking at 1000 
pages of reports, Polk claimed that the investigation revealed no “intentional mishandling 
or willful neglect on the part of any Academy official in their actions to address the issues 
of sexual assault in these cases” (Polk, 2004, p. 17). Furthermore, they had found 56 
formal cases of sexual assault (which included rape, indecent assault, assault with intent 
to commit rape or sodomy, carnal knowledge, indecent acts or liberties with a child) that 
were promptly investigated (Polk, 2004; Shanker, 2004). Like the policies that were put 
in place after Tailhook and APG, this investigation gave the impression that the military 
was doing a thorough internal investigation. 
 This report stood in stark contrast to what a civilian commission investigation, led 
by former Florida congresswoman, Tillie Fowler, found. In their report, Fowler and her 
team discovered that sexual assault had been an issue at the AFA for over a decade, and 
likely since women were first admitted in 1976 (Schemo, 2003b; Shanker, 2004). 
Furthermore, a survey by the DoD inspector general found that nearly 12% of women in 
the graduating class of 2003 at the AFA were victims of rape or attempted rape during 
their 4 years at the academy (Schemo, 2003a). 
 What soon became evident was that much of the problem could be attributed to 
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the hypermasculine military culture  and the power dynamics of the hierarchal 
orgniazation of classes at the AFA, and not to a few misbehaved airmen. Bingham (2003) 
reported that interviews with both current and former cadets revealed “an institutional 
culture steeped in hostility toward women” and one that was made even more dangerous 
due to the “sometimes brutal hazing of new cadets” (para. 7). At the AFA, where women 
compose approximately 16% of the AFA’s cadet wing (student body), upperclassmen 
would use the power they had over the first year students, called “doolies,” who were too 
afraid to question their superiors. Using this to their advantage, many upperclassmen 
would order female doolies to perform sexual favors, threatening to spread rumors or 
report infractions to authorities if the women would not cooperate. The abuse of power 
was a major factor in the sexual assaults, where rapists often consisted of upperclassmen, 
but also included a priest who was an academy counselor, as well as a counselor who 
worked for the sexual assault hot line (Martin, 2003). Again, like the APG case, power, 
not sex, was revealed to be a major issue.  
 This aggressive and hypermasculine culture, in combination with fact that women 
composed a small minority of the student body, fostered “a startlingly high rate of 
resentment and harassment of female candidates,” which created a “negative gender 
climate” (Bingham, 2003, para. 49). Additionally, the Fowler panel discovered that “on 
average one in five male cadets believes women do not belong at the academy” (Bingham, 
2003, para. 50). This is made even more interesting by the fact that young men being 
surveyed had no memory of the AFA without women—since they were born after 1976, 
when women were first allowed into the academy—yet they still thought it should be that 
way, displaying how ingrained the culture was.  
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 This hostility may have been surprising to some, given that 99.7% of all Air Force 
jobs were open to women in 2003, higher than both the Army and the Navy, and the Air 
Force was considered the most family- and woman-friendly military branch (Bingham, 
2003). However, greater opportunities for women might have been the very reason so 
many women faced backlash as cadets at the AFA, since the men may have felt 
threatened by women who could very likely compete for the same jobs.   
 The biggest problem with this backlash is that it went unchecked for so long. The 
failure of successive administrations at the AFA to take seriously the severity of the 
problem of sexual assault resulted in either inaction or victim-blaming and fostered an 
atmosphere where rape, harassment, and mistreatment and abuse of women flourished 
(Bingham, 2003; Schemo, 2003b; Shanker, 2004). This lack of response sent the message 
to the male cadets that they would not be punished (C. B. Thomas, 2003). It also 
encouraged female upperclassmen to advise the first year cadets not to report rape 
because it could get them kicked out.  
 Ultimately, these allegations caused many to question whether the military was 
actually able to produce a new culture and a new system that punished the perpetrators in 
response to the Tailhook scandal, the Aberdeen scandal, or the AFA’s 1993 program that 
included a rape-crisis hotline (C. B. Thomas, 2003). The charges called into question who 
would be held accountable for the massive problem, and if the system could change. In 
response to Fowler’s report, there were leadership and systemic changes. The Air Force 
removed the top four officials at the AFA, which included AFA superintendent, General 
John R. Dallger, his second-in-command, Brigadier General S. “Taco” Gilbert III, vice 
commandant Colonel Robert D. Eskridge, and the commandant of cadet training, Colonel 
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Laurie S. Slavec (Martin, 2003, para. 1).  
Systemically, there were a few changes made as well. First, sexual assault victims 
could report to specified counselors and receive medical treatment from a team that 
included medical professionals, victims’ advocates, and chaplains, whereas before they 
could only seek help from chaplains (Shanker, 2005). Additionally, victims could report 
without an official inquiry immediately starting. Officials hoped that this would increase 
reporting since many victims were not ready to be questioned and part of an investigation 
within hours of their assault. Also, when Brigadier General Johnny Weida took over as 
acting superintendent of the AFA, he altered the four-class system, so that first-year 
students would only be doolies until Thanksgiving, limiting the time of complete control 
and intimidation by upperclassmen (Bingham, 2003). Furthermore, in the fall of 2003, 
Air Force Secretary James Roche and Air Force chief of staff, General John P. Jumper 
sent letters to the families of the 218 women who had been admitted to the AFA, 
“assuring them that special measures will be taken to insure their daughters’ safety” 
(Martin, 2003, para. 8).  
In other areas it was reported that a “military-wide overhaul” had taken place in 
the form of establishing the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) 
and noting that reports of sexual assault increased by 40% (“Postscript: Code of 
Dishonor,” 2006). Ultimately, the Air Force vice chief of staff, General T. Michael 
Moseley, asserted that “true culture[al] change takes time” (Shanker, 2004, para. 15), 
which is true. However, if the institution is not completely supportive of the culture 
changes, and instead uses containment strategies, nothing will change, no matter how 
much time unfolds. 
 57 
Military Sexual Assault Since 2003 
 Despite each of these high-profile instances ending with promises of culture 
change and implementation of new policies, in 2007 sexual assault in the military was 
once again in the spotlight. An article by Helen Benedict called, “The Private War of 
Women Soldiers,” was featured in Salon in March and would serve as the main impetus 
for making The Invisible War (Brooks, 2012). Her article highlighted the continuing 
hostile environment for servicewomen. This may have come as a surprise to many who 
assumed all of the policy changes in reactions to the scandals would have curbed this 
type of environment. Benedict interviewed female veterans on the topic of sexual assault 
in the military. The interviews revealed that the culture of sexual assault was still 
proliferating in the military, and servicewomen were no safer than they were in years past. 
She interviewed female veterans of the Iraq War and found that every one of them said 
“the danger of rape by other soldiers is so widely recognized in Iraq that their officers 
routinely told them not to go to the latrines or showers without another woman for 
protection” (Benedict, 2007, para. 3). In Kuwait one of the camps was called “generator 
city” because the generators at the camp made it so loud that a woman could not be heard 
screaming for help. Women soldiers were more at risk than their male counterparts just 
because of their biology. Although arguments against women in combat often appeal to 
the rationale that female soldiers, because of their biology, will be more likely to be raped 
by the enemy, the reality is that their biology is seen as inferior within the U.S. military 
as well (Jeffords, 1991). And this was at a base where the soldiers were supposed to be 
safe.  
 Other servicewomen reported that they carried knives with them at all times, not 
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for fear of the enemy, but for fear of their comrades. And, it was reported by Colonel 
Janis Karpinski (the same person who was disciplined and demoted after the offenses at 
Abu Ghraib under her command) that in 2003, three female soldiers died from 
dehydration in Iraq, where the temperature can reach 126 degrees Fahrenheit, because 
they refused to drink any liquids in the latter part of the day for fear that they would have 
to then walk to the unlit latrines in the dark where there was a threat of rape by male 
soldiers. Despite Karpinski’s claims, the deaths were reported as “non-hostile fatalities 
with no further explanation,” (Benedict, 2007, para. 9) providing yet another example of 
the hypermasculine military culture’s attempt to cover up major issues of sexual assault 
and the ramifications. As will be discussed in the following chapter in terms of self-
performed abortions, this is not the only instance in which failed policies resulted in the 
deaths of female soldiers. 
 Benedict’s article also highlighted that the military was waiving criminal records 
so that the troop numbers would be sufficient. In fact, she reported that for more than one 
in 10 Army recruits, a criminal record was waived, which contributed to an even more 
dangerous environment for women.1 With more women serving in the military than ever 
before, many taking similar risks to men, the feeling in 2007 was still that being a woman 
                                                
1 Waivers are generally approved at the Pentagon, and allow recruiters to sign up 
potential service members “who would otherwise would be ineligible for service because 
of legal convictions, medical problems or other reasons preventing them from meeting 
minimum standards” (Benjamin, 2006, para. 6). In 2005, Salon discovered, through the 
Freedom of Information Act, that more than 17% of all Army recruits in 2005 were on 
waivers, likely due to the Army missing its recruiting goal that year by its largest shortfall 
since 1979. What was most troubling was that the Army apparently liberally used “moral 
waivers,” which officially were supposed to be for minor infractions such as traffic 
tickets or littering, but the documents obtained by Salon revealed that many of the 
offenses were much more serious, including drunk driving and domestic abuse (para. 6).  
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in the military felt like “sending three women to live in a frat house” (Benedict, 2007, 
para. 15). What was worse, despite the steps that were taken after Tailhook, Aberdeen, 
and the Air Force Academy—which were supposed to have military-wide effects—the 
climate was still so hostile to whistle-blowers that women who reported rape were 
viewed “as incapable traitors” (Benedict, 2007, para. 23). Therefore, Benedict argued that 
despite a shiny new Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) website 
that discussed sexual assault and numbers to call for help, very little had changed. For 
example, although women were promised they could remain anonymous when they 
reported, the only way for their assaulter to be prosecuted was if they ceased their 
anonymity, which carried great fear for many servicewomen and also negated the 
purpose of anonymity (Benedict, 2007). 
 Furthermore, the traditional understanding that reporting assault is betraying 
fellow soldiers still prevailed (although no one apparently was viewing assaulting fellow 
soldiers as betrayal). In the end, what many women discovered or already knew was that 
it boiled down to he said–she said, and the one who usually found an advocate was the 
assaulter. So, in the end, the understanding was that if a woman reported, she would be 
punished and the assailant would go free. Many women did not think reporting was worth 
the risk. The scandals and Benedict’s interviews revealed consistent themes of cover-ups, 
power abuse, and a hostile culture of hypermasculinity that continued to flourish despite 





Rhetorically Containing Sexual Assault 
The above scandals help create a larger context for understanding The Invisible 
War and reactions to it. In this chapter, I contend that in the wake of the release of TIW, 
various U.S. political and military leaders and those in the media have employed the 
historically utilized related, but distinct, rhetorical strategies of conflating sex and gender, 
victim-blaming, and red herrings in order to contain the problem of sexual assault in the 
military. In the following analysis, I use the film The Invisible War as my main text, and 
then create larger (con)texts by examining the rhetorical strategies that the media, 
politicians, and military members utilized to manage public understandings of the 
military sexual assault epidemic in the wake of the film’s release. Similar to Shugart 
(2011), I employed a thematic analysis that allowed me to identify these three common 
rhetorical strategies that occurred across the various public discursive “fragments.”  
 
Conflating Sex and Gender 
Many arguments about sexual assault in the military made by political leaders, 
military leaders, and the media conflate sex and gender, which implicitly assumes gender 
is immutable and subordinates women as naturally different than and inferior to men, 
making them unsuitable for service in the armed forces. This strategy draws on “the body 
as the site of difference” and works as an explanation for why sexual assault is so 
prevalent (Jeffords, 1991, p. 109). It also calls for segregation in the military in order to 
eradicate sexual assault. This tactic may also be referred to as essentializing because it is 
used to argue that because women are essentially different than men, rape is a risk women 
take as it is “incident of service” (Jeffords, 1991, p. 106). A common belief is that 
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women’s biology makes them more likely to be raped by the enemy. However, the 
multiple military sex scandals discussed in the previous section and TIW revealed that the 
enemy is not always out on the battlefield, but rather on the ship, in the mess hall, and 
walking in formation next to potential victims. In this section, I will explore these various 
conflationary discourses surrounding sexual assault in the military, beginning with an 
example from Tailhook and ending with more recent examples in light of TIW.  
For example, in the fallout from the Tailhook scandal, conflationary comments 
were used as a way to excuse the behavior at the conference. Rear Admiral Duvall M. 
Williams, Jr. was one of the military personnel who was in charge of the Navy’s internal 
investigation of the events and was a prime example of utilizing this rhetorical strategy in 
order to keep the problem as contained, and therefore as invisible, as possible. Barbara 
Pope, who was the assistant secretary of the Navy at the time, explained that the top Navy 
officials did not take the events at Tailhook seriously, instead believing it was just a case 
of misbehavior, not assault (Winerip, 2013). As she recalled, 7 months after the 
convention, 1,500 men had been questioned, but only two were associated with assault 
because none of the officers would talk. When Pope doubted the results and asked 
Williams about them, he explained that they were accurate because some of the women 
brought it on themselves. He further explained that men and women could not work 
together because when they do, it always comes down to sex (Winerip, 2013). Williams’ 
response assumed the conflation of men/male and women/female and the supposed innate 
sexuality and sexual attraction associated with each group in the binary. This binary is 
founded in the hypermasculinity of the military culture, which assumes that, as General 
Barrow, a commandant of the U.S. Marines stated, “war is man’s work” and that keeping 
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women out of combat protects the “manliness of war” (as quoted in Turner & Hao, 1999, 
p. 117).  
More recently, in 2012, the year that TIW was released, sexual assault in the 
military was receiving quite possibly the most sustained attention it had ever received, 
Fox News reporter Liz Trotta boldly proclaimed that,  
the military is not a social services operation or a testing ground for gender wars. 
It is a fighting machine. Yet male troops are now encumbered with the realities of 
feminist [sic] biology. Women are not as strong as men. Their instincts and 
reactions in crisis are markedly different. There's a reality the left will not face. 
Biology is destiny. . . . the environment of combat by definition sets up a situation 
where basic instincts rule. The niceties of male, female interaction fade in this 
arena and any scientist will tell you that testosterone rules. (Shapiro, 2012, para. 5, 
7) 
 
Comments like Trotta’s attempt to undercut arguments made by the servicewomen in 
TIW by focusing exclusively on biology and biological determinism. Whereas TIW 
showcases story after story of servicewomen who were assaulted and then ignored, let go, 
or given no justice, Trotta’s arguments belittle these experiences, attempting to minimize 
the authority of the narratives of TIW by focusing on the “authority” of biological science. 
For example, the interviews in TIW, which are based on the experiences of multiple 
service members, testify to a military culture complicit in sexual assault and a corrupt 
military justice system, where issues are not that of biology but instead that of power. 
Trotta’s remarks, in contrast, are rooted in an essentialist ontology and epistemology and 
attempt to weaken the arguments in TIW by using sexed biology as the singular reason 
why women should not serve in the armed forces.  
Furthermore, Trotta’s remarks could imply that women who were sexually 
assaulted and/or raped in the military were basically asking to be assaulted because they 
entered a masculine environment ruled by testosterone and therefore did not deserve 
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protection from such violent crimes. Trotta, and others like her, perpetuate beliefs that, 
although not all military men are rapists, it is not reasonable to think that these men will 
be able to be in control of their sexual desires while in an environment of mixed company 
that breeds testosterone. The conflationary strategy is similar to victim-blaming (a 
strategy that will be discussed shortly) because female soldiers are told they should have 
known better, but differs in that the reasoning behind the current strategy is that 
men/males and women/females have distinct, innate, and immutable characteristics. Of 
course, this does not take into consideration the continuum of the distribution of 
hormones in males and females that accounts for some males displaying more 
traditionally feminine characteristics and vice versa (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Furthermore, 
statements like Trotta’s not only ignore, but cannot account for the 20,000 military men 
who are assaulted by other men each year (Dick, 2012; Pacatte, 2013). 
 The Invisible War also highlighted a campaign by the Sexual Assault Prevention 
and Response Office (SAPRO) that had essentialist assumptions about sex, gender, and 
sexual assault. SAPRO is the organization responsible for the oversight of DoD sexual 
assault policies, implementation, and response (United States Department of Defense, 
n.d.). Originally put in place as a task force, SAPRO became a permanent office in 2005 
once the overarching elements in the sexual assault and response policy were deemed 
necessarily ongoing. The overarching mission of the organization is to reduce, and 
hopefully eliminate, sexual assault from the military.   
In TIW, two successive SAPRO directors were asked about the types of policies 
and responses that were currently being implemented in sexual assault cases. The 
interviews revealed how the SAPRO campaign was overtly gendered in its assumptions 
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about sexual assault. Whereas TIW acknowledged the large quantity of males who are 
also sexually assaulted, the awareness and prevention campaigns that former SAPRO 
directors Dr. Kaye Whitley and Air Force Major General Mary Kay Hertog discussed 
were primarily based on female victims and a basic understanding of biological 
determinism. The campaign assumed that random men were waiting to rape women 
walking outside at night, simply out of sexual desire for women’s bodies, not out of 
power. Yet, most of those interviewed for the film explained that they knew their 
assaulters, the attacks often happened inside the barracks or offices, and a power 
relationship between a superior and subordinate often played a role. The interviews 
confirmed the statistics. Rape is more likely to happen between people who know each 
other, and rape is rarely  
a stranger who grabs someone and pulls them into the bushes. . . . Women are in 
danger of violence or rape from somebody that they know, especially if that 
person is in a position of power over them, like a boss or clergy person, or other 
authority figure. (Anderson, 2014, para. 19) 
 
SAPRO’s campaign, as portrayed in TIW, did not even acknowledge the issue of power, 
military hierarchy, or “command rape” (when a commander rapes a subordinate), 
problems that the military has acknowledged (Benedict, 2007). As the office that should 
be the most informed about the victims, causes, and situations in which sexual assault 
occurs—especially if it is to reach its goal of eliminating sexual assault in the military—
this type of campaign displayed unacceptable ignorance. 
Furthermore, in a court case highlighted in TIW, Kori Cioca and 16 other 
plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against the former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and the current Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2011. In the case, Cioca v. 
Rumsfeld, Cioca et al. argued that Rumsfeld and Gates violated their Constitutional rights, 
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as detailed in the allegations: 
Defendants failed to prevent Plaintiffs and others from being raped and sexually 
assaulted. . . . Instead, Defendants ran institutions in which perpetrators were 
promoted and where military personnel openly mocked and flouted the modest 
Congressionally-mandated institutional reforms. Defendants ran institutions in 
which Plaintiffs and other victims were openly subjected to retaliation, were 
encouraged to refrain from reporting rapes and sexual assaults in a manner that 
would have permitted prosecution, and were ordered to keep quiet and refrain 
from telling anyone about the criminal acts of their work colleagues. Defendants 
lack any legal justification for their failures to remedy such a flawed system. 
Defendants' failures to act violated Plaintiffs' individual Constitutional rights. 
(Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 2011, p. 3) 
 
Cioca et al. focused on the systemic issues that perpetuated a culture of sexual assault. In 
the past, obtaining justice from assaulters did not work, so the plaintiffs went to the 
institutional level, and attempted to hold the Secretaries of Defense responsible. 
Unfortunately, instead of obtaining justice, the class action suit highlighted the 
military’s “level of civil immunity” or what some might call “sovereign immunity” where 
the state, or in this case the military, cannot commit a legal wrong and is therefore 
immune from any prosecution. The case was dismissed by United States District Judge 
Liam O’Grady on December 9, 2011, because of “the ‘unique disciplinary structure of 
the military establishment’ [that] is a ‘special factor’ that counsels against judicial 
intrusion” (O’Grady, 2011, p. 2). The attorneys for the Department of Defense, led by 
Marcus Meeks, argued that per the 1950 Supreme Court ruling in Feres v. United States 
(Feres, Executrix v. United States, 1950) “the military cannot be sued by current or 
former soldiers for injuries incurred in the armed forces,” which they argued also 
included sexual assaults (Ellison, 2011, para. 6). The defense attorneys further averred 
that “The alleged harms are incident to plaintiffs’ military service” (Ellison, 2011, para. 
6). Ultimately, Judge O’Grady agreed with the defense’s arguments, stating that,  
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In the present case, the Plaintiffs sue the Defendants for their alleged failures with 
regard to oversight and policy setting within the military disciplinary structure. 
This is precisely the forum in which the Supreme Court has counseled against the 
exercise of judicial authority. Where the Supreme Court has so strongly advised 
against judicial involvement, not even the egregious allegations within the 
Plaintiffs' Complaint will prevent dismissal. (O’Grady, 2011, p. 2)  
 
Judge O’Grady’s rhetoric indicated that his hands were tied, and that, even if he 
disagreed with the injustices, the military’s immunity limited his agency and prevented 
him from acting. His language implied that he believed the assaults happened, but he was 
unable to help victims obtain justice due to the Feres Doctrine. The failure, or negligence, 
of the Secretaries of Defense to protect the female soldiers and sailors was deemed by 
Judge O’Grady as falling under the Feres Doctrine, and therefore rape by fellow service 
members was considered one of those risks that could happen to servicewomen as part of 
their jobs as soldiers. Whereas most people would think of occupational hazards being 
related to combat—war, dying, losing limbs in roadside bombs, or being captured and 
raped by the enemy—the reality is that women stand a higher chance of being raped by a 
fellow soldier than killed in combat (Ellison, 2011). The judge’s ruling only perpetuated 
the “military’s culture of tolerance for rape” and also confirmed that servicewomen are 
never safe; whether they are on base or in combat, the enemy is always close (Purchia, 
2012, para. 3).  
 Judge O’Grady’s decision was highlighted at the end of The Invisible War and 
made to appear even more outrageous as it was juxtaposed to story after story of 
intramilitary sexual abuse. Although Judge O’Grady’s dismissal did include the phrase 
“egregious allegations,” which indicated that he did not condone the actions, ultimately 
his dismissal of the case confirmed that the military has a lack of accountability that 
allows it to continue its culture of cronyism, holding no one responsible for heinous acts 
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while the victims continue to be punished.  
 Furthermore, as Purchia (2012) argued, Judge O’Grady’s dismissal of the lawsuit 
by saying that sexual assault and rape are “incident to service” pointed out the heart of 
the problem, that sexual assault and rape are “occupational hazard[s] for service members” 
and that the “problem is so endemic that being raped by co-workers has come to be seen 
as just part of the job” (Purchia, 2012, para. 3–4). Implicit in the ruling for the case is the 
sexist attitude that the combination of women’s biological bodies and men’s (biological) 
testosterone creates a working environment where rape and sexual assault are inevitable, 
uncontrollable, and expected. Instead of taking proactive steps of prevention and censure, 
the Feres Doctrine allowed for the court to rule toward maintaining the problematic status 
quo of a very insular and unjust military justice system. 
Ultimately this attitude, and the judge’s ruling, reinforced what many service 
members have claimed is the most damaging aspect of the epidemic of sexual assault in 
the military: the way that the problem is handled (Ellison, 2011). The plaintiffs in Cioca v 
Rumsfeld discovered that though their case was given some publicity, and therefore 
visibility, it was ultimately the victim of a discursive containment policy, the Feres 
Doctrine. This doctrine helped military leaders rhetorically manage the situation since it 
ultimately denied any agency to victims and quickly removed the case from the public 
eye. As a way to combat the case’s invisibility and highlight the unbelievable ruling, TIW 






 The second strategy utilized by politicians, military leaders, and the media is 
victim-blaming. This rhetorical tactic functions to blame the victims for sexual assault, 
which then allows the solution to be situated with victim behavior instead of institutional 
culture change. The institutional problems may then remain invisible. As a form of 
scapegoating, it displaces the blame from the military and vilifies victims who are shown 
to have brought the assaults on themselves due to their inappropriate behaviors. While 
similar to the previous strategy of conflation in ways, in which some argued 
servicewomen should have known better before joining the military due to “scientific” 
biological understandings of sex, this strategy places all blame on the victim and the 
victim’s character, therefore making the problem more individualistic and relieving the 
military institution of responsibility and guilt. 
The strategy of victim-blaming has been a strategy utilized by the military for 
quite some time. Because it is rooted in gendered assumptions, at times it is used to 
reinforce a “boys will be boys” culture that places women in the morally superior 
position. These beliefs, which were commonsense at one time in history (Elshtain, 1995; 
Zaeske, 2003), were used to keep women from joining the military or participating in so-
called men’s activities because of women’s presumed innate purity and moral superiority. 
This line of reason has been used by the military to remove blame from some men (they 
are just acting as men “naturally” do, as Trotta was quoted explaining earlier) and place it 
on women who should have known better. For example, Paula Coughlin had attended the 
Tailhook convention with her boss and was harassed in the gauntlet. Afterward, Coughlin 
reported the incident to her commanding officer, who she claimed responded, “That’s 
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what you get when you go down a hall of drunk aviators” (Winerip, 2013). Problematic 
in these assumptions is the way they position military men. They are framed as 
embodying an opposing duality where they are both intellect-driven defenders protecting 
the nation as well as hormone-driven boys who cannot be held accountable for acting on 
sexual urges (Shapiro, 2012).  
Victim-blaming places the fault on victims—and what they were wearing, doing, 
or saying—in order to displace fault from perpetrators. For example, Rear Admiral 
Williams, who had told Pope after the Tailhook scandal that when men and women work 
together it all comes down to sex, was documented telling a journalist that women do not 
belong in military service, and telling Pope that “a lot of female Navy pilots are go-go 
dancers, topless dancers or hookers” (Healy, 1992, p. 2). Of course, his (unfounded) 
statement problematically assumes that women who engage in activities such as 
prostitution cannot be raped or sexually assaulted. Williams’ statements relied on 
assumptions that if one’s character is seemingly less than desirable, one is deserving of 
any sexual assault experienced. To make matters even worse, at one point a female 
officer came forward with complaints about sexual harassment and used profane 
language when she described her assault. In response, Williams stated, “Any women who 
would use the F-word on a regular basis would welcome this type of activity” (Healy, 
1992, p. 2). Williams’ use of victim-blaming attempted to divert attention from the Navy 
as an institution and instead make it an individual problem brought on by the women 
themselves.  
 Additionally, the AFA scandal was also saturated with victim-blaming. Frank 
Spinner, the defense lawyer for accused and sentenced Staff Sergeant Delmar Simpson, 
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stated that, “All the women who said they were raped were lying” (Holman, 1997, para. 
5). The sentiment behind his comment and others like it were the main reasons victim-
blaming was one of the largest barriers keeping female cadets from reporting sexual 
assault. Historically, the victims, not the attackers, were punished, which encouraged 
victims to remain silent about the abuses they faced (Schemo, 2003a). Victims were 
routinely disciplined for minor infractions that occurred at the time of the rape, such as 
drinking alcohol, fraternization with upperclassmen, wearing civilian clothes, and sex 
(Bingham, 2003; Martin, 2003). These women failed to be protected by the academy’s 
amnesty policy, which dated back to 1993 when 13 female cadets reported being sexually 
assaulted. The policy was supposed to protect victims from punishment for breaking rules 
at the time of their rapes. Instead, the authorities at the AFA reinforced the longstanding 
belief that victims were responsible for their rapes, blaming the women for drinking too 
much, being too promiscuous, or—as Colonel Laurie Slavec, who was in charge of cadet 
conduct and discipline stated—simply lying about consensual sex by saying it was not 
consensual after the fact (Bingham, 2003; Martin, 2003). One cadet, Andrea Prasse, was 
flagged as a “person of questionable character,” and her degree was withheld, while her 
assaulter went unpunished (Martin, 2003, para. 11). In another case, Colonel Alfred 
“Marty” Coffman, a top academy official, intervened and told the Office of Special 
Investigations (O.S.I.) to shut down the case (Bingham, 2003). Ultimately, Colonel 
Coffman turned the tables and blamed the victim, Beth Davis, punishing her with three 
Class D “hits,” which are the most severe levels of offense, including alcohol (because 
she knew her attacker was supplying alcohol to her classmates but did not report it), 
fraternization, and sex in the dorms. When Davis appealed the punishment, she was told 
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to see a psychiatrist who diagnosed her with emotional disorders, which ultimately 
dictated her discharge from the academy. 
 In other AFA cases, the commandant of cadets, Brigadier General “Taco” Gilbert, 
told cadet Lisa Ballas that because she had been drinking and playing strip poker it was 
her fault she was raped (Bingham, 2003). And Kira Mountjoy-Pepka was told by Colonel 
John “Lucky” Rivers, the vice commandant of cadets, that she was, “a ‘promiscuous little 
slut,’” and she further stated that he “inferred that I deserved what had happened to me” 
(Bingham, 2003, para. 72). Her case was also eventually dropped. 
 The most troubling aspect of these stories is that women were afraid to come 
forward about being raped for fear that they would be disciplined for the other infractions 
in which they were involved at the time of the rape. Despite rape being a felony as 
opposed to an infraction, the women knew that their chances of being blamed for the rape 
or told they were lying were much higher than actually seeing justice.  
Finally, a key example of this was given in TIW, and involved interviews with 
Whitley, the Former Director of SAPRO, and Hertog, the director at the time of the 
filming. In the documentary, Dr. Whitley explained that the military was taking major 
steps to eradicate the epidemic of sexual assault. When pushed further, she explained that 
they were utilizing posters and videos that encouraged women to always have a buddy 
walk with them at night and encouraged men to “wait until she’s sober” for sex (Dick, 
2012). She confidently explained that, “our campaign consists of a series of posters that 
are actually training tools, and each of those posters has a different focus” (Dick, 2012). 
Many women interviewed in the film pointed out the lack of effectiveness of a poster 
campaign, how it had no real impact on sexual assault, and is often so far removed from 
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reality that it is practically a joke. For example, in the film, Anu Bhagwati, the executive 
director for Service Women’s Action Network (SWAN), argued that,  
You cannot prevent sexual assault with pretty posters. Posters do not prevent 
sexual predators from praying upon women and men in the military. We’re 
talking about barging into rooms in the middle of the night. No poster can 
prevent a criminal from barging into a room. These are violent people. (Dick, 
2012) 
 
And, Jessica Hinves, a military rape survivor who also appeared in the film, stated that 
the campaign, “is a joke. The things that are said are ignored or they’re made fun of” 
(Dick, 2012). The film effectively sutured the comments of Whitely with those of 
Bhagwati and Hinves to create a convincing juxtaposition that emphasized the ultimate 
ignorance of the DoD’s office that was supposed to be the most informed about sexual 
assault. This served as yet another example of a policy or procedure that was put in place 
in response to the sexual assault epidemic that, in fact, was not very effective at all.  
Furthermore, Whitley’s campaign focused most of its attention on the abuse of 
alcohol by women who were raped. This diverted attention from the epidemic of rape to 
the actions of servicewomen, implicitly placing responsibility on women instead of the 
system or the assaulters. For example, the campaign ad, which encouraged servicemen to 
“wait till she’s sober,” had many problematic underlying assumptions. Primarily, the ad 
assumed that perpetrators likely did not even realize they were raping, but rather thought 
it was consensual. Following this line of thought, the misunderstanding arose because the 
woman was drunk. (It should be noted that there is no mention of the level of intoxication 
of the assaulters. Instead the focus was on the woman who was drunk and not the drunk 
man or men involved.) Using this reasoning, if the woman had been sober, she likely 
would have consented to sex and the whole fiasco could have been avoided. However, as 
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many of the stories in TIW emphasized, the women were not always drunk, or if they 
were, like in the case of the two Marines’ stories, they often had been forced to drink 
because their command required it. And, in each story, the assaulters were well aware 
that they were raping the victims. As Pond (2012) explained, Hertog’s “efforts appear in 
the film to be misguided at best and come perilously close to blaming the victims at worst” 
(para. 21). Seemingly without realizing it, both Whitley and Hertog placed blame and 
responsibility on female victims, believing their poster campaign was enough to change a 
culture of intimidation, power, and sexual assault, when in reality they were just 
perpetuating the broken system.  
Moreover, the gendered assumptions about military sexual assault victims by the 
campaign ignored any male victims, who quantitatively comprise more victims than 
females. The fact that males are also victims of sexual assault complicates matters, 
especially in a hypermasculine institution like the military. Therefore, employing a 
campaign that silences those facts is easier and gives the illusion of containing a problem 
that in reality is more complex. In a “good ol’ boys” society, like the military often 
reveals itself to be, it is much easier to blame individual women for their assaults than the 
entire system. Blaming women served to contain the real issue at hand.  
 
Red Herrings 
The final, and most common, strategy utilized in order to rhetorically manage 
sexual assault in the military is the red herring fallacy. Through the use of diversionary 
arguments U.S. political and military leaders have displaced the focus from substantive 
cultural change to other, less impactful areas, thus engaging in containment policies. 
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While similar to the previous strategy, in that the focus of the problem is displaced, red 
herrings utilized in the cases of military sexual assault do not focus on victim-blaming, 
but instead on a different issue altogether. Whereas the conflation of sex/gender and 
victim-blaming still center around sexual assault, red herrings have been utilized to focus 
on a different issue, such as women in combat or increased reporting. This tactic works to 
contain not only the problem, but also the victims’ agency because there is a shift in the 
topic. The following examples will move chronologically, from Tailhook to the present, 
to display how this tactic has been employed for decades and continues to work to 
contain the sexual assault problem in the military. 
In terms of Tailhook, although the Pentagon’s investigation reported that there 
were 90 victims and 140 officers involved, there were zero criminal prosecutions 
(Kempster, 1993; Winerip, 2013). Yet, some, such as Winerip (2013), still claimed that 
Tailhook led to major changes, citing the fact that 2 years after the scandal, the Navy and 
Air Force opened up combat positions to women. This led the way for ground combat 
jobs to be opened up to servicewomen in early 2013. As Barbara Pope explained, 
sometimes change is sped up by a crisis (Winerip, 2013). However, the change for which 
Coughlin and others were fighting was not just equality in combat, but equal treatment as 
human beings in the military and the eradication of sexual assault. Although the Tailhook 
scandal exposed the sexual assault problem in the Navy, the reforms did not end it, and 
the culture was not significantly changed. As Paula Coughlin argued, to really change the 
culture, assaulters needed to be prosecuted. Punishing the assaulters is a step that could 
work toward eradicating sexual assault in the military, not allowing women to serve in 
combat. In the case of Tailhook, the media and military leaders’ focus on how women 
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were in combat served as a red herring to divert attention away from the fact that no real 
cultural change happened that could curb or eliminate sexual assault in the military. 
 In the Aberdeen Proving Ground scandal, the red herring came in the form of 
focusing on consensual sex within military ranks instead of sexual assault. During the 
investigation following the revelation of the scandal, Army officials argued that the 
“more widespread problem” was how rampant consensual sex was as a result of a 
breakdown of discipline. Fraternization—or consensual “improper romantic relationships 
between supervisor and soldiers” (McIntyre, 1996, para. 1)—was believed to be the main 
issue that needed to be fixed. Whereas many saw the activity at APG as “misbehavior of 
the relative few,” they believed that fraternization was much more widespread (McIntyre, 
1996, para. 8). As a result, the Army instituted an antifraternization policy that held 
supervisors responsible for any such relationships. The Army officials believed that this 
new policy would help curb instances of constructive force rape. By barring all 
relationships, the Army made it easier to regulate and punish offenders since the power 
relationship between superiors and subordinates made it difficult to determine actual 
consent. While fraternization policies may have been needed in order to make it clearer 
when servicewomen were victims of sexual assault and rape, it functioned as a red 
herring to take the focus off of nonconsensual sexual activity and instead focus on 
consensual sex. What was overlooked and/or contained by placing the focus on 
fraternization were the rape charges against many of the sergeants, as well as Simpson’s 
rape convictions.  
More recently, in March 2014, Senator Claire McCaskill’s fight to eliminate 
sexual assault in the military advocated for removing the “good soldier” defense in 
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military sexual assault cases. The good soldier defense allowed courts to reduce 
sentences of offenders if they had strong military records that displayed good military 
character (Zengerle, 2014, para. 2). The main idea behind it is that instead of looking at 
evidence in a case, investigating officers should first and foremost consider, “the 
character and military service of the accused” (Ellison, 2011, para. 8). Often the 
explanation for not convicting soldiers has been something along the lines of “He’s a 
good soldier. He just can’t handle an integrated training environment” (Ellison, 2011, 
para. 9). For example, in January 2014, Lieutenant General Craig Franklin retired after 
overturning the decision of an all-male jury. The accused pilot, Lieutenant Colonel James 
Wilkerson, was found guilty of sexual assault, but Franklin looked at Wilkerson’s 
character as a “doting father and husband” and said there was no way he would ever rape 
a sleeping woman (Whitlock, 2014a, para. 11). Under military law, no one could overturn 
Franklin’s decision, and prosecutors could not appeal. However, after Franklin’s decision, 
another allegation came out against the pilot that claimed he fathered a child out of 
wedlock, and Wilkerson was forced to retire. 
Ultimately, McCaskill’s bill looked at the problem of sexual assault as presented 
in The Invisible War yet reinterpreted it to contain the ambitious proposals in TIW. 
Instead of acknowledging that military culture was the problem, McCaskill explained it 
was the solution. Whereas TIW revealed one of the main problems with prosecuting 
sexual assault offenders in the military were the commanders, McCaskill argued that 
weakening the commanders would only reduce their ability to make the needed cultural 
changes and leave the victims more vulnerable (Chang, 2014; Peterson, 2014). The 
reason for increased vulnerability, McCaskill averred, would be that commanders, 
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deprived of their power, would claim it was not their problem, so it was not their 
responsibility (Peterson, 2014). When questioned about her bill and support for it, she 
used her experience with rape victims, stating, “I have more experience prosecuting 
sexual assault cases than anyone in the Senate. I have spent more time holding the hands 
of rape victims” (Newton-Small, 2014, para. 2). McCaskill’s language used persuasive 
feminist conventions such as drawing from her experiences to give validity to her bill 
(Campbell, 1973, 1989; Dubriwny, 2005) and divert attention away from how much of 
her work maintained the status quo. 
McCaskill’s rhetoric highlighted her own experiences while simultaneously 
silencing the experiential knowledge of the victims as was presented in TIW. This 
allowed her to spin her bill as victim-friendly. Ultimately, McCaskill’s bill avoided 
substantive (systemic) change, but gave the appearance of change by removing part of the 
problem.  
The most recent and prominent red herring occurred in May 2014 when the 
Pentagon released a report that showed an increase in reporting of military sexual assault 
by 50% (Alexander & Zengerle, 2014; Anderson, 2014; Baldor, 2014a; United States 
Department of Defense, 2014, p. 2; Whitlock, 2014b). The news made headlines and was 
quickly communicated by all the major media outlets. The numbers revealed that 5,061 
reports of sexual assault were made in FY13, which was an increase from the 3,374 
reports the previous fiscal year (United States Department of Defense, 2014, p. 2). 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel celebrated the jump in reported sexual assaults, although 
many officials still presumed that these reports only represent a fraction of the sex crimes 
committed each year since most victims are reluctant to report (Whitlock, 2014b).  
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In addition to increased reporting, the study revealed other statistics as well. For 
example, the Marine Corps, the branch that was highlighted as having a serious problem 
in TIW, saw an 86% increase in sexual assault reports in FY13. Other branches saw an 
increase as well, including the Army (51%), Navy (46%) and Air Force (33%) (Whitlock, 
2014b). Most of the victims of the reported assaults were enlisted troops under 25 years 
of age, and most of the alleged offenders were senior in rank (Whitlock, 2014b). 
Approximately half of the assaults also involved alcohol. Furthermore, about 80% of the 
victims were women (who comprise about 15% of the 1.4 million troops on active duty), 
yet Pentagon officials voiced concern that male victims underreported due to an even 
greater reluctance to report sexual abuse (Whitlock, 2014b). This underreporting is not 
surprising given the hypermasucline military culture that discourages soldiers, especially 
male soldiers, from acting like victims. 
 Many government and military officials were encouraged by the increase in 
reporting. In the report itself, it was confidently stated that the DoD believed the “record 
number of victims” who sought assistance was an “unprecedented increase in reports” 
and was “consistent with a growing level of confidence in the DoD response system” 
(United States Department of Defense, 2014, p. 3). In a Pentagon news conference, Hagel 
told reporters that he believed that the steps the DoD has taken have helped combat the 
underreported nature of sexual crimes in the military (Alexander & Zengerle, 2014).  
Other White House and DoD officials explained that the numbers showed that victims 
perceived the military “to be taking the problem seriously” (Cooper, 2014, para. 2). Yet, 
as I will show in the following pages, the celebrations around the increase in reporting 
actually function rhetorically as a form of deflection that allows the sexual assault 
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epidemic to be contained and the changes that would bring about substantive change to 
be avoided. 
The report asserted that because the average annual increase in reports of sexual 
assault since 2006 has been approximately 5%, and the fact that there were “relatively 
unchanged rates of unwanted sexual contact” in that same period, “it is unlikely the 
increase in reports this year is due to increased crime” (United States Department of 
Defense, 2014, p. 3). Yet, despite these positive comments, the report explained that 
sexual assault is still a “persistent problem” and that the DoD is “committed to ensuring 
that the needs of the victims are addressed while ensuring the interest of justice is served” 
(United States Department of Defense, 2014, p. 3).  
In the explanations of the new statistics, the DoD’s contradictory reasoning 
should be noted. For example, the DoD believed that it was possible to have a dramatic 
and unprecedented increase in reporting, yet did not believe that that could possibly 
reflect a dramatic and unprecedented increase in sexual assaults. Whereas officials were 
willing to accept that the 8-year trend in reporting could change by such a significant 
margin, they were unwilling to consider that the same might be true for crimes committed. 
The truth remained that no one could be certain if the sharp increase was due to more 
reporting and/or more crimes being committed, but officials believed that the “evidence 
suggested that victims were simply more willing to come forward” (Whitlock, 2014b, 
para. 2). Presented as is, the statistics were a misleading red herring that shifted the focus 
from actual cases of sexual assault to reporting of sexual assault. 
As I alluded to in the introductory chapter, statistics are biopolitically significant. 
Indeed, Foucault (1976a, 1995) explained that the transition from the classic mechanism 
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(sovereignty) to the new mechanism (biopower) meant that society transitioned from a 
disciplinary society to one that was regulatory. Instead of considering individual people, 
states began to examine entire populations, and their rates of fertility, birth, mortality, 
longevity, sexual activity, etc. (Foucault, 1976a, 1976b, 1995). Statistics, then, become a 
powerful technology of the state that could be used to better understand the population, 
predict and define what is normal, and note patterns. However, statistics can also be used 
to shape social reality (Kertzer & Arel, 2002). Statistics do not merely report, but at times 
can be “manipulated to suit particular interests or ideologies” and can become 
“instruments of social description” that help construct a specific version of reality (Urla, 
1993, pp. 820, 837). Whereas the statistics presented in TIW support the interests of those 
who want to eradicate sexual assault in the military, serving as a form of cultural critique 
(Britt, 2001), I argue that the statistics on reporting of sexual assault released by the 
Pentagon serve the (bio)political purpose of constructing a particular version of reality 
that purports the problem of sexual assault in the military is dissipating, when it may not 
be the case.  
 Indeed, these statistics and reasoning opened the door for much criticism. The 
most significant criticism circulated around the inability to compare the FY13 statistics 
with those of FY12. Every 2 years the Pentagon conducts a confidential survey to 
estimate how many sexual assaults took place that year. The last survey was in 2012, so 
one was not conducted in 2013. Therefore critics explained there is no way to accurately 
know what the increase in reporting reflected (Alexander & Zengerle, 2014; Cooper, 
2014). In fact, as Benedict (2007) explained, “as anyone familiar with sexual assault 
statistics knows, nobody can ever tell whether increases in rape rates are due to more 
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reporting or more rapes” (para. 29). So, while the increased numbers may indicate that 
many more victims have become increasingly confident in the system, they should also 
give people pause since they could simultaneously represent an increased amount of 
crime in the military. This second option is not out of the question, as the continual 
release of statistics, including those released on May 1, illustrate “how sexual violence is 
much more prevalent in the armed forces” than many previously thought (Whitlock, 
2014b, para. 3). 
 One of the most vocal critics of the report was Senator Kristin Gillibrand. In a 
press release, she showed concern that there was no way to really understand what the 
new numbers represented because no survey was conducted in 2013. She additionally 
stated that,  
The report in front of us should send chills down people’s spines. A system where 
only 1 out of 10 reported cases proceed to trial for a survivor to have a fair shot at 
receiving justice is simply not working. . . . That is a system screaming for 
additional reform. . . . Further, I am deeply worried by today’s data showing no 
increase in the prosecution and conviction rates compared to overall reporting. 
More reporting is not the end game. Justice and removing recidivist predators 
from the military so they can not [sic] commit more crimes to arrest the problem 
is the end game. More people coming forward and not receiving justice only 
further erodes trust in the system. These shocking numbers should spur Congress 
to act and finally put these cases in the hands of trained legal professionals to fix a 
system that is failing our brave men and women in uniform. (Gillibrand, 2014, 
para. 3–4)  
 
Senator Gillibrand’s statement included two prominent criticisms that many had. She 
emphasized that increased reporting without increased discipline is not effective at 
curbing and eradicating the problem of sexual assault in the armed forces, and, in fact, 
could lead to even more hostile conditions for victims.  
 In response to criticisms, many White House and military officials explained that 
the increase in numbers was only a first step in efforts to eliminate the problem of sexual 
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assault in the military. Because rape is such an underreported crime, both in the military 
and in society in general, officials explained that their first goal was to increase reporting, 
which, they argued, had worked if one looked at the statistics. And, as Major General 
Jeffrey Snow, the Director of SAPRO explained, other steps have been taken by the DoD 
in recent months in an effort to fix the system, including starting a victims’ program that 
offers legal consultation and instituting new ways to improve investigator collaboration 
(Cooper, 2014). He also announced six additional directives meant to continue and 
expand the fight against the systemic epidemic, including an alcohol policy and goals of 
increasing male reporting (Alexander & Zengerle, 2014).  
 Despite these initiatives and the optimism by many officials, of the 5,061 reports, 
only 2,149 service members were investigated, and of those only approximately 73% 
received some form of punishment (and “punishment” is broadly defined here, for many 
people would not consider punishment for sexual assault anything less than jail time). 
Only 11% of all of the criminal investigations resulted in a conviction at court-martial, 
and only 6% were convicted of a crime that was considered serious enough to land the 
defendant to a sex-offender registry (Whitlock, 2014b).  
In response to criticisms about these numbers, DoD officials, as well as “outside 
experts,” explained that the low numbers “reflect the inherent difficulty of bringing 
sexual-assault cases to trial and winning convictions” because “physical evidence is often 
lacking, and it can be hard to establish whether consent was not given” (Whitlock, 2014b, 
para. 16). Given understandings of constructive force and the hierarchal power relations, 
as well as Miller’s (2007) discussion of the biopolitical aspects of rape and consent 
discussed earlier, this criteria needs to change. Additionally, Snow tried to explain the 
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low numbers by stating that each case is unique and has its own merits, but that “the 
victims are getting their day in court, and the results are the results” (Whitlock, 2014b). 
As the Director of SAPRO, an organization with the goal of increased investigation and 
accountability (United States Department of Defense, 2014, p. 13), this statement is 
indifferent and calloused. If more victims are willing to come forward, but there is no 
increase in the number of convictions, the system is still very broken and favors an 
environment that breeds sexual assault. First, the system should focus on discipline and 
then on increased reporting. 
 Many critics expressed that the Pentagon’s statistics demonstrated little 
improvement in the percentage of cases that went to trial or in the percentage of 
convictions (Alexander & Zengerle, 2014). Representative Jackie Speier echoed Senator 
Gillibrand’s concerns, when she contended that, “You can’t tell me that only one in 10 
cases are worthy of going to trial. That’s like saying 90 percent of those who come 
forward are lying” (Alexander & Zengerle, 2014, para. 8). Indeed, the low level of 
convictions can likely be interpreted in one of two ways: either (a) the victims are lying 
about being sexually assaulted (the strategy of victim-blaming), or (b) military officials 
are letting offenders go. Either option is not good for the military justice system. The first 
option reinforces the long-held belief that women lie about rape, a belief that has resulted 
in a societal system that is often skeptical of victims’ claims (Cuklanz & Moorti, 2006). 
Relying on this narrative also reinforces gendered assumptions about rape victims (that 
they are all female), which might further discourage male victims from coming forward. 
The second option reinforces that it is easier to get raped in the military than obtain 
military justice (MacPherson, 2014).  
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 Yet, Senator McCaskill believed that the report revealed progress and was 
encouraging. She stated, “We know that the majority of survivors, both military and 
civilian, choose not to report their assaults. This data suggests that the number of brave 
men and women in uniform choosing to pursue justice is increasing” (Alexander & 
Zengerle, 2014, para. 11). Yet her words seem to be mere lip service because time and 
time again, the offenders, not the victims, are rewarded. As a press release for Protect 
Our Defenders, an organization that works to help military men and women who have 
been sexually assaulted by fellow service members, explained, “While some of the 
changes [McCaskill is] proposing will do some good, none will provide for fundamental 
reform of the currently conflicted and frequently biased system. And they will not 
substantially address the lack of trust in the current system, which has led victims to opt 
out of reporting or seeking justice” (Protect Our Defenders, 2013, para. 1). 
 Additionally, the focus on men in the report was widely discussed. Hagel declared 
sexual assault a “clear threat” to both male and female service members’ lives and well-
being, and the inclusion of men in this statement (as well as McCaskill’s above) was 
intentional (Anderson, 2014; Baldor, 2014a). Women face tremendous stigmas if they 
report a rape, but for men in a hypermasculine organization, it can be even more 
intimidating and stigmatizing. For example, DoD officials expressed concern that male 
victims are afraid to report being sexually assaulted for fear of appearing weak or having 
their sexual orientation called in to question, despite statistics showing that in most cases 
sexual assault is not about sexual orientation or sexuality at all, but rather about power 
and abuse (Baldor, 2014a).  
Furthermore, Nate Galbreath, the Senior Executive Advisor for SAPRO, 
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explained that “There is still a misperception that this is a women’s issue and women’s 
crime. . . . It’s disheartening that we have such a differential between the genders and 
how they are choosing to report” (Baldor, 2014a, para. 8). In an attempt to persuade male 
military members to be more sympathetic toward male victims, he compared men who 
are victims of sexual assault to men who need help on the battlefield, explaining, “It’s 
your fellow service member that might need you to step in. It’s not the damsel in distress” 
(Baldor, 2014a; MacPherson, 2014, para. 13). However, as MacPherson (2014) aptly 
argued, whether intended or not, Galbreath’s statement flippantly dismissed female 
victims and “revealed a crushingly macho environment” (MacPherson, 2014, para. 13). 
The gendered statement implied that women are weak and additionally distinguished 
women from “fellow service members.” This utilized the conflation of sex/gender 
strategy, implying that women can never really be soldiers or sailors, but will always play 
an auxiliary role next to the “real” service members. 
As many critics have argued, the steps being taken and the progress being hailed 
might not be all they are claimed to be. As MacPherson (2014) criticized, “Pentagon 
officials continue to present deceptive statistics to ward off criticism while it refuses to 
take the cases out of the hands of commanding officers” (para. 7). Indeed, if the number 
of assaults committed in FY13 was the same as FY12 (which was 26,000), then the new 
numbers still show that eight out of every ten people are not reporting assault, which is 
problematic (Gillibrand, 2014). Instead of celebrating the numbers reported as being the 
be-all and end-all, critics like McPherson (2014) argued that “dissecting the Pentagon 
numbers hype is vital in order to show why many leaders in and out of the military are 
arguing that sexual assault cases desperately need to be removed from the chain of 
 86 
command” (MacPherson, 2014, para. 3). Indeed, Anthony Zenkus, a specialist in helping 
victims of sexual assault and violence, explained that in “insular” institutions like the U.S. 
military, it can be easier for those in authority to sympathize with perpetrators instead of 
victims, because they understand how convictions could affect a service member’s career 
and family, and therefore chalk it up to a “mistake” so that people end up rallying around 
the offender instead of the victim (Anderson, 2014, para. 30). Therefore, Zenkus 
explained that he supported Gillibrand’s efforts to remove the chain of command in 
making decisions regarding sexual assault in the military. Ultimately, critics of the 
numbers assert that increased numbers in reporting by personnel that receive the “same 
old treatment only heightens military hypocrisy and trauma for victims” (MacPherson, 
2014, para. 3). It definitely does not show progress.  
The positive emphasis on the statistics of increased reporting by various military 
and political leaders as well as the media works to rhetorically manage the problem of 
sexual assault in the military by shifting the focus from actual sexual assault to that of 
reporting. Instead of concentrating on disciplining perpetrators, as many of the 
interviewees in TIW called for, which would likely result in fewer assaults, the DoD 
focused on increasing reporting, placing the onus and responsibility on the victims. This 
action combines two of the previously discussed communicative containment 
strategies—victim-blaming and red herrings—in order to divert attention away from the 
real problem and to celebrate and socially construct the recognition of the problem and 
the increase in reporting as the solution, whereas the solution in reality is to punish 
perpetrators. The so-called solution of increasing victim reporting was being touted as 
substantive, systemic change. This also gives insight into why the problem of sexual 
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assault continues to be so widespread: discursive strategies continue to contain it. 
 
Conclusion 
Director Kirby Dick explained that TIW was made with policy makers in mind, 
with hopes of bringing change. TIW was different from the previous scandals that brought 
military sexual assault into the public eye in that it was a film proactively produced with 
consciousness raising and policy change in mind, whereas the scandals were often met 
with reactionary policy changes. The hopes of Dick and his colleagues were answered 
when two U.S. Senators—Gillibrand and McCaskill—took it upon themselves to pass 
legislation to help combat the epidemic of rape in the military. Unfortunately, these two 
female senators have been pitted against each other in the battle to make these changes. 
Democratic New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand took her cue from the film and 
advocated for removing military commanders from deciding which sexual assault cases 
to prosecute. She argued that the victims did not trust their commanders enough to report 
rape to them (Chang, 2014). Because more than a quarter of victims were assaulted by 
their chain of command, it seems reasonable to move the reporting outside of it (Caplan-
Bricker, 2014; Peterson, 2014).  
In her campaign to pass needed reforms, Senator Gillibrand handed out copies of 
TIW to persuade the White House and lawmakers of the vital changes needed, relying on 
the rhetorical force of the film (Peterson, 2014). She pushed for the Military Justice 
Improvement Act (MJIA) in March 2014, which would have removed military 
commanders from decision making in sexual assault cases, something the film advocated 
(Pond, 2012). 
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However, on March 6, 2014, Gillibrand’s bill failed to get the necessary 60 votes 
needed for passage, falling short by a vote of 55–45 (Chang, 2014; Peterson, 2014; 
Trapper & Pham, 2014). It was a disappointing day not only for Gillibrand, but also for 
rape survivors, who felt that McCaskill betrayed them by campaigning against 
Gillibrand’s reforms. As one sexual assault survivor, former Army specialist and founder 
of the nonprofit Women Veterans Social Justice, BriGette McCoy, explained, 
McCaskill’s conclusion to keep decisions within the chain of command was “blanket 
betrayal. . . . We perceived . . . that she was going to be supportive of making changes 
within the system” (Trapper & Pham, 2014, para. 4–5). Afterward, Gillibrand explained 
that many Senators told her that they would watch to see what happened in the military, 
and if it is not better in 6 months, they would side with her next time (Chang, 2014).  
On March 10, 2014, the Senate unanimously passed McCaskill’s proposed 
reforms. Despite falling short of shifting the decision about whether to pursue assault 
cases that involve top commanders to independent military prosecutors—the change that 
was proposed by Gillibrand—McCaskill argued that her reforms would “make the 
military the most victim-friendly institution in the world,” because of the significant 
changes that would be implemented (Caplan-Bricker, 2014, para. 8). McCaskill’s use of 
the phrase “victim-friendly” relied on rhetoric that acknowledged the cultural issues in 
the military and promised change. Yet her bill worked to domesticate the problem and 
keep decisions within command, which would not bring significant systemic changes. It 
was exactly the opposite action all of the service members in TIW advocated. 
Ultimately, it appears that a false dichotomy has been created that has pitted two 
female U.S. Senators against each other in a battle between two traditionally male-
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dominant organizations—the military and the government. This dichotomy has served as 
an additional red herring to deflect from the real issues that revolve around the epidemic 
of sexual assault in the military, including a track record of ineffective sexual assault 
prevention policies, a lack of prosecuting sexual assault offenders, and a hypermasculine 
military culture that has historically been complicit in sexual assault. Two decades ago, 
Campbell (1993) warned about this, stating that “Men empower women who attack other 
women who attempt to change the status quo” (p. 154). As Gillibrand has tried to push 
for the sweeping changes advocated in TIW and by other victims, McCaskill’s bill—
which keeps the decisions within the chain of command, and therefore perpetuates the 
culture of fear and intimidation—was passed instead (Trapper & Pham, 2014). Although 
it has been argued that the film was cathartic and many more victims are coming forward 
as a result, rape survivor McCoy explained that the only reason these victims have been 
coming forward is because they believed radical change was coming (Trapper & Pham, 
2014). 
Yet this change seems to be always already elusive, and the case and point is the 
Sinclair case and sentencing, mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, within weeks of 
the Gillibrand failure and the McCaskill success in the Senate. Once again, an accused 
soldier was given the equivalent to a “wrist slap” (Honeycutt, 2012, para. 6). The military 
reinforced its image of cronyism, with one military lawyer observing that “the general 
made out like a bandit” (Bowman, 2014, para. 11). After hearing the sentence, Gillibrand 
pointed to how the case reinforced the need to move the justice system out of the chain of 
command, and renewed her efforts to fix the broken military system (Collins & Biesecker, 
2014). However, McCaskill viewed the case as affirming her bill, explaining that 
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commanders, and not prosecutors, would be more aggressive when pursuing prosecution 
since a commander pushed for this case to go to court (Collins & Biesecker, 2014).  
Removed from the Gillibrand/McCaskill debate, General Sinclair stood outside 
the courthouse after hearing his sentence and smiled, claiming, “The system worked. I’ve 
always been proud of my Army. All I want to do now is go north and hug my kids and 
my wife” (Collins & Biesecker, 2014, para. 3). Drawing from the rhetoric of family 
values (Cloud, 1998), Sinclair attempted to erase the charges against him and the 
admissions he made. In fact, this self-proclaimed family man had been accused of rape 
and admitted to adultery with the accuser and sexual misconduct with two other female 
subordinates. Now he was free to continue on as he had before the trial, the only evidence 
of his guilt being a letter of reprimand, and a $20,000 fine (Collins & Biesecker, 2014). 
The Sinclair case reaffirmed the stories depicted in TIW, where containment policies 
continue to be championed as real change, while the institutionalized dehumanization of 
sexual assault victims continued.  
It appears as if the military and Congress are responding to the calls to action by 
putting bandages on the problem with hopes that it will soon be out of the public’s 
attention. Some, like Honeycutt (2012), predicted these containment strategies. For 
example, although Honeycutt (2012) commended Dick for making the film, he 
recognized the difficulty in any significant change taking place as a result, remarking, 
that Dick “delivers the document so damning that it will be interesting to watch how the 
military establishment tries to sweep this under the rug. Not that it won’t try” (para. 4). 
Further voicing his skepticism, Honeycutt lamented,  
The worst thing is the military reaction, historically and contemporaneously, to 
this fact: It doesn’t give a damn. Its system to deal with this issue is designed 
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solely to protect the military image and not the victim. Seldom do sexual 
predators receive more than a wrist slap. More often, the victims themselves are 
prosecuted for daring to report the crime. (para. 6)  
 
And this appears to be on par with the current situation. As it stands, 90% of victims who 
report an assault are involuntarily discharged, “often after receiving dubious diagnoses of 
‘personality disorders’” (Ellison, 2012, para. 11; see also Winerip, 2013). In a culture that 
continues to blame the victim, who would dare to come forward, despite how cathartic 
the film may be? 
 Following the lead of TIW, I argue that the solution does not lie in increased 
reporting, allowing women in combat, or eliminating fraternization. Instead, the solution 
is to listen to sexual assault survivors and their call to remove the chain of command from 
decision-making in sexual assault cases and begin to prosecute and punish perpetrators. 
Although the film took a problem that was seemingly invisible and made it visible, 
consciousness raising is not enough. Effective policy change is needed, but will be 
difficult to come by if military leaders, political leaders, and the media utilize the 
rhetorical strategies of conflating sex/gender, victim-blaming, and red herrings in order to 
contain the problem. Although the epidemic of sexual assault is no longer invisible, it is 
still given limited visibility due to these discursive strategies. Indeed, policies have been 
passed, as such as McCaskill’s bill, as well as the various policies passed after the three 
prominent military sex scandals. However, almost all of those policies have functioned to 






EQUALITY WITHOUT AGENCY; COVERAGE WITHOUT  
ACCESS: THE MATERIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE  
MILITARY ABORTION AMENDMENT 
 
But let’s just note what an absurdly small step towards true access to comprehensive 
reproductive health care it really is. Currently, the military’s insurance only covers 
abortion if the woman’s life was in danger. Now, it will also cover it in cases of rape and 
incest. This is progress because the status quo is so shitty.      
 – Maya (2012, para. 4) 
 
In January 2013, President Obama signed into law the House of Representatives 
Bill 4310 (H.R.4310), which included the Military Abortion Amendment (MAA) that 
was passed by Congress at the end of 2012 (McKeon, 2012). Section 711 of the bill 
stated that one of the healthcare benefits for servicewomen now included the “use of 
Department of Defense funds for abortions in cases of rape and incest” (p. 9). Whereas 
civilian federal employees have had this abortion coverage since 1993, their military 
counterparts (who are also federal employees) had been denied the same coverage.  
Before the adoption of the amendment as part of the Fiscal Year National Defense 
Authorization Act (FY13 NDAA), servicewomen were only guaranteed abortion 
coverage in limited cases of “therapeutic abortions,” specifically instances when the 
mother’s physical health is at risk.  Additionally, they only had access to abortions in 
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three cases: (1) if their lives were in danger, (2) if they paid for them out of pocket, 
and/or (3) if they sought care outside the military system.  
Abortion policy is necessarily an exercise of biopower, and specifically reflecting 
the tension between biopolitics (the politics of life) and necropolitics (the politics of 
death), as well as women’s agency over their bodies. First, it has been asserted by many 
antiabortionists that abortion results in the death of a fetus, which many argue is a human 
life (Perry, 2011). Yet, abortion could also be viewed as biopolitical if it aids in the 
(physical, mental, and/or emotional) health of the woman. Therefore, there is a double-
sided quality of abortion as a remedy for rape or illness, when parturition is more morbid 
than abortion. In these cases, strictly referring to abortion as an issue of life or death is 
inaccurate, as it is often a conflation of the two, with bio- and necropolitical implications. 
In a way, this points to how abortion undoes biopolitics because abortion regulations 
discipline bios. Second, abortion policies inevitably are caught up in biopolitics as they 
pertain to the female body and issues of agency. Dr. Jeffrey Jensen, a former Navy doctor, 
argued that abortion policies “penalize” servicewomen and argued that, “Women should 
not be burdened by their biology” (Montgomery, 2013, para. 23). Although it takes both a 
male and a female to produce a pregnancy, if the pregnancy is unplanned and/or 
unwanted, policies and laws dictate that it is ultimately the woman’s responsibility to find 
a way to obtain access to abortion care as well as the necessary funding for it. As such, 
biological issues are placed squarely on the shoulders of women, not men. The regulatory 
functions of biopower control and limit how much and what type of agency women have 
when making reproductive decisions with regard to their bodies. Indeed, this is where 
biopower intervenes not only to make live, but to regulate “how to live” through 
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restrictive abortion policies (Stormer, 2002, p. 25).  
In the case of the MAA, much of the discourse surrounding and following its 
passage championed the equality it brought to a system that was in dire need of 
responding to healthcare issues that servicewomen face, especially in a climate of 
unprecedented rates of rape. However, an examination of military abortion policies over 
time reveals how the (hyper)masculine military has historically put roadblocks in place 
that regulate and restrict servicewomen’s abortion rights and access to abortion care. 
Additionally, a rhetorical analysis of the various discourses surrounding the bill—those 
of military and political leaders, the media, servicewomen, and feminists—reveals that 
the bill is much more complicated and contested than it may initially seem.  
In this chapter, I examine the MAA and its surrounding discourse, asking the 
following interrelated questions: What does a rhetorical history of abortion policies in the 
military reveal about the so-called progress of the recent MAA? What discursive 
strategies have been/are being used to communicate a narrative of progress surrounding 
the Military Abortion Amendment? How have the media and political leaders shaped the 
discursive understandings and perceptions of the Military Abortion Amendment? How 
does the discourse surrounding the Military Abortion Amendment intervene in the 
constitution of the subject position(s) of military women, and what are the biopolitical 
implications? In order to answer these questions, I examine news articles, press releases, 
statements from political leaders, videos, and feminist blogs to consider how the rhetoric 
circulating around the MAA defines equality for servicewomen. 
In light of my analysis of these various texts, I argue that the discourse 
surrounding the MAA functions to perpetuate restrictive, and often regressive, abortion 
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policies for servicewomen through various understandings of the ideograph  <equality>. I 
support this assertion with three subarguments. First, the history of abortion policies in 
the military reveals that instead of being progressive, abortion rights for servicewomen 
have followed a more regressive trajectory, and the most recent amendment is more 
restrictive than the earliest military abortion policies, despite rhetoric that communicates 
otherwise. Second, political leaders, military leaders, and the media have utilized the 
powerful rhetoric implicit in the ideograph <equality> discursively asserts that the MAA 
was a major step in the progress of servicewomen’s equality while concealing how 
limited the material progress actually is. And finally, despite increasing the number of 
circumstances in which servicewomen may obtain abortions, the MAA still perpetuates a 
problematic lack of agency and access for servicewomen, which serves to sustain 
discriminatory policies against women in the military. 
This chapter follows in two parts. In the first section, I look at the rhetorical 
history of military abortion policies from the 1960s to the present. The history is divided 
into three subsections by time period based on the major phases and changes in abortion 
legislation within the U.S. military. The history displays the contested nature of abortion 
policies in the military and how issues of power, discrimination, and biopower interact to 
regulate and control policies. The second section is an in-depth analysis of discourse 
surrounding the Military Abortion Amendment that investigates how the subject 
position(s) of military women were created by the discourse circulating around the 
amendment and its history. These two sections allow this chapter to situate the present 
day politics surrounding military abortion policies within both historical and discursive 
contexts. In the end, although the discourse surrounding H.R.4310 implies a change in 
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military servicewomen’s reproductive rights and agency, the analysis uncovers that the 
change is mostly discursive. Servicewomen are inserted into subject positions that 
already dominate discourses surrounding abortion in general. Instead, I suggest a more 
liberating discourse that allows women to choose for themselves instead of enforcing 
limitations. 
 
A Rhetorical History of Abortion Policies 
The Military Abortion Amendment is part of a larger history of the military’s 
relationship with abortion policy. Whereas the fight for servicewomen’s abortion rights 
was renewed around 2009, military policies regarding abortion can be traced back to the 
1960s.  The history of abortion policies in United States in general is complicated and 
complex, and military policies have developed alongside and in relation to them, which 
adds an additional layer of complexity and politics.  
My goal in discussing the history behind the current MAA is to examine policies 
pertaining to servicewomen’s access to reproductive healthcare and the various politics 
and power dynamics that have influenced fluctuations in servicewomen’s rights in order 
to show the development of the current subject position(s) of servicewomen in the U.S. 
military. The “truths” that many have come to accept today—including that this 
amendment brings servicewomen equality and grants substantially more agency and 
access to abortion services than ever before—have been constructed over time through 
the various power dynamics bound up in abortion legislation. I explained in the 
introductory chapter to this dissertation that the following section in ways borrows from 
Foucault’s (1995) genealogical approach in that it shows how the various shifts in power 
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over time have not necessarily contributed to progress in servicewomen’s rights, but 
rather a regression in many ways. However, my linear organization of this section departs 
significantly from Foucault’s method. This section progresses from 1960 to the present, 
with the intention to show how the various discourses that surround and influence 
military abortion legislation have fluctuated in restricting and liberating legislation and 
have not followed a progressive linear development. 
Therefore, in my effort to discuss the history of abortion policy and the various 
relational intersections of power and (constitutive) rhetoric (Charland, 1987) that have 
influenced understandings that circulate around today’s policies like the MAA, I draw 
partially from Foucault’s genealogy and partially from the concept of rhetorical histories 
from scholars like Zarefsky (1998). Because I recognize the interdependent relationship 
between rhetoric and history, I utilize Zarefsky’s (1998) understanding that one of the 
dimensions of rhetorical history is “the study of historical events from a rhetorical 
perspective” so that “one can see significant aspects about those events that other 
perspectives miss” (Zarefsky, 1998, p. 30). Whereas applying a strictly historical 
framework may overlook important rhetorical aspects, and relying solely on a rhetorical 
understanding might isolate events from their historical contexts, using a rhetorical 
history perspective allows for an understanding of the development of the historical 
processes over time. Additionally, utilizing a quasi-Foucauldian genealogical approach in 
conjunction with rhetorical history can illuminate power dynamics, constructions of 
truths, and constitution of (biopolitical) subject positions of servicewomen by abortion 
legislation.  
The examination of past and present military abortion policies reveals two 
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primary restrictions that have determined legislation: the use of federal funds to pay for 
abortions and the use of facilities in which abortion procedures can be performed (Gates, 
2013; see also Burelli, 2013 for an account of the changes in U.S. Code 1093). As will be 
discussed further in this section, there have been times when abortions were funded and 
allowed at military facilities, times when both have been denied, and times when there 
was partiality for both.  
Additionally, regarding funding restrictions, the Supreme Court has considered 
two categories: therapeutic and elective abortions. Therapeutic abortions are those 
abortions that are considered medically necessary, often in regard to the woman’s life 
(Shimabukuro, 2014). Traditionally, if the woman’s health is in danger due to the 
pregnancy and/or if it would be in danger if the pregnancy were carried to term, abortion 
has been allowed in order to save the woman’s life. This has been called the “life 
endangerment” exemption when it comes to abortion restrictions. With the passage of the 
MAA, it was decided that for pregnancies resulting from cases of rape or incest abortions 
would also be considered therapeutic. In these instances, funding restrictions are lifted, 
and the government pays for the abortions. However, in the instances of elective, or 
nontherapeutic abortions, funding is often not offered. These cases involve women 
desiring an abortion for any other reason besides life endangerment, rape, or incest, and 
often are called elective because the women simply do not want to be pregnant. 
Additionally, cases of fetal abnormality are not covered under therapeutic abortions, but 
are considered elective (Hansen, 2012; Segal, 2012).    
In this section, I examine the story of abortion policies in the military by looking 
at the major players who have impacted servicewomen’s rights. The history is complex 
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and interwoven with policies related to the broader U.S. population as well as other 
federally funded institutions, like Medicaid. Therefore, I show the historical development 
of military policies alongside those of the U.S. in general and their impact and reliance on 
each other. What becomes quite clear through this section is that primarily elite men in 
powerful positions, such as Congress or the Senate, have determined most legislation 
concerning servicewomen’s reproductive rights, with little, if any, input from 
servicewomen themselves. Additionally, this historical examination reveals that abortion 
legislation, similar to other legislation that involves women’s reproductive rights, often 
disproportionately affects lower class women, a concept that has been termed the 
“biopolitical agenda of stratified reproduction” (Gaines & Davis-Floyd, 2004, p. 102). 
The following sections will discuss various events within military abortion policy 
and will at times also mention U.S. abortion policies that affected and/or influenced 
military policy as well, such as Roe v. Wade and the Hyde Amendment. To be sure, this 
is not an exhaustive account of every single piece of abortion legislation in the United 
States to date; instead, it is a broader diachronic account of U.S. military abortion policies 
and their rhetoric and how those policies have evolved (Condit, 1990; McGee, 1980). In 
this section, I argue that the histories of abortion policies in the military reveal that 
abortion rights for servicewomen have not followed a progressive trajectory, as the most 
recent amendment is more restrictive than the earliest military abortion policies.  
 
History of Military Abortion Policies through 1975 
In 1821, the first law banning abortion in the United States was passed in 
Connecticut (Segal, 2012). Unlike much abortion legislation today, the impetus behind 
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the law at that point was not morality, but rather to protect the safety and lives of 
pregnant women, as abortion procedures were quite dangerous. From 1821 until 1973, 
abortions were governed on a state-by-state basis, and abortion policies evolved to 
encompass moralistic, rather than only safety concerns.  
Within the military, there were no formal abortion policies before 1970 (Burrelli, 
2013). In fact, beginning in 1966, military hospitals were no longer required to abide by 
civilian hospital laws, and therefore abortions were performed at military clinics, even if 
the states in which the bases were located did not allow abortions (Hansen, 2012; 
Jacobson & Jensen, 2011; Ponder & Nothnagle, 2010; Vuic, 2007). Discursively, this 
policy granted servicewomen and military dependents more access to abortions than the 
general public, essentially giving them more rights than civilians. Yet, abortion 
availability varied at this time, depending on the branch of the military, as the Air Force 
was more liberal and the Army and Navy were more conservative. Additionally, location 
(in terms of access) and physicians (and how they personally felt about abortions) 
impacted availability.  
At this time, both therapeutic and elective abortions were allowed within the 
military and were privately funded (Saunders, 2010). In fact, in 1970, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) implemented a policy that obligated military hospitals to provide abortion 
services to military members and their dependents if two physicians approved of the 
procedure (Ponder & Nothnagle, 2010; Vuic, 2007). Memoranda were issued to the 
surgeons general of all the military departments, which stated that abortions could be 
provided at military facilities if it was medically necessary, if the mother’s physical or 
mental health was in danger, and/or if there was available space at the facilities and 
 101 
capable medical staff (Boonstra, 2010; Burrelli, 2013). In these instances, if the 
physicians had religious, moral, or ethical objections, they were not obligated to perform 
the abortions. However, the memoranda also “stated unequivocally” that abortions could 
be provided without regard to the state laws in which the bases were located, which was 
“significant because, at the time, 30 states and the District of Columbia prohibited 
abortion except in cases of life endangerment, and three states (Louisiana, New 
Hampshire, and Pennsylvania) prohibited all abortions without exception” (Boonstra, 
2010, p. 2). The military’s law took precedence over the states’ laws in these cases, so 
that military women could obtain abortions at any base at which they were located, 
regardless of the domestic policies. At this point, servicewomen and military dependents 
often had more access to abortion care, and in some cases more agency, than did civilian 
women.  
Before moving on, I want to highlight the use of the word “mother” versus 
“woman” in terms of rhetorical power and symbolism in abortion policies and orders. 
The word mother brings with it many implications and cultural understandings revolving 
around maternity, motherhood, and relationships between a mother and child(ren), 
implicitly intimating that the fetus should be considered a child. Conversely, if she is 
called a woman, there is a sense of autonomy, independence, and separation from the 
fetus, and the fetus is not necessarily considered a child. In both of these cases, the way 
the pregnant woman is referenced impacts the relationship she has with the fetus and the 
politics surrounding the pregnancy. As Solinger (2007) explained, the rise of “fetal 
personhood” happened when people began to refer to the fetus as a child. This 
understanding has “made the fetus into a contested space” in regard to whether or not it is 
 102 
a person (p. 232). For the purposes of this paper, I will use the term woman unless the 
word mother is stated in the policy or statement under analysis. My decision to use 
woman instead of mother is an effort to avoid the moral implications of, as well as basic 
assumptions about, pregnant women who desire or consider abortion. 
This distinction is important, because, despite using the word “mother” in early 
military abortion policy, this policy also understood the woman as distinct from, rather 
than closely connected to, the fetus. Oftentimes, this was because of the need for more 
bodies to serve in the military, such as during the Vietnam War, and the needs of the 
military were placed above the needs of the fetus. Women stationed in Vietnam were 
given access to abortion services on military bases and were flown to bases in other 
countries, such as Japan, if needed (Burrelli, 2013; Ponder & Nothnagle, 2010; Vuic, 
2007). In these cases, women could obtain abortions without having to give a reason; the 
fact that women wanted an abortion was reason enough (Vuic, 2007). Although the 
Vietnam War was the first war in which pregnancy did not result in immediate discharge 
from the service, having this policy kept more troops serving in Vietnam, something that 
was desperately needed at the time (Vuic, 2007). The abortion policies during the 
Vietnam War were the most liberal to date and even more liberal than the policies for 
women serving in the armed forces in other locations at this time. 
Then, in 1971, President Nixon implemented a policy change that would be the 
beginning of ongoing restrictions on servicewomen’s access to abortion. His policy stated 
that military facilities must abide by the abortion laws in the states and countries in which 
the bases are located. This policy became known as the “good neighbor policy” and 
coincided with a change in the motivations behind abortion policies (Burrelli, 2013; 
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Ponder & Nothnagle, 2010). Whereas such policies used to be influenced by the danger 
abortions posed to the woman, the policies regulating abortions now stemmed from 
morality, as Nixon was morally against abortions (Hansen, 2012). This policy would 
mark the beginning of many debates over abortion rights and access both in the military 
and in the civilian realm. It also would be a significant example of how powerful men 
would make restrictive legislative decisions regarding women’s reproductive choices. 
 Shortly after, in 1973, the landmark case Roe v. Wade ruled that, based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s right of personal privacy, the U.S. Constitution protects 
women’s decisions to terminate their pregnancies. This decision acted to decriminalize 
abortions and instead position them as basic medical procedures, which also served as an 
effort to separate abortions from moral arguments (Shimabukuro, 2014).2 After this 
decision, abortions financed by taxpayer dollars became common in military facilities, 
since DoD funds covered abortions for women on DoD healthcare (Burrelli, 2013; 
Hansen, 2012). There were a few limitations on abortion coverage at this time, including 
that two physicians had to agree that the abortion was “medically indicated” or required 
for “reasons of mental health” and also that funding abortion services could not conflict 
with state laws in which the abortion was performed, thus reinforcing the good neighbor 
policy (Burrelli, 2013, p. 4).  
 That same year a companion decision was made in the case Doe v. Bolton. In this 
case, the Court ruled that states may not “unduly burden the exercise of that fundamental 
                                                
2 It is interesting to note that whereas women wanted abortion to be considered 
another medical procedure (a consideration that not only might decriminalize it, but also 
remove it from moral judgment), the women interviewed about their pregnancies did not 
agree with treating pregnancy as a medical procedure (see Chapter IV in this dissertation). 
In these two cases, it appears that a woman’s relationship to the fetus—as a mother or as 
a woman—impacts her view of appropriate medical terminology, attention, and care. 
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right with regulations that prohibit or substantially limit access to the means of 
effectuating the decision to have an abortion” (Shimabukuro, 2014, p. 1). Furthermore, 
the Court warned that similar to how states cannot make abortions a crime in order to 
prevent them, they also cannot make it “unreasonably difficult” to obtain an abortion by 
“prescribing elaborate procedural barriers” (Shimabukuro, 2014, p. 2). As a result, the 
Court rejected the requirements that licensed hospitals be the only facilities that could 
perform abortions, that a hospital committee approves of the abortion beforehand, and 
that two physicians must concur on the abortion decision. The Court did continue to 
protect the rights of hospitals and employees who refused to perform abortions due to 
religious and moral beliefs. These decisions, while groundbreaking, did not make access 
much easier or the laws much clearer; instead these cases just fueled the fires and 
generated even more debates over abortion services, access, and coverage. From 1960 to 
1973, servicewomen’s abortion rights became more and more restricted. Indeed, 
biopolitical regulation of women’s bodies continued to increase. And, although court 
cases appeared to help women fight against legal barriers to access, as will be noted in 
the next section, they may have had more discursive impact than material impact due to 
the various exceptions (good neighbor policy, conscience clause) in place that could limit 
servicewomen’s access and agency.    
 
History of Military Abortion Policies: 1975–2009 
In the wake of Roe v. Wade, from August 31, 1976–August 31, 1977, 
approximately 26,000 abortions were performed in military hospitals or through military 
insurance (Burrelli, 2013; Segal, 2012). However, in 1976, federal funding of abortions 
 105 
was significantly changed as Representative Henry Hyde fought to restrict the use of 
federal funds used for abortions through the Medicaid program (Shimabukuro, 2014). 
The Hyde Amendment, as it is now commonly referred to because of its original sponsor, 
stated that, “None of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to perform abortions 
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term” 
(94th Congress, 1976, 90 Stat 1434). This amendment severely limited women to one 
circumstance under which they could obtain insurance-covered abortions.  
Additionally, this amendment and its surrounding discourse were blatantly 
discriminatory and classist (Boonstra, 2013; Solinger, 2007). As Kimberly Inez McGuire, 
the Director of Public Affairs of the National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health 
argued, “The Hyde Amendment isn’t just about reproductive justice; it’s about economic 
justice” because it predominantly affects poor people of color (Culp-Ressler, 2014, para. 
18). Indeed, Hyde’s discourse surrounding the amendment acknowledged this in the 
debate over the measure. He argued that abortion should be a luxury available to women 
with means who can pay their own expenses, but not to poor women who rely on public 
funding (Boonstra, 2013, p. 3). Furthermore, he stated that, “If rich women want to enjoy 
their high-priced vices, that is their responsibility . . . that is fine, but not at the taxpayers’ 
expense” (Boonstra, 2013, p. 3). This statement is significant for several reasons, 
including the rhetorical choice to use language that referred to class privileges given to 
the “rich” who do not have to rely on taxpayer dollars and as a result have more agency 
in making personal decisions regarding abortions, as well as more access to abortions. 
Hyde’s statement also relied on moral understandings of abortion, calling abortions 
“high-priced vices” in an effort to position women who do choose to pay for their own 
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abortions as morally inept.   
Furthermore, when accused of being classist in policy, Senator Orrin Hatch 
defended the Hyde Amendment and argued that the policy did not prevent anyone from 
receiving an abortion since poor women could just save their money (he suggested 
perhaps $5 or $10 a week) until they had enough to pay for an abortion (Solinger, 2007). 
This logic is saturated in ignorance, as it ignores the reality that poor women do not likely 
have the means to save money weekly in case they might one day need an unplanned 
abortion; once they discover they are pregnant, by the time they could save enough 
money it would likely be too late to obtain an abortion. The rhetoric of Hyde and Hatch 
revealed a disconnect to the material realities of poor women. 
Perhaps in a way to reconcile this issue, when the Hyde Amendment was 
readdressed in Congress in 1977, Hyde explained that, “I certainly would like to prevent, 
if I could legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a middle-class woman, or a 
poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the . . . Medicaid bill” 
(Boonstra, 2013, p. 3). As a result, the Hyde Amendment mainly affected low-income 
women who were on comprehensive health care plans. The emphasis on the demographic 
of women who are most severely affected by this legislation plays into the biopolitical 
agenda of stratified reproduction.  Originally coined by Shellee Colen, this phrase 
“encapsulates the myriad discriminatory hierarchies affecting women’s reproductive 
choices and treatments” (Gaines & Davis-Floyd, 2004, p. 102).  Typically, as Kessler 
(2009) explained, stratified reproduction often benefits white, middle-class, insured 
women and denies the same benefits to women of lower classes. In a tragic example of 
the impact of the Hyde Amendment on poor women, a pregnant teen who was denied 
 107 
abortion coverage shot herself in the stomach after she was told it would cost her $600 in 
cash if she was to obtain an abortion at a public hospital (Trussell, Menken, Lindheim, & 
Vaughan, 1980). That cost was more than twice the amount of the average welfare check 
for an entire family for 2 months (Solinger, 2007). 
Yet, although the Hyde Amendment denied protection to “poor women and only 
poor women” in terms of abortion rights, it was likely understood that starting with 
legislation for poor women could eventually impact all women (Solinger, 2007, p. 201). 
Therefore, although it was only supposed to govern Medicaid, the focus on federal 
funding inspired the passage of additional restrictions on abortion in other spheres, 
affecting people such as Indian Health Services recipients, Peace Corps volunteers, and 
military personnel (Ponder & Nothnagle, 2010).  
Following the Hyde Amendment, in 1977 three cases ruled that states have no 
obligation to fund or provide access for elective abortions (Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 
[1977]; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 [1977]; and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 [1977] 
[per curiam]; Burrelli, 2013, p. 9). Whereas under Roe women were given the right to an 
abortion, these three cases understood that having the right to an abortion did not 
automatically imply access to abortion services, ultimately voiding any rights the women 
might have. At this time, the debate over coverage of therapeutic and elective abortions 
became more intense, and the definition of what exceptions were to be considered 
therapeutic (read: allowed) abortion became increasingly significant.  
As a result of legislation on federal funding of abortions to Medicaid recipients, in 
1978, Representative Robert Dornan argued for new restrictions on federal funding of 
abortions (Burrelli, 2013; Hansen, 2012). Consequently, the 1979 Defense 
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Appropriations Bill stated that no federal funds could be used for abortions  
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried 
to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or 
incest, when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement 
agency or public health service; or except in those instances where severe and 
long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy 
were carried to term when so determined by two physicians. (Burrelli, 2013, p. 4) 
 
This new legislation, while allowing federal funding of abortions in four cases—
immediate life endangerment of the mother, long-term health danger for the mother, rape, 
and incest—is interesting to examine closer. First, as was mentioned earlier, the use of 
the word “mother” instead of “woman” connotes assumptions that the only reason 
women would be seeking an abortion that is funded by the government would be in the 
most severe cases of health endangerment or trauma, when the woman is supposedly 
“innocent.” The women covered by the bill are considered mothers who would otherwise 
care for their unborn children if the circumstances of their pregnancies (which are out of 
their control, positioning them as blameless) were not so difficult. In addition to 
positioning women as mothers, the bill also required that women “promptly” report rape 
if they want to have the abortion funded. The use of “promptly” is vague and open to 
interpretation, which could act as yet another obstacle to obtaining access to an abortion. 
After a woman is raped, what she considers prompt and what law officials consider 
prompt may be quite different.      
Because of the change in legislation, the following year, 1979, there was a 
decrease in the amount of abortions performed at military facilities. In total, 1,300 
abortions were performed overseas at military facilities, but they were privately funded 
(Burrelli, 2013; Segal, 2012). This was a significant drop in the number of abortions 
compared to 1976–77 discussed earlier.  
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Then, in 1980, two pieces of legislation altered abortion rights in the U.S. and in 
the military. Under Chief Justice Burger, the case Harris v. McRae found that Roe had 
not established the legality of abortion and therefore the necessity of federally funding it, 
but only that abortion was no longer to be criminalized. This meant that women could 
obtain abortions—if they were allowed in their state—but that they were not guaranteed 
funding by the government (Solinger, 2007). Additionally in 1980, the language for the 
FY1981 DoD Appropriations Act became even more specific. The amendment stated that 
funding would only be given to victims of rape and incest “when such rape has within 
seventy-two hours been reported to a law enforcement agency or public health service” 
(Burrelli, 2013, p. 5). This language was no longer ambiguous (like “promptly”), and 
likely presented significant issues for rape victims. After being raped, a woman 
essentially had 6 days to report the rape if she was concerned that she might be pregnant 
as a result and may want an abortion. This meant that women had to report the rape, a 
traumatically violating and private event, before they even discovered if they were 
pregnant.  However, if they did not report the rape soon enough, and later discovered they 
were pregnant, they would have no option for an abortion. The new abortion legislation 
limited women’s options and contributed to the regressive trajectory in military abortion 
rights and access.  
Following suit, 1 year later, in 1981, the rape and incest exceptions were 
completely removed from the amendment, and it was decided that federal funding could 
only be used in cases where the woman’s life was in danger if the pregnancy were carried 
to term (Burrelli, 2013; Saunders, 2010; Segal, 2012). Abortions could still be performed 
on military bases, but they had to be privately funded, or prepaid, if they were performed. 
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So, women could still obtain abortions if they were victims of rape or incest, but they 
were required to pay for them out of pocket.  
However, private funding of abortions on military bases would soon be 
discontinued. By 1988, restrictions became very limiting, as privately funded abortions at 
military medical facilities were no longer allowed (Burrelli, 2013). In the memorandum 
that barred abortions at military medical facilities, Dr. William Mayer, who was the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated that, although  
the informal practice of performing so called “pre-paid” abortions in very limited 
circumstances outside the United States does not violate the legal prohibition . . . 
it might suggest insensitivity to the spirit of the Congressionally-enacted policy of 
withholding government involvement in the provision of abortions. (Boonstra, 
2010, p. 3) 
 
This restriction was a crucial change for women overseas because their choices for places 
to obtain abortions outside of military facilities could be very limited, not to mention 
dangerous, due to the lack of safe, legal, and affordable options available (Saunders, 
2010; Segal, 2012). For example, one servicewomen explained that she became pregnant 
while serving in Germany and went to a German clinic to obtain an abortion since she 
could not get one on the U.S. base. She ended up having a severe reaction to the 
anesthetic used in the procedure, but because she did not know what type of anesthetic 
the German doctors had used, the doctors at the U.S. base could not accurately evaluate 
her condition, putting her life at risk (Stand with Servicewomen, 2012).  
During this time, court cases continued to make decisions on abortion restrictions 
within the U.S. and on federal funding. In Webster v. Reproductive Services (1989) it was 
ruled that states had more license in the ways they restrict abortions and therefore access 
to the procedure. Then, in Rust v. Sullivan (1991) it was ruled that women who were 
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recipients of federal funding could not receive federally funded counsel about the option 
of abortion or have abortion-related activities covered. Despite possessing a 
constitutional right to abortion, the logic was that the government was under no 
obligation to subsidize something just because it is a constitutional right (Shimabukuro, 
2014). Additionally, the legislation was an effort to clearly separate any potential federal 
involvement or relationship with abortion procedures, which also implicitly implied that 
abortion is morally wrong.  
From 1976 until the 1990s, the Hyde Amendment’s only real exception was for 
the life of the mother. In 1993, however, the exceptions of rape and incest were once 
again added as a reason women could obtain abortions at federal hospitals, although those 
cases were still excluded from DoD funding for military personnel. That year President 
Clinton also issued a memorandum that stated that the ban on privately funded abortions 
at military clinics was “unwarranted” (Clinton, 1993). As a result, the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Health Affairs, Dr. Stephen C. Joseph issued a memorandum with the goal 
of making a consistent and unified DoD policy regarding abortion funding. Specifically, 
the 1994 policy had five parts that 
(1) provided access to abortion services for service women and eligible 
dependents overseas, (2) required the valid consent of a parent or other designated 
person in the case of a minor who was “not mature enough and well enough 
informed to give valid consent,” (3) relieved those medical practitioners directly 
involved from performing abortions if they objected, (4) respected host nation 
laws regarding abortion, and, (5) directed the Military Health Services System to 
provide other means of access if providing pre-paid abortion services at a facility 
was not feasible. (Burrelli, 2013, p. 7) 
 
However, lifting the ban did not have the type of impact that Clinton may have 
anticipated. Despite a more liberal policy regarding abortions, access was still an issue. 
For example, oftentimes there were no doctors who were deployed who were willing to 
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perform abortions, and the good neighbor policy was still quite restrictive. As a result, 
only 37 abortions were performed when the ban was lifted (Segal, 2012).  
 The small number of abortions performed and the lack of willingness in general 
by health care personnel in the military has been explained in a few ways. First, because 
fewer medical schools require training in abortion procedures compared to the years 
immediately following Roe v. Wade’s decision, many doctors might not be comfortable 
performing the procedure.3 Additionally, the military as an organization, and military 
personnel more specifically, tend to be more conservative on social issues than the 
general population. Therefore, even if medical personnel were trained, they might not 
volunteer to perform a procedure, especially if they have a moral or ethical opposition to 
it. Also, the good neighbor policy was still in place, which meant that the military bases 
had to abide by the laws of the country in which they were located. As such, the 
restrictions in a country may limit or forbid any elective abortions (Burrelli, 2013). 
 Whereas at face value the Clinton Memorandum discursively seemed to be a way 
to help servicewomen and dependents overseas, in actuality it really did quite little to 
increase access. Therefore, when Congress reinstated the ban on abortions on military 
bases in 1996, it was not as dramatic of a change as it may appear (Burrelli, 2013; Ponder 
& Nothnagle, 2010). Title 10 of United States Code Section 1093 was amended to state 
                                                
3 Other often-elective surgeries are routinely performed on military bases, such as 
vasectomies and cosmetic surgeries like liposuction and breast implants. Former 
Department of Defense spokesman, James Turner, explained that the reason these types 
of surgeries are performed is because they help keep the military doctors current when it 
comes to reconstructive surgeries, which is crucial when treating soldiers’ combat 
wounds (HeraldNet, 2004). In contrast, abortion does not have the same transferrable 
payoff in terms of skills used by doctors, and therefore has not been deemed as necessary 
for doctors to practice. 
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that privately funded abortions were once again banned at military facilities and that 
federal funds could only be used when a woman’s life was at risk. Additionally, Public 
Law 104-106 was enacted in 1996, which stated that no DoD facility could be used to 
perform an abortion except in the cases where the mother’s life is in danger if the fetus is 
carried to full term or in cases of rape or incest (104th Congress, 1996, 110 Stat 383; 
Burrelli, 2013, p. 2). It amended U.S. Code Section 1093 as follows: 
(a) Restriction on Use of Funds—Funds available to the Department of Defense 
may not be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would 
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. 
(b) Restriction on Use of Facilities—No medical treatment facility or other 
facility of the Department of Defense may be used to perform an abortion except 
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term 
or in a case in which the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest. 
(Burrelli, 2013, p. 3) 
 
Section 1093(b) still stands today (with the addition of rape and incest exceptions to part 
(a) as a result of the MAA), despite President Clinton’s protests. Specifically, on January 
3, 1996, he vetoed the act that would change Section 1093, stating in a letter to Congress,  
H.R. 1530 also contains . . . provisions that would unfairly affect certain service 
members. . . . I remain very concerned about provisions that would restrict service 
women and female dependents of military personnel from obtaining privately 
funded abortions in military facilities overseas, except in cases of rape, incest, or 
danger to the life of the mother. In many countries, these U.S. facilities provide 
the only accessible, safe source for these medical services. Accordingly, I urge the 
Congress to repeal a similar provision that became law in the “Department of 
Defense Appropriations Act, 1996.” (Clinton, 1996, p. H12) 
 
Clinton’s rhetoric is interesting for several reasons. First, he appealed to fairness, 
expressing the inequitable nature of coverage in regard to servicewomen, a common 
theme in the current rhetoric around the MAA, as will be discussed shortly. Additionally, 
his reference to the word “mother” articulated the women once again as mothers and 
appealed to those who may have been morally opposed to abortion by framing those 
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denied abortion coverage as maternal and as facing a traumatic situation out of their 
control (they were ultimately blameless victims, who would suffer because their lives 
were in danger or they were sexually assaulted). Finally, he appealed to Congress to act 
as protectors, providing “safe” places for servicewomen to obtain abortions. These three 
themes—motherhood, victims, and protection—have often been repeated in the fight for 
more liberal abortion policies and move away from the language of prevention and 
protection of the fetus in the Hyde Amendment and toward protection of servicewomen 
and their rights.  
Additionally, Burrelli (2013) reported that as a result of Public Law 104-106, 53 
therapeutic abortions were performed at military facilities in the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force between 1996–2009. Although an amendment to allow abortions at facilities 
overseas was proposed in 2006, it did not pass the House by a vote of 191–237 (Saunders, 
2010).  
 
History of Military Abortion Policies: 2009–present 
  From 1996 until 2009, the issue of federal funding for abortions was largely 
dormant. In the summer of 2009, President Obama started implementing health care 
reform; however, he and prochoice leaders in Congress did not want the health care 
reform to reopen debates over federal funding of abortions, so they advocated to continue 
the status quo (Boonstra, 2013). As a result, abortion activists backed down, but 
antiabortion activists saw this as an opportunity to redefine what was considered for 
federal funding, through efforts such as the introduction of the Stupak Amendment. This 
amendment, put forth by Representatives Bart Stupak and Joseph Pitts, argued that no 
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federal funding could pay for abortions, and no private insurance that receives any federal 
money could fund abortions (Stupak & Pitts, 2009). In congressional debate, arguments 
for the amendment claimed that it “ensures that pro-life Americans will not be forced to 
fund, enable, or facilitate the killing of unborn children and the wounding of their 
mothers” (“Congressional record—House,” 2009, p. H12849). Despite appeals to 
morality and the rhetoric of protection from horrible violence (killing children and 
wounding mothers) in which taxpayers would indirectly be associated, the amendment 
did not pass, receiving 45 of the needed 60 votes (Stupak, 2010).   
 In March 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law and 
represented a compromise for both sides. It stated that federal funds could only be used in 
cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest (Boonstra, 2013). However, this was a 
decision on federal funding in general, and the military’s policy remained more limited, 
stating that for service members and their dependents, federal funds could still only be 
used to cover abortion in cases of life endangerment.  
 The same year, Senator Roland Burris proposed an amendment that would reverse 
the policy regarding abortions at military facilities. His proposal was for elective 
abortions to be allowed at military facilities, especially in cases where women would pay 
out of pocket for the procedures (Boonstra, 2010). The change would have struck out 
Section 1093(b), therefore allowing abortions at military facilities, but not funding them 
(Saunders, 2010). Because the law did not specify domestic or international, the 
amendment would have had an effect worldwide. However, it was still limited by the 
DoD’s good neighbor policy, and women would still have been prevented from obtaining 
abortions at bases located in countries where abortion was illegal. 
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 As has been the case with all abortion legislation, there was much opposition to 
this proposed type of change in abortion laws from lawmakers as well as military 
members, which included military women, such as Army Sergeant Pauline Keehn, who 
supported abortion rights, but not in the armed forces due to what she perceived were 
significant logistical problems that could detract from the military’s mission (HeraldNet, 
2004). Arguments like Keehn’s point to the disciplinary and regulatory functions of the 
military as an apparatus of biopower that limits and closely regulates women’s bodies 
and their functions that may intrude upon military functions. 
Specifically in terms of the Burris Amendment, legislative opposition came from 
Senator Roger Wicker and Representative Todd Akin, who argued that if abortions were 
allowed at military hospitals, it would effectively make them “abortion mills” (Boonstra, 
2010, p. 3). Explicit in this statement is the understanding that so many military women 
want to obtain abortions that all other medical procedures would have to be put on hold in 
order to accommodate the dramatic increase in demand for abortions once the law passed. 
Problematic with this assumption is that no one was asking why there may be so many 
military women seeking abortions in the first place (high rates of intramilitary rape, for 
example), if this assumption is true.  
Furthermore, Wicker, Akin, and others argued that it was important to keep the 
current law prohibiting women from obtaining abortions at military facilities, even if the 
women paid for the abortions out of pocket because allowing such procedures at military 
hospitals “is tantamount to government sanctioning of the procedure, and that it would 
effectively turn military hospitals into abortion clinics” (Boonstra, 2010, p. 2). If the 
current law stayed in place, women could only have abortions at military facilities in 
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cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest, and only the first case would be funded by 
insurance. Furthermore, opposition to the amendment argued that even if women paid for 
the abortions themselves, the government would still be complicit because the military 
facilities, doctors, and equipment are all funded by taxpayer dollars. Therefore, taxpayers 
would ultimately be funding abortions both in terms of access and the procedure (Segal, 
2012, p. 345). It is important to note in all of these arguments the long-standing focus on 
the wellbeing of the fetus over the wellbeing of the mother, an understanding that 
originated in the early 1900s with the advent of prenatal care (Seigel, 2013). 
Additionally, in these debates it is easy to see how the conflation of the private 
and public spheres of women’s lives had developed since the 1960s. Whereas in the 
1960s, women in the military had much more control over their own reproductive 
decisions, especially in regard to abortions, by the 2000s the personal had become quite 
political, and servicewomen’s decisions about their own reproductive choices had come 
under public scrutiny due to their chosen careers. Because the Federal Government 
employs servicewomen and because the government is funded by taxpayer dollars, 
justifications have been made that not only could the military discipline service members 
to be good soldiers, it could also regulate servicewomen’s personal reproductive lives. 
This is an example of what Foucault (1976/2006) called “hysterization” of womens’ 
bodies, wherein women’s bodies are disciplined, scrutinized, and under public 
surveillance in the name of public health (p. 104). In these cases, women are 
biopolitically discriminated against due to their biology (i.e., their bodies can become 
pregnant) in a way that servicemen are not.  
 Indeed, supporters of the Burris Amendment argued that women who enlisted in 
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the military were being penalized for choosing to serve their country (Boonstra, 2010, p. 
4). Many of these arguments came in the form of equity and fairness. As Boonstra (2010) 
explained, proponents of the Burris Amendment contended that,  
with the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is time that the United States 
stop treating its women in uniform as second-class citizens. It is fundamentally 
unjust, they say, to deny women who have volunteered to serve their country from 
exercising their legally protected right simply because of where they are stationed. 
(Boonstra, 2010, p. 7) 
 
It should be noted that in this language, there was no appeal to maternity, or that which 
functions to separate women from men, but rather an appeal to citizenship and rights, or 
that which unites the sexes. Furthermore, proponents of the Burris Amendment—which 
included lawmakers, military officials, servicewomen, and veterans—argued that instead 
of looking at whether abortion should be legal and/or under which circumstances, “equal 
access and rights” were of greater importance, especially to women overseas, where the 
“ban on privately funded abortions is cruel and unfair” (Boonstra, 2010, p. 2). Threaded 
throughout these arguments were appeals to equality and fairness for servicewomen who 
were not receiving the same benefits not only of their civilian counterparts, but also of 
other Americans who relied on federal funding. Ultimately, the Burris Amendment 
passed the Senate Armed Services committee (by a vote of 15–12) and was included in 
the Defense Authorization Act on May 27, 2010, but was defeated in December of 2010 
(Segal, 2012, p. 345).  
 The fight for equality for servicewomen was not over, however, as many 
lawmakers continued to fight for better legislation for servicewomen. In 2011, Senator 
Jeanne Shaheen, a New Hampshire Democrat, proposed two amendments regarding 
abortion in the military. One proposal included rape and incest provisions for health care 
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coverage. The second was a revival of the Burris Amendment and would have allowed 
elective abortions at military facilities, if the women paid for the procedures themselves 
(Cunningham, 2012). Both of her proposals were blocked on the Senate floor. The 
measures by Burris and Shaheen represented attempts to move military abortion policy 
toward a more liberating trajectory for servicewomen, thus granting them more rights, 
agency, and access when it came to their personal decisions regarding abortions. 
However, the persistent defeat of such measures only continued the regressive trajectory 
of military abortion policies, problematically limiting servicewomen’s and dependents’ 
abortion rights. 
The following year, Shaheen narrowed her focus and presented what came to be 
called the “Shaheen Amendment.” This amendment proposed that there be an exemption 
for abortions to be covered by federal insurance in cases of rape and incest in addition to 
life endangerment, but did not appeal for federal funds to be used in other circumstances, 
or for privately funded elective abortion access (Shaheen, 2012, para. 6). As this 
amendment gained traction and publicity, language of fairness and protection was used as 
justification for the new legislation. For example, Retired Major General of the U.S. 
Army, Dennis Laich, was quoted explaining that the Shaheen Amendment was “greatly 
needed” because “it’s simply unfair to deny our military women the same abortion 
coverage that other government employees have. Our servicewomen fight every day for 
us—it’s time we fight for them” (Shaheen, 2012, para. 9). Furthermore, Gale Pollock, 
also a retired US Army Major General, advocated that  
Women who put their lives on the line fighting for our freedom shouldn’t be 
denied reproductive health care services. The Shaheen Amendment restores 
fairness to discriminatory legislation that denies servicewomen access to the 
healthcare they need. At the very least, our servicewomen deserve the same level 
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of coverage as other women who rely on the government for their health care. 
(Shaheen, 2012, para. 10) 
 
In both of these quotes, the common themes of fairness, equity, and protection from the 
government are conflated so that protection equals equality. This is interesting to note 
because in all of the discourses surrounding the amendment, equality with men, a 
common feminist argument (Cott, 1986; de Beauvoire, 1989a; Gilligan, 1997; Grosz, 
1994; Haslanger, 2006; Kaufman-Osborn, 2006; MacKinnon, 1987; Spelman, 1988; 
Steinem, 1978; Young, 2005) is not mentioned, but rather equality with other women. In 
order to get these rights, it is argued, women need to be protected, a theme that has also 
been popular throughout history in terms of the relationship between men and women, 
and the gender stereotypes related to women (see also Heck & Schlag, 2012; Mohanty, 
1991, 2006; Young, 2003a, 2003b).  
One of the biggest turning points for the 2012 version that Shaheen proposed was 
bipartisan support in the Armed Services Committee, something that was lacking the 
prior year. Specifically, GOP Senators John McCain, Susan Collins, and Scott Brown 
signed on to the amendment, which likely helped significantly (Cunningham, 2012). The 
Military Abortion Amendment passed in the FY13 NDAA in January 2013 (as was 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter) and marked the first time that military 
women would not have to pay out of pocket for abortions due to rape since 1981 (Bassett, 
2012). However, despite this important step, women were still more limited in 2012 than 
they had been in 1960, when elective abortions were also allowed. In what follows, I will 




The Military Abortion Amendment 
In the second part of this chapter, I analyze discourse surrounding the MAA, 
including newspaper articles, videos, congressional records and statements, scholarly 
articles, and feminist blogs, and arrive at two conclusions. First, I argue that political 
leaders, military leaders, and the media have utilized the powerful rhetoric implicit in the 
ideograph <equality> to claim that the MAA was a major step in the progress of 
servicewomen's equality, even though material progress was limited. This argument 
surfaced in two discursive themes: framing servicewomen as dependents who need equal 
protection and the role of rape in abortion legislation. Secondly, I argue that despite 
increasing the number of circumstances in which servicewomen may obtain abortions, 
the Military Abortion Amendment still perpetuates a problematic lack of agency and 
access for servicewomen in terms of abortion. This argument emerged from three 
discursive themes: back-alley abortions, depriving servicewomen’s agency, and lack of 
actual access to abortion. Through the analysis of these two arguments and their 
subthemes I conclude that the articulation of the servicewomen’s subject position(s) 
created by these public discourses merely inserted them into subject positions that already 
dominate general abortion debates, instead of actually granting them freedom, agency, 
and access. The following sections will discuss each argument and theme in more depth. 
 
<Equality> 
One overarching argument that emerged from the analysis of various coverage of 
the MAA is the issue of equality for servicewomen, an ongoing theme in discourse 
regarding military abortion rights. More specifically, this discourse relies on the powerful 
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rhetoric implicit in the ideograph <equality>. McGee (1980) explained that ideographs 
are abstract, commonplace words that link rhetoric and ideology and have meanings 
generally understood as “obvious” to a culture’s population, of which <equality> is a 
prime example (see also Cloud, 1998; Condit & Lucaites, 1993). The abstract nature of 
ideographs contributes to contestations over ideographs’ meanings, yet ideographs are 
not completely polysemous and have limits to their employment, which helps maintain 
their political force in controlling public beliefs (Condit & Lucaites, 1993; McGee, 1980). 
In terms of the MAA, <equality> was used to frame the amendment as more 
emancipatory than it actually was. In these cases, different groups interpreted the 
ideograph differently, with some understanding <equality> to mean equality with other 
women, while others understood it to mean achieving social justice for servicewomen. In 
the following subsections, I argue that some media and politicians utilized <equality> to 
position servicewomen as dependent and to draw attention away from the epidemic of 
rape by focusing on increased rights of servicewomen. 
 Positioning servicewomen as dependents. Some of the media and as well as a few 
politicians framed the larger goal behind the MAA as achieving a state of equality 
between servicewomen and other women employed by the federal government. Before 
the bill passed, prochoice advocates like Segal (2012) explained that many other women 
had rights, but that servicewomen were “on their own” in obtaining abortion coverage, 
explicitly suggesting that servicewomen were ignored and neglected (p. 347). In Segal’s 
discussion, as well as others, specific populations of women—the general U.S. female 
population as well as other women on federal funding—were referenced in comparison to 
servicewomen. These comparisons positioned servicewomen not as independent soldiers, 
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but as dependents in need of protection. This gendered assumption is reminiscent of 
sexist understandings of women as the weaker sex, dependent on men for provision and 
protection. 
Much of the discourse surrounding the MAA focused on other women who were 
on federal funding and already had abortion coverage in cases of life endangerment, rape, 
or incest, including federal employees like postal workers as well as civilians on 
Medicaid (“An Injustice for Women in Uniform,” 2011; “The Rights of Female Soldiers,” 
2012; “Two Important Steps for Women,” 2012; Bassett, 2012; Iskra, 2012a; Shaheen, 
2012; Yarrow, 2013). For instance, Senator Shaheen (2012) contended,  
This is about equity. Civilian women who depend on the federal government for 
health insurance—whether they are postal workers or Medicaid recipients—have 
the right to access affordable abortion care if they are sexually assaulted. It is only 
fair that the thousands of brave women in uniform fighting to protect our 
freedoms are treated the same. (para. 2) 
 
This statement by Shaheen is loaded with emotive language and laced with ideographs. 
First, Shaheen’s choice to lead with sexual assault as the primary reason for expanding 
coverage draws from the recent traumatic revelations of the epidemic of rape in the 
military (see Chapter II). This highly troubling and emotional topic cannot be ignored or 
denied and serves to position military women as victims as a result of rape. Additionally, 
framing the coverage as helping all federal dependents, from postal workers to Medicaid 
recipients, revealed how isolated and exceptional the servicewomen were since they 
appeared to be the only population left without such rights. Finally, in the last sentence, 
Shaheen drew from extreme patriotic language, using the words “brave,” “uniform,” and 
“protect” and the ideograph of <freedom> to unmistakably frame servicewomen as 
valiant soldiers selflessly fighting for others and receiving little in return, which 
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ultimately framed the government as unpatriotic. Shaheen positioned servicewomen as 
both victims and as soldiers, yet the ultimate message is that the women need to be 
protected by the government, enforcing servicewomen’s subject positions as victims. 
Instead of equality being empowering, the language of Shaheen’s plea positioned military 
women not as protectors, but as dependents in need of protection. 
Additionally, in a Time magazine piece, Iskra (2012b) highlighted the disparity in 
coverage of federal dependents explaining, “Unlike others who rely on the government 
for their health care needs, including federal workers, members of Congress, and prison 
inmates, military women—including military wives and daughters—cannot get coverage 
for abortion in cases of rape or incest” (para. 2). Two important points should be noted 
from Iskra’s statement. First, like Shaheen, Iskra utilized the rhetoric of dependency by 
mentioning military wives and daughters in addition to military women. This strategy 
drew from traditional masculine notions of militaries, combat, and war, according to 
which men are fighting to protect the women back home. Whether it was because Iskra 
did not think people would sympathize with military women, or because “wives and 
daughters” sound more vulnerable, her emphasis on dependent populations situated 
women associated with the military as dependents. Second, by emphasizing the diversity 
of those covered by government insurance, Iskra’s statement draws attention to the 
multiple populations that benefit from the abortion coverage that servicewomen have 
long been denied. Iskra made the inequity stark by naming specific groups of people, 
such as members of Congress and prison inmates so that it was not open to interpretation 
and hence more difficult to overlook.   
 In fact, a majority of the news articles mentioned how the most offensive aspect 
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of federal funding was that prison inmates possessed coverage when servicewomen did 
not (“An Injustice,” 2011; “Rights of Female Soldiers,” 2012; “Two Important Steps,” 
2012; Yarrow, 2013). The comparison of female soldiers to prison inmates magnified the 
injustice, juxtaposing women who were voluntarily fighting for freedom with women 
who have defied the nation’s legal dictates. Discursively, these arguments framed women 
serving in the armed forces as more imprisoned than inmates in that they chose to serve 
their country and were rewarded with fewer rights than criminals. Essentially, these 
articles hold that the servicewomen were protecting their country, but their country was 
not protecting them.  
Furthermore, in discussions of equality surrounding the abortion policies in the 
military, abortion advocates often argued that women’s most basic constitutional rights 
were being violated, especially in comparison to the general U.S. population (Hansen, 
2012; Segal, 2012). As Jessica Kenyon (2011), a former member of the U.S. Army, 
explained, shortly after joining the armed forces she often heard servicewomen say, “we 
are defending a Constitution that doesn’t apply to us” (para. 1). Furthermore, Segal 
(2012) argued that the women who choose to protect their country “have inferior 
constitutional protections” and that there is no reason for this, “rational or otherwise” (p. 
350). The repetitive appeal to denied constitutional rights framed servicewomen’s rights 
as less than those of the citizens whom they protect. 
In addition to veterans like Kenyon, Senators Shaheen and Gillibrand found this 
discrepancy problematic. When expressing frustration over the disparity, both senators 
used the language of protection, framing servicewomen as protectors working hard to 
defend the rights of citizens, whose rights often exceeded those of servicewomen. 
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Advocating for the amendment, Shaheen argued, “Women in the military would finally 
have the same rights to reproductive health services as the civilians they protect” 
(Shaheen, 2012, para. 1). And, Senator Gillibrand was quoted as saying that, “It is an 
outrage and a national security risk that the women in our military do not have the same 
basic protections for reproductive health care as women across the U.S.” and furthermore 
that the amendment would be a “strong step forward towards putting an end to this 
egregious injustice” (Shaheen, 2012, para. 3). Senators Shaheen and Gillibrand argued 
that servicewomen have been overlooked and ignored in terms of reproductive health 
services and rights. The juxtaposing of servicewomen with average citizens again served 
to highlight the inequity and equated it with injustice since servicewomen were framed as 
being punished, rather than rewarded, for their effort and sacrifice.  
Moreover, a few of the news articles leading up to the MAA explained that those 
women affected by the ban were often of a similar demographic: single, enlisted 
servicewomen. In another Time article Iskra (2012a) explained, “Most rape victims are 
junior enlisted women who cannot afford an abortion in the civilian sector. Enlisted earn 
less pay, and often come from families who cannot afford to help them” (para. 4). As 
Iskra contended, making abortions available on military bases if women pay out-of-
pocket still did not grant equality.  Not only do rape and incest victims need better access 
to abortions, but Iskra emphasized that they also needed healthcare coverage (like 
civilian workers) due to their financial position.  An editorial in the New York Times 
further stressed this point, stating, “dealing with the trauma of rape is difficult enough. 
Making a modestly paid enlistee find the money to end a pregnancy resulting from a rape 
is inextricably cruel” (“An Injustice,” 2011, para. 4). Once again, the emphasis on the 
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demographic of women who are most severely affected by the ban highlighted stratified 
reproduction, as the poorest military members received the fewest benefits.  
Interestingly, most of the above statements compared servicewomen to women 
who already possessed abortion rights (Gillibrand, 2013b). Whereas it could (should?) be 
argued that women, as humans, deserve the rights to govern their own bodies, the 
arguments in these instances focused not on women’s innate rights, but rather use 
comparison as a way to justify their arguments. This means that the referents are not 
women with full agency over their bodies, but instead women with more limited agency 
than was granted to servicewomen pre-1976. As a result, as other feminists have argued 
about the problematic reasoning behind using males as the referent for equality (de 
Beauvoire, 1989b; MacKinnon, 1987), using other women with limited agency functions 
as a red herring to divert attention away from the rights of women to govern their own 
bodies, instead celebrating minor victories in legislation, and continuing to position 
servicewomen as dependents instead of protectors. 
The role of rape. More problematically than positioning women as dependents, it 
appears as if the ideograph of <equality> functions in the discourse circulating around the 
MAA to cover up the main impetus driving the passage of the amendment. Although the 
amendment supposedly grants more reproductive agency to servicewomen, the 
motivation behind the passage of the amendment is likely the increased proliferation of 
rape cases in the military and media coverage of the rape allegations (“A Barrier Drops,” 
2013; “Rights of Female Soldiers,” 2012; “Two Important Steps,” 2012; Cunningham, 
2012).  If all of the rape cases were not made public, would servicewomen still be denied 
equal healthcare insurance coverage? In this case, it seems equality in healthcare 
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coverage has only been granted because of the pervasive issue of rape in the military, not 
because servicewomen should be in control of their reproductive choices.  Through the 
widespread use of vocabulary that emphasized the ideograph <equality>, “a rhetoric of 
control” functions to divert attention from the systemic issues at hand, particularly the 
epidemic of rape in the armed forces, which is rooted in the (hyper)masculine culture of 
the institution (McGee, 1980, p. 6). Although there has been a long history of rape in the 
military, recent revelations (with the help of the film, The Invisible War) have made 
sexual assault in the military a very visible problem.  
The high prevalence of sexual assault in the military continues at unprecedented 
rates (see Chapter II). It is estimated that the rates of rape or attempted rape in the 
military are double that of the general population (Segal, 2012). The greater likelihood 
that military women will be victims of sexual assault compared to their civilian 
counterparts puts servicewomen in a position of increased risk for unintended pregnancy. 
Because of this increased risk, researchers have called for abortion policy reform in the 
military (Holt, Grindlay, Taskier, & Grossman, 2011). In fact, Segal (2012) expressed 
surprise at the failure of military abortion amendments (starting with the Burris 
Amendment) considering the increasing public knowledge of the high rates of rape and 
sexual assault in the U.S. military. 
 Indeed, many scholars, feminists, and abortion activists have explained that the 
epidemic of sexual assault in the U.S. military alone is justification for granting 
servicewomen abortion coverage and access (Boonstra, 2013; Grindlay & Grossman, 
2013; Holt et al., 2011; Oslund, 2012; Segal, 2012; Signer, 2011). For example, Signer 
(2011) argued that the policy, which only allowed abortion coverage in cases of life 
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endangerment (the policy before the MAA passed), was not good enough, contending, 
“It’s a callous, unjust policy—especially at a time when rape in the military is at crisis 
levels. Abortion restrictions are a moral issue; they deny women the ability to act 
according to the dictates of their conscience” (para. 2). Signer’s statement appeals to 
morality, but not in the traditional way it is often used in debates over abortion legislation. 
Whereas antiabortion activists often argue that abortion is immoral because it is killing a 
(potential) life, Signer argued that denying women rights to make decisions about their 
own bodies is immoral.  
Additionally Oslund (2012) used the “unsettling history and incidence of sexual 
assault in all branches of our military” as the reason the law needed to be changed (para. 
5). Oslund further referenced the concept of stratified reproduction and asserted that 
junior enlisted women are often the most affected by sexual assault and unintended 
pregnancy and are most often the ones living with the greatest financial strain. If the 
women were not given health care plans with abortion coverage in cases of rape, Oslund 
claimed, they would feel compelled to seek dangerous alternatives, such as self-abortions. 
Although this claim might seem dramatic at first blush, it is a real threat, as will be 
discussed shortly. 
Furthermore, much attention has been diverted from the issue of the systemic 
problem of rape and has been placed on individual women instead. For example, studies 
on military women and pregnancy have often looked at the behaviors of women to 
understand the high rate of unplanned pregnancies, which removes the women from the 
military context and places primary responsibility on them. One such study by Gerrard, 
Gibbons, and Warner (1991) looked at risk-taking behaviors of women Marines that 
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could lead to unplanned pregnancies. Ironically, this study was published in the same 
year as the 1991 U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Tailhook scandal, yet the study did not 
acknowledge unplanned pregnancies due to rape.  
Moreover, some antiabortion activists expressed concern that with the new rape 
exception in the MAA, servicewomen will falsely report rape out of desperation to obtain 
an abortion for an unplanned pregnancy (Yarrow, 2013). This logic functions to equate 
lying with the heinous act of rape, which consequently serves to relocate the blame back 
on women instead of addressing the larger systemic issues at stake—that rape is 
widespread in the military and that servicewomen have few options when it comes to 
unplanned pregnancies. Diverting attention away from rape and placing it on false reports 
plays into the long history of putting the blame and responsibility on women when it 
comes to reproductive issues. 
 Despite these challenges, in a climate of increasing knowledge of and frustration 
over the rape epidemic in the military, Boonstra (2013) argued the final straw that helped 
get military abortion legislation passed in the form of the MAA were ignorant and 
offensive comments by two lawmakers. Specifically, she argued that Senator Todd 
Akin’s comments about how “legitimate rapes” do not result in pregnancy because 
women’s bodies can “shut that whole thing down” (Blake, 2012, para. 3) as well as 
Senate candidate Richard Mourdock’s assertion that pregnancy from rape is “something 
that God intended to happen” (McDuffee, 2012, para. 2) helped push forward legislation 
at the end of 2012 to get the MAA included in the FY13 NDAA. The cavalier comments 
by both men caused many to question how seriously the issue of rape in the military was 
being handled.  
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The connection between military rape and abortion policies should not be 
overlooked. Women in the military had no abortion coverage in cases of rape or incest 
from 1981 until 2013. The momentum behind the MAA was likely fueled by the 
exposure of the appalling rape problem across all branches in the armed forces, as well as 
ignorant remarks by lawmakers, not the belief that all women deserve to have equal 
coverage. The use of <equality> diverts attention away from the systemic issue of rape 
and how elusive punishment for rapists is and instead focused on how military women 
can now receive the additional resource of abortion in certain instances.  
 
Perpetuating a Lack of Agency and Access 
 The second argument I make based on my analysis of discourse surrounding the 
MAA is that although servicewomen may now receive abortions in the cases of rape, 
incest, and health endangerment, the MAA still significantly limits their agency and 
access when it comes to abortion care. In the following subsections, I will explain how 
restrictions in agency and access not only have historically endangered women’s health 
when they took dramatic measures to end pregnancies, but also continues to insert 
women into problematic subject positions that require them to be “blameless” for the sex 
that led to the unintended pregnancy or lie about it if they are to receive coverage.  
Back alley abortions. First, discourses surrounding the MAA also appealed to the 
commonplace of botched self-inflicted or illegal back-alley abortions that goes back to 
the nineteenth century, explaining it was the servicewomen’s reactions to a lack of 
equality in coverage and access (Solinger, 2007). These accounts emphasized the 
desperation many women experienced when faced with unwanted pregnancies and no 
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abortion coverage and the drastic measures they attempted to end the pregnancies.  
Women were so desperate to avoid the harsh disciplinary measures and 
punishments for becoming pregnant, especially while deployed, that some of them 
attempted self-abortions (HeraldNet, 2004). As the National Abortion Federation (2010) 
explained, when military physicians are prohibited from providing abortions on base, 
even if the servicewoman uses her own funds, the alternatives are either traveling great 
distances to find an American provider, seeking abortion services from local facilities (if 
possible), or “having an unsafe, back-alley abortion” (para. 1). In cases like these, 
Grindlay et al. (2011) explained that women often do not feel they have alternatives and 
therefore “reported considering unsafe methods to terminate the pregnancy themselves” 
(p. 262). In many cases consideration turned to action in the form of self-abortions. 
 Quoting a female Marine who wished to remain anonymous, Bumiller (2010) 
explained how the soldier knew being unmarried and pregnant would not be beneficial 
for her military career.  Ultimately, she attempted a self-abortion that landed her in a 
“military hospital in Iraq with severe bleeding” (para. 8).  After the fiasco, she was 
honorably discharged.  The implied message in Bumiller’s news article was that if the 
servicewoman had the same abortion coverage and access as her civilian counterparts, 
she likely never would have attempted a self-abortion.  
In addition to the severe injury, the news coverage highlighted that many 
servicewomen who attempted self-inflicted abortions died as a result.  A video that was 
embedded in Iskra’s (2012a) news article, by the group Stand With Servicewomen (2012), 
quoted retired Brigadier General Clara Adams-Ender, an RN in the U.S. Army, who 
explained that during her time of service she saw many situations in which women were 
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desperate to end their pregnancies. Adams-Ender stated, 
They [the servicewomen] will do whatever it takes in order to make sure that they 
are not pregnant when they don’t want to be pregnant. And so I’ve seen some 
really sad cases of situations where individuals have . . . tried to do the abortions 
themselves, or went to other people who were not able to do it well and ended up 
with very sad outcomes, many times death. 
 
In these cases, biopolitical regulation of the womb had the opposite effect of what the law 
seemingly intended.  Whereas Kuhner (2011) argued in his article that if President 
Obama lifted the abortion ban, it would mean he “champions the culture of death,” these 
illustrations show that keeping the ban may also champion death—that of pregnant 
servicewomen (para. 4).  Although women’s lives may not have been in danger due to 
their pregnancies, the servicewomen’s reactions to a lack of or very limited abortion 
coverage and access, as well as a fear of ruining their careers, resulted in the 
endangerment of their own lives (Bumiller, 2011; Iskra, 2012a; Segal, 2012). The implied 
message is that equal abortion coverage may have prevented some of these terrifying 
self-abortions.  
Most of the news articles and interviews promoted the MAA in the name of 
stopping back alley abortions. However, the MAA only allows servicewomen abortion 
coverage and access to military medical facilities in three specific instances—rape, incest, 
and life endangerment—which all situate women as either “blameless” for the sex that 
led to the pregnancy or blameless for the complications that have endangered their lives. 
So women with unplanned pregnancies falling outside these parameters still do not have 
the right to have an abortion on military grounds.  
Depriving women of agency. Because H.R.4310 now grants all women working 
for the federal government equal access to abortion care, many news articles depicted 
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coverage of abortions as a triumph for servicewomen.  However, some news coverage 
emphasized that abortions are limited to three distinct circumstances: rape, incest, and 
when a woman’s health is at risk. This simultaneously expands and restricts 
servicewomen’s reproductive rights. Yet, Cunningham (2012) noted it was not a simple 
matter to rally for even a limited expansion to abortion coverage, explaining,  
Mrs. Shaheen has tried before to expand the Defense Department’s abortion 
coverage. She offered two amendments last year [2011] that were blocked on the 
Senate floor; one contained the rape and incest provision, while the other would 
have made elective abortions available at military medical centers if paid for out 
of pocket. (para. 9–10)  
 
Since both were rejected, Shaheen narrowed her focus in 2012 by omitting the elective 
abortions coverage proposal.  Her subsequent attempt was successful, as was discussed in 
the first part of this chapter. 
Although the inclusion of the Military Abortion Amendment in the FY13 NDAA 
may grant women more equality in terms of abortion rights, it is simultaneously quite 
restrictive in terms of agency, because elective abortions are still denied.  Yarrow (2013) 
explained that the two additional provisions worried some antiabortion advocates, who 
“have expressed concern that allowing for abortions or abortion coverage in the case of 
rape or incest would create an incentive for women to falsely report those conditions” 
(para. 10). The limited coverage and specter of false reporting cast women who are 
professional protectors as victims. 
False reporting is not a new concept when it comes to abortion. Reagan (1997) 
and Solinger (2007) both explained how abortion laws have historically forced women to 
make false allegations and follow scripts in order to obtain abortions. For example, 
women in the eighteenth century, before abortion was a crime, knew that self-abortions 
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were dangerous and that doctors might not approve of an abortion, so they would make 
up symptoms to try and get their doctors to prescribe medicines that could cause an 
abortion but heal the so-called issues the women claimed to have (Solinger, 2007). As 
Reagan (1997) expounded, starting in the 1940s and continuing through the 1960s, 
psychiatric indications, such as suicidal intentions, justified abortions labeled therapeutic. 
This shift meant that risks involving a woman’s physical and mental health warranted 
access to an abortion. Whereas physical health risks can be fairly obvious, oftentimes 
being more visible and easy to diagnose (such as bleeding, etc.), psychiatric risks are 
more subjective and thus may open the door for false reports.   
As a result of the psychiatric clause, nearly half of the abortions reported between 
1950 and 1960 were performed for psychiatric reasons (Reagan, 1997). Reagan explained 
that it became “widely known that a woman might obtain a therapeutic abortion if she 
found the right psychiatrists and said the right words. Women learned to speak of their 
emotional distress and suicidal intentions” (p. 201). Women seeking elective abortions 
learned how to rhetorically engage in the necessary script required to obtain them. This 
script instructed women to appear mentally unstable and/or suicidal.  Discursively, this 
constituted women as victims who had to act and speak a certain way in order to make 
reproductive “choices.” Ultimately, if a woman said the correct words, the doctor was 
more likely to perform a therapeutic abortion.  
Similarly, it may be difficult to “prove” if a woman was raped or an incest 
survivor, which is why prolife advocates see these new provisions as a loophole, or as 
“incentive” to file false reports. Therefore, if women can learn the scripts that will open 
the doors to obtain an abortion, there may be more abortions performed due to false 
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allegations of rape.  While these scripts may be viewed as a path of resistance for patients 
and physicians as they reclaim reproductive authority from the state, ultimately, these 
scripts force the women to perform the role of victim, despite their status as soldiers 
protecting the U.S. Additionally, they also reinforce the commonly held belief that 
women often make false accusations, which is even more troubling and complicated. 
The dissonance of their professional lives and the scripts necessary to control their 
personal reproductive decisions is problematic since servicewomen are then asked to play 
two roles—that of protector and that of victim, thereby enacting an unsustainable 
chiasmus. Many news articles emphasized the role of servicewomen as protectors. As 
Iskra (2012b) stated, “women in uniform [should] receive the same reproductive rights as 
the civilians they protect” (para. 1).  Bumiller (2010) additionally said, “military women 
serving overseas do not have the same access to basic health care that other American 
women do, or that is ensured by the laws of the country they are fighting to protect” (para. 
3). Finally, an editorial in The New York Times quoted Shaheen urging that 
servicewomen “are fighting to protect our rights, and they should have the same rights to 
reproductive health care as our civilian employees” (“An Injustice,” para. 3).  The 
constant emphasis on servicewomen as protectors stands in stark contrast to adopting a 
victim status if they wish to use the scripts necessary to obtain abortions covered by 
insurance.  The discourses by Iskra, Bumiller, and others displayed concern that the hard-
earned equality women experience in the military serving alongside men as protectors has 
been compromised by their lack of rights and agency when it comes to their reproductive 
decisions. Once again, as was discussed in regard to equality, servicewomen are 
positioned as victims. 
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Performing the role of victim through the use of scripts places servicewomen in a 
position of needing protection, which frames them as dependent, depriving them of their 
agency.  This type of discourse was emphasized by Jennings’ (2013) discussion of 
Hagel’s nomination for defense secretary and his role in the protection of female troops.  
Jennings explained that Hagel will “have the opportunity to make a positive impact by 
continuing to advance and adequately protect women under his command” (para. 14). 
This discourse situates women as needing protection from men, a historically patriarchal 
point of view, and one that aligns well with the traditionally (hyper)masculine military.  
Through all the conversations circulating around Hagel’s nomination, the consistent 
theme was the power he would have in decisions regarding the protection of women and 
their reproductive rights, reiterating the long history of men making reproductive 
decisions for women. 
 Furthermore, framing military women as dependent justifies why they may be 
treated unequally. The military has always had different standards than civilian society, 
including the expectation that service members often sacrifice their rights to privacy for 
the greater good. As a result, despite Roe v. Wade’s ruling based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s right to personal privacy, which meant that women could decide privately 
whether or not to terminate their pregnancies, women in the military are not granted such 
privacy. Instead, servicewomen must disclose the circumstances of their pregnancies if 
seeking an abortion under the new policy since it must fall within the three exceptions 
(Gillibrand, 2013b). A woman must go through her commanding officer to report the 
reason she wants an abortion and obtain permission from the commanding officer to do 
so (Hansen, 2012; Ponder & Nothnagle, 2010). This lack of medical privacy and military 
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hierarchy is one of the issues servicewomen—married and single—find most frustrating. 
For example, one married servicewoman who wished to remain anonymous detailed her 
desperate circumstances,  
I am a member of the armed forces currently serving in Afghanistan. I am here 
with my husband and was unaware that the pills I take to prevent malaria can 
counteract my birth control pills. My husband is as shocked as I am. We do not 
want a child now; we have a job to do here. . . . I am pretty desperate. It isn’t like 
you can even go off base here, and you can’t just say you need medical leave 
without saying why. (Stand with Servicewomen, 2012, para. 5) 
 
Additionally, a servicewoman with the pseudonym Erin explained the difficulties that she 
would face not only to obtain an abortion off-base, but how it would be impossible to 
obtain permission to leave the base without disclosing her reason for doing so,  
I am stationed in Kuwait and in a relationship with a serviceman here. I recently 
discovered I am pregnant and have explored my options. It is virtually impossible 
to obtain abortion care in Kuwait. I would have to prove that the abortion was 
necessary to preserve my mental/physical health; get approval from three Islamic 
doctors; and get the consent of the man involved, which I cannot do. In addition, 
it would be difficult for me to leave the base without having to report to a superior 
and explain why I needed to go off the base. (Stand with Servicewomen, 2012, 
para. 9) 
 
The servicewomen in both of these stories expressed their frustration and desperation 
with a system that only allows one option for women who become pregnant under 
circumstances other than rape, incest, or life endangerment—they must continue their 
pregnancies, which they believe will sacrifice their careers. Furthermore, in a situation 
that is already quite stressful, servicewomen must disclose their pregnancies and desires 
to obtain an abortion to their commanding officers who ultimately can give them 
permission, sacrificing their right to make private reproductive decisions. In contrast to 
their civilian counterparts in the U.S., servicewomen do not have the option to obtain an 
elective abortion (especially overseas) without informing their employers of their desire 
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to do so. In this close monitoring of reproductive choices pertaining to women’s bodies, 
the military is the ultimate example of where the public interest and control of women’s 
bodies—what Foucault (1976) called “a hysterization of women’s bodies”—is occurring 
(p. 104). Hysteria used to be a disorder diagnosed exclusively in women (with symptoms 
such as faintness, sexual desire, coughing fits, and convulsions). In fact, some doctors 
basically believed it was what made women different from men. Foucault argued that all 
women came to be seen in this way, as disorderly and needing help. He explained that the 
female body has come to be considered an object of medical knowledge. Because it is the 
center of reproduction, Foucault argued that controlling the private reproductive 
decisions of women’s lives have been justified in the name of biopolitics and 
encouraging a healthy, productive population. Because all women’s bodies were 
perceived as disorderly and intrinsically laden with pathology, policing women’s bodies, 
and specifically the functions that have to do with sexuality and reproduction, was 
deemed necessary. In light of this, I argue that the requirement of female soldiers to 
obtain permission for an elective abortion from their superiors perpetuates the policing of 
women’s reproductive decisions and the hysterization of their bodies.  
Indeed, this is another situation where the private is made public, as women 
would not only have to disclose that they desire an abortion, but also under the new 
legislation they must disclose if they were victims of rape or incest. This is something not 
all women want to report, such as an anonymous servicewoman who stated, “I was 
raped. . . . No, I did not file a report. No, I am not going to” (Stand with Servicewomen, 
2012, para. 3). Rape is a highly personal, emotionally traumatic situation to handle, and 
many servicewomen are well aware of the difficulties, stigmas, and harassment they 
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might face if they do report their rapes and therefore choose to keep their trauma to 
themselves. 
Additional delays might also occur if their commanding officers do not agree with 
abortion (Ponder & Nothnagle, 2010). Most of the time the commanding officers are 
male, oftentimes conservative males. This can cause major issues for servicewomen 
seeking to obtain abortions because their commanding officers must give them 
permission. If these requests happen while the servicewoman is deployed, it complicates 
the issue even further. In these cases, the commanding officer might not only be morally 
opposed to abortion, but also now having the knowledge that the servicewoman is 
pregnant may result in “bias or prejudice against the woman as irresponsible or neglectful 
of her duty” as a deployed service member who is to refrain from sex (Hansen, 2012, p. 
136). In these situations, the man involved in the pregnancy is not mentioned. Therefore, 
although the rules are supposed to apply equally to both men and women, the biological 
and visual aspects of pregnancy make it so that women are potentially disparately 
impacted from policies because there is no “evidence” that a man had sex when he was 
commanded not to do so (Hansen, 2012). 
 In sum, despite changes in abortion policy brought by the MAA, servicewomen’s 
agency in abortion decision-making is still quite limited, which may persuade them to lie 
to obtain abortions and/or encourage suspicion toward women who decide to report rape 
in order to obtain an abortion.  
Lack of access. Finally, although the amendment states that women have abortion 
coverage in cases of life endangerment, rape, and incest, it is important to note the 
difference between rights and access, as it appears that the MAA is more of a discursive, 
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rather than material, form of progress. Indeed, the amendment actually replicates 
strategies of the antiabortion movement in the larger culture, where access is restricted 
instead of outlawed. An example of this was discussed earlier regarding the 1989 ruling 
in Webster v. Reproductive Services that allowed more state restrictions on women’s 
access to abortion facilities. Women may have the right to obtain—and in the case of the 
MAA also the insurance coverage for—abortions, but be unable to find places to have the 
procedure. Specifically, there are three prominent ways in which access to abortion is 
restricted: the “undue burden” standard, the “good neighbor” clause, and the conscience 
clause. 
 First, the Supreme court has articulated the difference between the right to 
abortion and access to abortion (Segal, 2012). Therefore “impinging on access does not 
infringe on the right itself” (Segal, 2012, p. 325). This means that just because women 
have a right to abortion does not mean that they are guaranteed access in the form of a 
clinic and/or funding. This is based in the “undue burden” standard, which was defined 
by the Supreme Court in the 1992 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey case. The Court defined undue burden as a “substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus” (Burrelli, 2013, p. 4). This standard was 
to be used to determine whether or not a state’s abortion restrictions are unconstitutional 
and most of the time allowed for more state restrictions to be considered constitutional. 
The decision was a 5–4 vote, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, 
and Thomas dissented and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Stevens, and Blackmun 
were in the plurality. As it stands, the undue burden clause has been interpreted to give 
“unprecedented weight to the state’s interest in the embryo or fetus” (Borgmann, 2010, p. 
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311). This perpetuates the long history of elevating the interests and rights of fetus over 
the pregnant woman (see Seigel, 2013). 
Furthermore, Borgmann (2010) argued that after the retirement of Justice 
O’Connor, the current interpretation of the undue burden clause could be attributed 
primarily to Justice Kennedy who has allowed it to be expansive and quite invasive on 
women’s privacy. Whereas Roe’s decision was based on the Fourteenth Amendment right 
to privacy, and Casey reinforced the constitutional right to abortion, under the current 
interpretation of Casey and the undue burden standard women have experienced 
“extensive encroachments” on their personal privacy when it comes to their abortion 
decision-making (Borgmann, 2010, p. 291). 
 The issue of rights versus access in the military gets even more complicated. In 
fact, the military does not always uphold the undue burden standard for servicewomen 
because it is implicitly and explicitly understood that “in the military one has to sacrifice 
one’s individual rights for the military’s mission” (Ponder & Nothnagle, 2010, p. 390). In 
these cases, servicewomen may not have the constitutionality of Roe or Casey supporting 
them because of the exceptionalism that is serving in the armed forces. 
 Second, access has been made difficult for servicewomen because of the good 
neighbor clause, which altered military abortion policy when President Nixon 
implemented it. Whereas in 1970, the DoD ordered military hospitals to perform 
abortions if the mother’s physical or mental health was threatened, this new clause 
directed military bases in the United States to “correspond with the laws of the States 
where the bases are located” (Burrelli, 2013, p. 4). This clause came to apply to foreign 
nations, as well, so military bases must abide by host country laws.  
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 This can be severely limiting for servicewomen’s access to abortion. For example, 
when most troops were in Iraq and Afghanistan, no abortions could be done on military 
bases due to the strict host country abortion laws (Grindlay et al., 2011). Whereas in the 
general population, approximately 43% of unintended pregnancies end in abortion, this is 
not an option for most deployed women (Grindlay & Grossman, 2013, p. 244). When 
women are deployed in countries with strict abortion policies and/or poor civilian living 
conditions, essentially all access is removed from them. They cannot get abortions on 
base due to the good neighbor policy, and they cannot obtain them anywhere off-base 
because the host country would not perform them. In these situations, women must be 
evacuated from the theater if they wish to terminate their pregnancies, which can be a 
tremendous strain on the woman and the troops. In cases like these, Grindlay and 
Grossman (2013) explained, “some women deployed abroad even consider unsafe means 
of self-inducing an abortion,” as was discussed earlier (p. 244).  
 According to the National Abortion Federation, these restrictions are not only 
difficult for women, but also for some doctors. The organization quoted a servicewoman, 
who wished to remain anonymous, talking about her experience overseas with regard to 
the good neighbor policy: 
I will never forget the humiliation I felt. . . . I was turned away by my American 
doctors on base who wanted to educate me on the issue but couldn’t do so 
legally. . . . Although I serve in the military, I was given no translators, no 
explanations, no transportation and no help for a legal medical procedure. . . . The 
military expects nothing but the best from its soldiers and I expect the best 
medical care in return. (National Abortion Federation, 2010, para. 5) 
 
In this woman’s situation, and many others similar to it, it becomes evident that women’s 
privacy, dignity, and pride are sacrificed in the name of military abortion policy. 
 Lastly, the conscience clause creates a barrier for women seeking abortion in 
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cases where doctors may use moral and/or religious reasons for not performing abortion 
procedures. Under this clause, physicians and facilities are not required to participate in 
or provide facilities or personnel for abortions (Office for Civil Rights, 2012). After 
President Obama passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that gave more 
coverage to birth control and preventative services, Senator Roy Blunt attempted to get 
the so-called Blunt Amendment passed. This proposed amendment drew heavily on 
Thomas Jefferson, who stated that, “no provision in our Constitution ought to be dearer to 
man than that which protects the rights of conscience against the enterprises of the civil 
authority” (Blunt, 2011, p. 1). The proposal went on to argue that “Jefferson’s statement 
expresses a conviction on respect for conscience that is deeply embedded in the history 
and traditions of our Nation and codified in numerous State and Federal laws, including 
laws on health care” (Blunt, 2011, p. 2). Using these statements as a basis, the 
amendment attempted to “vastly expand conscience exemptions” that would make not 
only abortion, but other forms of birth control difficult for all U.S. women to access. The 
Senate rejected the amendment, but the basics of the conscience clause remain in the 
military and general U.S. 
 Applied to the military, this means that women might find themselves in locations 
that are not exempted by the good neighbor policy, yet none of the physicians present 
may morally and/or religiously agree with an abortion procedure. Therefore, once again, 
servicewomen realize a barrier to access, despite having the constitutional right, as well 





 In the end, what has been touted as a form of progress with the MAA is not 
actually an intervention into the constitution of the subject position(s) of women with 
regard to abortion, but instead reinforces the biopolitical policies of the hypermasculine 
military that regulates and controls women’s private reproductive choices. The rhetoric 
simply inserts servicewomen into subject positions that already dominate discourse about 
abortion in general. More explicitly, four subject positions are reinforced by the new 
amendment: the role of rape makes women victims rather than protectors, the policy 
likely requires women to lie to get the procedure, servicewomen are required to be 
“blameless” for the sex that led to the pregnancy if the procedure is to be covered, and the 
fetus is ultimately given more rights than the women. Additionally, and equally 
importantly, the MAA, while it increases coverage in certain situations, does not 
ultimately increase access for servicewomen, especially in light of the good neighbor 
policy. As a result, progress is discursive, but not material.  
 Likewise, this rhetorical history analysis revealed that what has been promoted as 
progress in the form of the MAA actually grants fewer rights, agency, and access to 
servicewomen than they had in the 1960s.  Therefore, instead of arguing that progress has 
been achieved, this analysis asserts that, similar to Foucault’s (1995) conclusion, progress 
has been elusive. Indeed, there has been a lack of material progress, and the only real 
progress has been discursive. I argue that if we are ignorant of the historical context 
leading up to the MAA, we will be tempted to herald the amendment as a tremendous 
victory instead of understanding how restrictive it is. The lower standards were 
rhetorically and biopolitically constructed via discourse leading up to and surrounding the 
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MAA. Indeed, the MAA and its surrounding discourse functions as a myth in the sense 
that Barthes (1972) used the term, where it is “constituted by the loss of the historical 
quality” and “history evaporates” and we do not wonder about “where it comes from” but 
only celebrate it for what it is (pp. 142, 150). And, this, Barthes warned, is “the 
irresponsibility” of humans (p. 150).  
In the case of the MAA, if we are unaware of the historical context that has led to 
the amendment, we may uncritically celebrate the progress for servicewomen instead of 
understanding how the amendment reifies the same rationale that has always surrounded 
abortion. The only way for women to obtain abortions under the new law is if they are 
somehow “innocent”: their life is in danger due to the pregnancy, and this is out of their 
control and/or they are blameless for the sex that led to the pregnancy because they were 
raped or (historically) deemed crazy. Analogous to all abortion restrictions, this is about 
the biopolitical agenda of denying women sexual freedom/agency and enforcing 
conservative norms on behavior.  
The lack of access is an aspect of the amendment that appears to continually be 
overlooked. There is a significant difference between women having the right to an 
abortion and having access to an abortion. As Segal (2012) emphasized,  
Putting such restraints and obstacles in the way of women to undergo an abortion 
is effectively taking away that right to an abortion. If that right cannot be 
exercised, it means little to those servicewomen needing access to safe abortions. 
(p. 337) 
 
The lack of access can happen particularly in two situations: (1) a woman could be 
located overseas or on a base where the good neighbor policy will not allow for her to 
obtain an abortion, even if she is a victim of rape or incest, and (2) a woman still may not 
have access to an abortion at a military facility, even if she wants to pay for it out of 
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pocket, unless it is in one of the three excepted cases (Gates, 2013). Because there is 
evidence that the main reason women seek abortions in the military is due to the timing 
of the pregnancy (which is most often related to a fear of military censure in the form of 
getting kicked out, losing rank, or going to a military prison, bringing up yet other 
discriminatory issues within the military culture), many servicewomen cannot obtain an 
abortion at a military facility even under the new law (Grindlay et al., 2011). In cases like 
these, access becomes unequal within the military, as women who are stationed in the 
domestic United States may seek off-base or out-of-state facilities that will perform the 
abortions if they pay out of pocket, whereas women deployed overseas may not have any 
similar options.  
 In response to this lack of access, shortly after the MAA passed in 2013 the 
Military Access to Reproductive Care and Health (MARCH) for Military Women Act (S. 
1214) was proposed. It was authored by Senator Gillibrand and cosponsored by Senator 
Shaheen (Shaheen, 2012, para. 5). Representative Louise McIntosh Slaughter introduced 
the bill to the House (H.R. 1389) on March 21, 2013, and it was in subcommittee by 
April of that year. The bill argued for allowing women serving in the military to use their 
own money to pay for abortions at military facilities, what the Burris Amendment in 
2010 and Shaheen’s first proposal in 2011 advocated. Specifically, it proposed to amend 
Section 1093 of Title 10, United States Code, which currently states  
(a) Restriction on Use of Funds.—Funds available to the Department of Defense 
may not be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would 
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term or in the case in which the 
pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest. 
(b) Restriction on Use of Facilities.—No medical treatment facility or other 
facility of the Department of Defense may be used to perform an abortion except 
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term 
or in a case in which the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest. 
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(“United States Code Title 10 §1093. Performance of abortions: restrictions,” 
2010) 
 
MARCH would amend this by “(1) by striking subsection (b); and (2) in subsection (a), 
by striking (a) Restriction on use of funds.— .” (Gillibrand, 2013a). This would make 
Section 1093 of Title 10, United States Code read as follows:  
Funds available to the Department of Defense may not be used to perform 
abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus 
were carried to term or in the case in which the pregnancy is the result of an act of 
rape or incest.  
 
It would not mention anything about facilities and therefore make military facilities 
available for women wanting to obtain elective abortions. Gillibrand argued that this is an 
imperative move because currently women are not allowed to obtain abortions at military 
facilities, and “servicewomen who have an unintended pregnancy may be dissuaded from 
receiving an abortion at facilities outside of the military base because it is an inadequate 
facility; there are language barriers, lack of availability, or lack of privacy” (Gillibrand, 
2013b, para. 1). Unfortunately, while this bill proposes to reinstate the pre-1970 military 
abortion policies, it is listed as having a 1% chance of being enacted (Gillibrand, 2013a).  
As I just mentioned, this is reminiscent of the premise of the first 2011 proposal 
by Shaheen. Her proposal was not for insurance to cover elective abortions, but rather to 
allow doctors to perform elective abortions at military hospitals (Cunningham, 2012). 
The only difference between this proposal and the current situation was that 
servicewomen would no longer have to seek elective abortions off military grounds. 
While it may be more convenient to obtain an elective abortion, the cost could still be an 
issue for economically disadvantaged servicewomen.  This proposal never passed, 
indicating the government’s distaste for terminating otherwise healthy pregnancies and 
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the continuation of efforts to protect the biopolitical space of the womb.  
 Ultimately, in this age of biopower, abortion regulations reveal how military 
women are governed reproductively and that most often the fetus, and not the women and 
their bodies, are placed as the focus of the argument due to the government’s “interest in 
protecting potential life” (Boonstra, 2013, p. 3). As a result of the modern hysterization of 
women’s bodies (Foucault, 1976), the politicization of the womb has served to remove 
servicewomen’s agency over their own bodies and place it in the public realm where the 
government (and men like Hagel) makes decisions about women’s reproductive rights. 
As the rhetorical history of abortion policies in the military and the analysis of discourse 
surrounding the MAA revealed, the rights of life and death are not entirely those of the 
individual, but essentially still reside in the State through disciplinary apparatuses.   
 Furthermore, there is an interesting pairing of protection and equality in much of 
the discourse, implying that protection equals equality. Equality is set up as a necessary 
control to protect women. For example, Gillibrand (2013b) argued that passing more 
liberal abortion legislation is about “protecting women in the military” (para. 2). Yet, in 
these conversations the long history of military abortion legislation is forgotten, and the 
position that was designed to better control abortion (with limited exceptions beyond the 
life of the mother) is championed by the military and many other groups as equality. In 
situations of protection, agency is always compromised, but it supposedly frees the victim 
from harm. However, when abortion control becomes a victory for women, it should be 
questioned. 
 Moreover, this analysis displays how false reports and scripts are complicated.  
Although they may be an avenue to regain agency, this agency comes at a high cost.  Not 
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only do women need to assume the role of victim, but they must publicly declare they are 
rape victims, a highly-stigmatized position. Once they have identified as victims, they 
must live with that label for the rest of their lives. And, not only must they adopt this 
victim status, in some cases, they may also need to falsely accuse someone of rape, a 
dangerous action with serious consequences.  Furthermore, false reports could be 
damaging to women who actually were raped or victims of incest, as severe skepticism 
may be cast on anyone claiming to be a victim desiring an abortion. 
Additionally, even with the new policy, the issue of privacy is still significant for 
military women. Because of the highly regulated nature of the military, if a 
servicewoman wants to get an abortion, she must go through her chain of command. This 
is interesting to note in regard to all of the equality discourse because the MAA gives 
servicewomen and dependents of service members funded abortions in the three cases of 
rape, incest, or life endangerment, but only servicewomen, not dependents, have to go 
through their chain of command and explain the reasons for seeking an abortion (Segal, 
2012). 
In sum, access to abortion should not be limited only to women who have been 
raped, are victims of incest, or are experiencing health issues due to pregnancy. 
Essentially, while the amendment has been celebrated as granting equal rights to 
servicewomen, the government is still ultimately dictating women’s reproductive choices. 
Removing women’s abilities to make decisions regarding their reproductive rights is a 
biopolitical issue since restrictions on abortions are framed as preventing necropolitical 
actions (“killing”) to the fetus population. While abortions can be viewed as 
necropolitical actions, it is just as important to pay attention to the servicewomen who are 
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victims of the necropolitical acts of rape, incest, and reproductive control.  As a 
population, servicewomen get lost in the discourse because the focus tends to circulate 
completely around the womb and the fetus.  Therefore, echoing Johnson (2008), despite 
any seeming advances in democracy and freedom, the choice of abortion does not reside 
in the individual, but is highly regulated by biopolitical regimes of control. This confirms 
the understanding of many feminists that if any abortion laws exist, no matter how liberal 
they are, they are still denying a basic right to women (Seigel, 2013). 
 The discourse surrounding the amendment and abortion policy conceals important 
issues related to abortion policies and rights. Although military women now have 
abortion funding in three cases, fetal abnormality and the former exception for 
psychological issues are still not permitted. Furthermore, it ignores the issue of coverage 
versus access. Just because women have coverage for abortions does not necessarily 
imply that they now have access to get abortions in the cases that are exceptions. If there 
is no real access, there is no real progress. The change is merely discursive, and the 







THE PREGNANCY “PROBLEM”: THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SERVICEWOMEN’S MATERNITY EXPERIENCES 
 
We should not be surprised to learn that discourse on pregnancy omits 
subjectivity, for the specific experience of women has been absent from most of 
our culture’s discourse about human experience and history. . . . I seek to let 
women speak in their own voices.   
– Iris Young (2005, p. 46)  
 
Historically it has been common to hear and read about the “pregnancy problem” 
in the military (“The Military Is Pregnant: Coping with motherhood in the armed forces,” 
1979, para. 9). As Lundquist and Smith (2005) reported, in the early 1980s, a large 
number of women were leaving the service, making pregnancy seem like “such a 
problem for the military that the Reagan administration called a halt to recruiting 
women” in 1982 (p. 2). Additionally, as recent as 2009, Army Major General Tony 
Cucolo, a commander in Iraq, threatened to court martial soldiers for pregnancy in order 
to highlight “the importance of appropriate reproductive planning for female soldiers” 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2013, p. 511). Implicit in the reference to servicewomen’s maternity 
experiences as the “pregnancy problem” are biopolitical understandings of female 
bodies within the (hyper)masculine U.S. military because servicewomen’s fertility is 
framed as a women’s issue that negatively impacts (traditionally masculine) military 
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operations. Yet, pregnancy is not—or should not be—only a women’s issue. As 
Natalie4 contended, it is not as if “you just choose to get pregnant and there’s no one 
else involved. . . . We didn’t force [servicemen] to do that [get us pregnant]” (personal 
communication, October 26, 2013).  
Indeed, pregnancy in the military is controversial because it is viewed as 
“antithetical to effective soldiering” and places the focus mainly on women and their 
family planning, positioning them as impeding on military readiness while 
simultaneously perpetuating the stereotype “that mothers are more responsible for 
family life than are fathers” (Peach, 1996, p. 171). Furthermore, Biggs et al. (Biggs, 
Douglas, O’Boyle, & Rieg, 2009) asserted that pregnancy is “the most controversial of 
all women-related issues debated and researched in the military, with respect to morale, 
discipline, attrition, and readiness” (p. 64). The military is an organization focused on 
control, predictability, and readiness, and the pregnant soldier threatens to disrupt these 
values. Furthermore, as an organization that is dedicated to making sure all soldiers are 
“uniform,” the visual signifier of a growing stomach that oftentimes cannot be ignored 
or hidden serves as a powerful reminder of the biological sex differences between males 
and females. Often this biologizing of women means that servicewomen must negotiate 
a nearly 9-month management of the dialectical gaze, in which they have to balance the 
demands of being a uniform soldier and a pregnant woman (Murphy, 2003).  
This chapter will examine the so-called “pregnancy problem” by looking at the 
discursive web of messages—from servicewomen, their commanding officers and 
                                                
4 Natalie is a pseudonym. All of the servicewomen interviewed for this chapter either 
chose pseudonyms or were given them to protect their privacy. To learn more about 
each of the servicewomen interviewed in this chapter, see Appendix A. For a list of 
guiding interview questions, see Appendix B. 
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fellow soldiers, policies and procedures, and military culture—that communicatively 
shape servicewomen’s pregnancy experiences. All of these discursive fragments have 
biopolitical implications on servicewomen’s lived experiences. Therefore, guiding this 
chapter are two broad research questions: (a) How do servicewomen communicatively 
construct their pregnant embodied experiences in the military? And (b) In what ways do 
U.S. military policies, procedures, and culture discursively shape perceptions about 
military maternity, and what are the biopolitical consequences of these perceptions on 
servicewomen? To answer these questions, this chapter analyzes transcripts from 
interviews with servicewomen as well as military policies and procedures.  
Throughout the analysis in this chapter, I contend that the hypermasculine 
culture of the military creates a discriminating environment for pregnant soldiers 
through the four main rhetorical strategies of stigmatizing pregnant servicewomen, 
expecting hyperplanned pregnancies, cultivating macho maternity, and medicalizing 
pregnancies. I further argue that this discrimination is based on how pregnant 
servicewomen are biologized by military policies and personnel during a time when 
their female body is very distinct from the generic male body. First, my analysis shows 
that servicewomen are unjustly stigmatized because colleagues and superiors assume 
pregnancies were planned to avoid deployment. This cultural stigma likely took root in 
the 1980s and 1990s during the Gulf War and Bosnian intervention, when more women 
were joining the armed forces, and newspapers published articles with titles such as 
“Sailor Pregnant to Avoid Tough Duty?” (Lundquist & Smith, 2005). Despite this 
popular stigma, Ponder and Nothnagle (2010) claimed that there are no clear data 
indicating that intended pregnancy rates are influenced by a desire to avoid deployment 
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or get reassigned. Yet the interviews reveal that this stigma persists in painting 
pregnancy as a problem in the military.  
Second, I argue that the military expects and encourages the hyperplanning of 
pregnancies, which treats women’s bodies as docile machines. The military relies on 
order, discipline, readiness, and predictability, so unpredictable events, such as an 
unplanned pregnancy, interrupt the military’s system. Indeed, Foucault (2003) 
explained that one of the main functions of a biopolitical regime, such as the military, is 
to control for all possible aleatory events, or those that happen by chance or are random 
(at least to the biopolitical regime, if not to the individual). Events like this are risky to 
the military, which rely on predictability and control. When unexpected events occur, 
they disrupt military plans and operations. Aleatory events such as pregnancy, however, 
are treated as events that should not be unplanned or random. The armed forces places a 
significant amount of stress on bodily discipline, with the implicit assumption that 
bodies can and will be controlled. Yet fertility control can never be guaranteed, and 
women’s bodies are “decidedly indocile” (Duke & Ames, 2008, p. 245), which can 
create a conflict for military planning, thus helping to frame pregnancy as a problem.  
Third, I contend that some servicewomen enact “macho maternity” in order to 
negotiate the tension between the reality of their biological differences from men and 
their desire for complete social equality. Smithson and Stokoe (2005) coined the phrase 
“macho maternity” to refer to females in the corporate workforce who take maternity 
leave “like a man,” or when “women feel compelled to work like men to succeed” (pp. 
160, 164). In terms of the military, many women perform macho maternity in order to 
prove they are the “same” as men despite their biological differences. Although 
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performing macho maternity seemingly gives women the equality they desire, it 
problematically reinforces the dominant status quo culture.  
Finally, I claim that the military medicalizes servicewomen’s pregnancies, 
which devalues women’s experiential knowledge. For many women, pregnancy can be 
an emotional and life-changing experience. Yet due to the military’s highly organized 
structure, pregnancies are treated more like medical conditions (read: problems) that 
must be taken care of instead of highly personal lived experiences.  
The rest of this chapter is laid out in four sections. The next section gives a brief 
background on pregnancy in the military. Then, I provide a literature review on 
previous research on pregnancy in the military. Third, I analyze the themes that 
emerged from my interviews and various military documents, including the four main 
strategies of stigmatizing, hyperplanning, macho maternity, and medicalization. 
Ultimately, through my analysis I find that the U.S. military’s culture, pregnancy 
policies, and pregnancy procedures constrain servicewomen’s agency and discriminate 
against many women by rhetorically positioning pregnancy as a problem.  
 
Pregnancy in the Military 
 When the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act (WASIA) of 1948 was 
passed, it was celebrated as the official integration of women into the armed forces. 
However, women have been engaged in national defense in various roles since the birth 
of the United States, often serving in auxiliary roles such as nurses, laundresses, and 
seamstresses (Murnane, 2007). In a few instances, women possessed such a desire to 
serve in the armed forces that they disguised themselves as men, but were separated 
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from the military as soon as their gender was discovered (Enloe, 1983; Murnane, 2007). 
Women who did serve in auxiliary roles were not recognized as members of the military, 
but as wives of soldiers, reflecting the general legal status of women in the United 
States at that time.  
Although women had been serving in the military in these unofficial ways, and 
in 1901 the Army Nurse Corps Auxiliary was established, the WASIA served as the 
official integration of women across the board in the military. In addition to officially 
allowing women to serve in the military, WASIA also authorized the various service 
secretaries to “terminate the service of a female member, enlisted or commissioned, 
under regulations established by the President” (Murnane, 2007, p. 1067; see also “The 
Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948: Public Law No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 
368,” 1948, sec. 214). As a result, despite the so-called integration of women into the 
armed forces, the act itself contained language that would allow for the involuntary 
separation of women at the discretion of the president. Therefore, the integration in 
many ways was much more discursive than it was material.  
 Indeed, there were still many limitations on the integration of women into the 
military. Servicewomen could not achieve ranks of colonel, general, or admiral, and 
their representation was capped at 2%. Despite the WASIA allowing women to serve in 
the military, it was almost more of a way to make official the roles women had already 
been performing—and pay them for their work—than actually granting equality and 
access.  
In fact, although it was (and still is) hailed as a major step for women in the 
military, the WASIA actually established the grounds to separate women from the 
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military on the basis of pregnancy and parenthood. In 1951 President Harry S. Truman 
signed Executive Order 10240, which did just that. Truman’s order delineated the 
“regulations governing the separation from the service of certain women” serving in the 
armed forces (Truman, 1951, para. 1). Truman explained that a servicewoman may be 
“terminated, regardless of rank, grade, or length of service” for reasons that are the 
same for a man as well as  
whenever it is established under appropriate regulations of the Secretary of the 
department concerned that the woman (a) is the parent, by birth or adoption, of a 
child under such minimum age as the Secretary concerned shall determine, (b) 
has personal custody of a child under such minimum age, (c) is the step-parent 
of a child under such minimum age and the child is within the household of the 
woman for a period of more than thirty days a year, (d) is pregnant, or (e) has, 
while serving under such commission, warrant, or enlistment, given birth to a 
living child; and such woman may be totally separated from the service by 
administrative action by termination of commission, termination of appointment, 
revocation of commission, discharge, or otherwise. (Truman, 1951, para. 2) 
 
Under this order, women who had any parental obligations (including those who were 
stepparents who housed a stepchild approximately 8% of the entire year) were to be 
terminated from military service. Clearly, the standards for military service followed the 
gendered understanding that women (including stepmothers) were the primary 
caregivers for children and must be home to care for children, while fathers may be 
absent, reinforcing that the “ideal military member is an unencumbered ‘masculine’ 
warrior” (Taber, 2011, p. 334). As a result, women who became pregnant were also 
involuntarily separated as soon as the pregnancy was discovered (Murnane, 2007). This 
was a difficult situation because most of the women serving in the armed forces were of 
childbearing age and therefore more likely to get pregnant, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally. This also meant that if a woman planned on having children at some 
point, she could not count on the military as her lifetime profession, as men could, 
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because being pregnant and/or a woman with children were deemed incompatible with a 
military career.  
 Sixteen years later, on November 8, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson signed into 
law the most significant legislative change for women in the military since WASIA 
(Murnane, 2007, p. 1068). President Johnson reduced some of the barriers women faced, 
such as lifting the legal ceiling so that women could achieve the ranks of colonel, 
general, and admiral, as well as lifting the 2% cap on women’s representation in the 
military (Murnane, 2007). However, despite these two significant changes, service 
secretaries still possessed the authority to discharge women from the service if they 
were pregnant, which prompted multiple court cases in the following years (Fitzgerald 
et al., 2013; “Public Law 90-130,” 1967). Furthermore, women were still segregated 
into separate corps, received unequal pay, and were excluded from military academies 
(Murnane, 2007).  
One of the most contested inequities was the double standard many women felt 
the military had in regard to men and women in terms of pregnancy. For example, in 
1970, unmarried Seaman Anna Flores became pregnant. Flores miscarried before she 
and her fiancé, who was an enlisted sailor in the Navy, could get married. Yet despite 
no longer being pregnant, her commanding officer worked to have her discharged based 
on Navy regulations. Her commanding officer recommended, 
In spite of FLORES [sic] excellent professional performance and her strong 
desire to remain in the Navy, retention is not recommended. To do otherwise 
would imply that unwed pregnancy is condoned and would eventually result in a 
dilution of the moral standards set for women in the Navy. (Flores vs. Secretary 
of Defense, 1973, para. 2) 
 
This statement reinforces the discriminatory culture of a (hyper)masculine military, 
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which disciplines individual bodies in order to (morally) regulate the larger military 
population. In this case, Flores represented potential for future unplanned/uncontrolled 
events (read: pregnancy), and therefore, it was in the best interest of the military to 
discharge her from the service. In response to her commanding officer, Flores filed suit 
before the U.S. District Court in Pensacola, Florida, to stop the Navy from discharging 
her, contending that   
the Navy did not apply to men and women a single moral standard in 
determining retention in the service, so that her severance from service on that 
ground and the recommendation was unjustifiable discrimination violating the 
equal protection standard of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States. (Flores vs. Secretary of Defense, 1973)  
 
Ultimately, Flores’ argued she experienced unconstitutional discrimination leveled 
against women who became pregnant and were discharged, while men who 
impregnated the women suffered no discipline. At the time of Flores, the Deputy Chief 
of Naval Personnel, Admiral Plate, testified that he did not agree with the single 
standard of morality for men and women. In fact, he argued that if there was a single 
moral standard, it would enable men who were looking to find a way to avoid their 
obligation to service “to find women willing to assist them in achieving violations of the 
morality standard to which military women were already being held” (Murnane, 2007, p. 
1073). Plate’s argument revealed that an additional barrier women faced in the military 
was that they were held to much higher standards than their male counterparts. 
Standards like this simply functioned as an additional way to make it difficult for 
women to serve in the armed forces and achieve equality with men. If they were not 
treated equally in terms of morality standards, they were not equal. Indeed, it seems that 
the military in the 1970s was perpetuating the antiquated nineteenth century belief that 
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women should be held to higher moral standards than men (Zaeske, 2003). Although 
Admiral Baldwin, who replaced Admiral Plate, did not agree with the double standard 
for morality, it was to be a battle that continued to be fought. 
 Servicewomen saw an opening for more access into the military when the draft 
ended in 1973 and was replaced by the all volunteer force (Lundquist & Smith, 2005). 
Once the all volunteer force emerged, the U.S. military actively began to recruit women 
to its ranks, in order to maintain troop numbers (Duke & Ames, 2008). Additionally, in 
June 1974, the Secretary of Defense ordered the secretaries of military departments to 
stop involuntary separations from the military due to pregnancy. The policy change was 
to be implemented by May of 1975, yet many senior ranking members believed that 
automatic discharges for pregnancy were necessary because pregnant soldiers sacrificed 
combat readiness for the troops (Lundquist & Smith, 2005).  
In fact, the Army resisted implementing the change until 1976, when the Second 
Circuit Court in Crawford v. Cushman held that “a discharge from the military for 
reason of pregnancy violated the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,” which was 
Flores’ argument a few years prior (Fitzgerald et al., 2013, p. 511). In this case, a 
female marine, Stephanie Crawford, became pregnant out of wedlock. The Marine 
Corps had a policy at the time that even if a woman gave up all custody and control of 
her child, she was to be discharged, echoing the sentiments of Flores’ commanding 
officer stated earlier. Additionally, if a woman was discharged for pregnancy, the 
Marine Corps had a patronizing policy that the woman’s parents should be notified of 
the reasons for her discharge.  
In the Crawford case, the court found that it was unconstitutional to assume a 
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pregnant Marine (or service member) was permanently unfit for duty, stating, 
Under this analysis the Marine Corps regulation here established an irrebuttable 
presumption that any pregnant female in the Marine Corps is permanently unfit 
for duty. Such a presumption constitutes a heavy burden on the exercise of the 
individual's protected freedoms of personal choice in matters of marriage and 
family life, freedoms protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. (Crawford v. Cushman, 1976, para. 31) 
 
This case was important in the long legacy of legislative and policy battles that were 
fought in order to eliminate the barriers that worked to keep the U.S. military a 
predominantly male institution (Murnane, 2007). As the U.S. transitioned to an all-
volunteer force, it would have to negotiate the two very challenging issues of pregnancy 
and parenthood that corresponded with utilizing “the talents of women of childbearing 
age” (Biggs et al., 2009; P. J. Thomas & Thomas, 1994, p. 107).  
Since the order of 1974 was implemented, women have been given a choice to 
stay or leave when pregnant. Some have argued that allowing pregnant servicewomen 
to stay and making concessions to transfer them out of forward-deployed units not only 
jeopardizes the combat readiness of the troops, but also the career of the pregnant 
servicewoman (Jacobson & Jensen, 2011; Lundquist & Smith, 2005), yet others contend 
that pregnancy as well as children are compatible with a military career (Biggs et al., 
2009; P. J. Thomas & Thomas, 1994, p. 107). Although this policy that allows women a 
choice to stay or leave after pregnancy sounds as if it has created a fair and equitable 
environment, military policies and interviews with servicewomen illustrate that 
pregnancy is still being used to define gender differences and perpetuate institutional 
gender discrimination. Despite the Crawford victory in 1976, the rest of this chapter 
will show that the attitude that pregnancy in the military is presumptively problematic 
has not dissipated. 
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Previous Research on Pregnancy in the Military 
As the armed forces continue to see a rise in female service members, research 
regarding pregnancy in the military has increased, especially in terms of unplanned 
pregnancies and troop readiness. A survey in 2008 (the latest available survey of this 
kind) found that 10% of active-duty women had an unintended pregnancy within the 
past year (Pittman, 2013). These rates of unintended pregnancies are significantly 
higher than those in the general public (Holt et al., 2011; Pittman, 2013). Additionally, a 
2005 Department of Defense survey revealed that 20% of active duty servicewomen 
across all branches become pregnant each year (Holt et al., 2011).  
Likely in response to these statistics, research on pregnancy in the military has 
largely focused on unplanned pregnancies and how these pregnancies affect troop 
readiness. Most research is quantitative and/or involves surveys (Biggs et al., 2009; 
Duke & Ames, 2008; Evans & Rosen, 1997; Gerrard et al., 1991; Holt et al., 2011; 
Jacobson & Jensen, 2011; Kwolek, Berry-Caban, & Thomas, 2011; P. J. Thomas & 
Thomas, 1994), likely because it is difficult for researchers to find service members to 
interview without a personal connection to the military (see Taber, 2011). Surveys also 
offer the ability to gather large amounts of data quickly. 
The survey research has revealed that many demographic factors are related to 
unplanned pregnancies. Multiple studies found that unplanned pregnancies are more 
likely to occur among young, single, enlisted soldiers (mostly on their first enlistment), 
compared to officers who were married and had been in the service for an established 
amount of time (Biggs et al., 2009; Evans & Rosen, 1997; Holt et al., 2011). As Holt et 
al. (2011) explained, the discrepancy between enlisted soldiers and officers in 
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unplanned pregnancies is complex and can be attributed to myriad factors, including 
age, educational status, marital status, race/ethnicity, rank, and/or socioeconomic status. 
This echoes the discussion of the “biopolitical agenda of stratified reproduction” in the 
previous two chapters, wherein women with the least means tend to disproportionately 
face more difficulties (Gaines & Davis-Floyd, 2004, p. 102). 
Indeed, Evans and Rosen (1997) learned that junior officers reported more 
negative reactions about their poor pregnancy planning than did higher level officers, 
indicating a discrepancy with rank and the multiple demographic factors that follow. 
Yet, Biggs et al. (2009) discovered that many women had positive maternity 
experiences, with 80% of those surveyed believing that their command was supportive 
during their pregnancies. This mixed feedback might explain why a study by Holt et al. 
(2011) revealed that approximately three-quarters of Army servicewomen intended to 
stay in the Army after delivery, yet Biggs et al. (2009) found that 64% of survey 
participants planned to leave at the end of their current service term. 
 Whether a pregnancy is planned or not, Duke and Ames (2008) explained that 
“from a military context, the specter of female soldiers and sailors becoming pregnant 
compromises the bodily discipline needed to maintain readiness” (p. 245). Readiness is 
a key concept in the armed forces and contributes to “the three Rs” that guide the 
military—recruiting, readiness, and retention (Tangney, 1999). Because of its apparent 
aleatory nature, pregnancy has historically threatened readiness and retention. While 
there are many policies that have changed over the years to increase retention rates of 
pregnant servicewomen—such as eliminating involuntary discharges for pregnancy and 
parenthood, as well as family-friendly services—the literature reveals continual 
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concerns about pregnancy as it affects troop readiness, reminiscent of the arguments in 
the Flores and Crawford cases discussed in the previous section.   
 Because a pregnant woman cannot be deployed, pregnancy has been 
biopolitically framed as a problem that not only affects servicewomen and their families, 
but has a major impact on the troops as well (Grindlay & Grossman, 2013; Gutmann, 
1997). Therefore, Gutmann (1997) argued that even if the military positions pregnancy 
as a “non-issue” the fact remains that pregnant service members must be evacuated 
from the theater. In fact, Jacobsen and Jensen (2011) explained that unintended 
pregnancies “remain the leading cause of U.S. servicewomen’s evacuation from combat 
zones” (p. 255). These evacuations, as well as the relocation of pregnant service 
personnel, may explain the prevalence of the belief that women get pregnant in the 
military to escape deployment. Yet, Grindlay and Grossmann (2013) discovered that in 
a 12-month period, deployed servicewomen did not have significantly higher rates of 
unintended pregnancy compared to their nondeployed colleagues. In fact, their data 
indicated that servicewomen experience unintended pregnancies “in all phases of their 
military careers”—while stationed at home base, preparing to deploy, and during 
deployments (p. 243). Therefore, despite the many military evacuations of pregnant 
servicewomen from combat zones, unplanned pregnancies are not limited to the combat 
zones, although the high visibility and nature of the situation may magnify the 
inconvenience of unplanned pregnancies while deployed. 
Furthermore, the belief that pregnancy is a significant factor in troop readiness 
may be completely unfounded. Biggs et al. (2009) claimed that “there is no documented 
study that demonstrates a direct negative impact of pregnancy on military readiness” 
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and that, in fact, “pregnancy and parenthood are compatible with a military career” (p. 
64). Therefore, despite the unofficial view by many in the military that mothers are 
“organizational impediments” (Taber, 2011, p. 341), it has been acknowledged that 
women’s absenteeism is not much greater than men’s (Carroll & Barkalow, 1991; “The 
Military Is Pregnant: Coping with motherhood in the armed forces,” 1979; P. J. Thomas 
& Thomas, 1994). For example, Peach (1996) explained that “Research has shown that 
the belief that female military personnel lose more duty time than men because of 
pregnancy-related reasons is unfounded, since males lose even more time for being 
AWOL and for desertion, drug and alcohol abuse, and confinement” (p. 170). Although 
women do take pregnancy leave, in reality, men have many situations that may make 
them unavailable for service, as well. Furthermore, because men make up 85% of the 
military, their absenteeism is likely quantitatively higher than women’s. 
Ultimately, as the interviews demonstrate, being pregnant has been framed as a 
problem for servicewomen, whether or not their pregnancies are planned, and this 
functions as a means of institutional discrimination. In the cases of unplanned 
pregnancies, servicewomen are accused of poor management of their fertility and 
inhibiting troop readiness. When the pregnancies are planned, or perceived to be 
planned, the servicewomen are blamed for trying to get out of deployment and 
hindering combat readiness (Biggs et al., 2009; Holt et al., 2011; Jacobson & Jensen, 
2011). Servicewomen end up in a double bind if they find themselves pregnant because 
just being pregnant is often perceived negatively. The only way to avoid the dilemma is 
not to get pregnant, ever. Indeed, Taber (2011) asserted, the “ideal military member is 
an unencumbered ‘masculine’ warrior,” and maternity is linked to a familial and 
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domestic role that will likely inhibit combat readiness (p. 334). For example, Taber 
interviewed a woman named Barbara who explained her frustration with one of her 
commanding officers who, “had a reputation of not really liking to employ mothers 
because . . . they had issues of kids being sick and babysitting issues and didn’t want to 
be on call, that sort of thing” (p. 341). Evidently, despite important strides in pregnancy 
policies in the military, especially since Crawford, servicewomen who get pregnant still 
are stigmatized. 
The rest of this chapter will closely examine servicewomen’s personal 
pregnancy experiences as well as military pregnancy policies, procedure, and culture in 
order to understand current military culture regarding pregnancy.  
 
Constraining the Construction of Military Pregnancy Experiences 
 An analysis of interviews with servicewomen as well as military brochures, 
policies, and procedures reveal that, despite supportive efforts by the military, many 
pregnant servicewomen nevertheless face discrimination because pregnancy in the 
military is constructed as problematic. Before discussing how the military treats 
pregnancy as a problem, which discriminates against some servicewomen, some 
supportive actions of the military should be highlighted. Although the dominant theme 
that resulted from the interviews and rhetorical analysis concerned the military as 
constraining, many women did express how grateful they were for some of the support 
offered by the military. Particularly, discussions often mentioned the 42 days of paid 
maternity leave (during which they still accrued vacation time), 10 days parental leave 
for spouses of servicewomen who just delivered, 100% healthcare cost coverage, free 
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prenatal educational classes, and free breast pumps (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009, 
p. 19).  
Additionally, Magellan explained that the Navy now has an Office of Women’s 
Policy that is working to ensure that women are cared for and considered in Navy 
policies (personal communication, August 28, 2013). This office holds and updates 
what are called the Instructions, which refer to pregnancy policies. At the time of the 
interviews, the most current version was OPNAV 6000.1C (Department of the Navy, 
2007). Sydney explained that the Instructions are where pregnant Naval sailors turn 
when they have a problem or a question. And Jada and Jules noted that it is the 
servicewoman’s responsibility to read the Instructions and make sure she understands 
them. Ultimately, the Instructions are in place to protect servicewomen from being 
overworked, getting injured, and/or participating in an activity that may cause a 
miscarriage. 
Yet many of the benefits offered come with strings attached, as several 
servicewomen also emphasized that benefits did not come for free. In fact, two of the 
women interviewed who seemed the most invested in the military—Joanna and Master 
Sergeant Mom—adamantly emphasized the sacrifices that needed to be made. Joanna 
explained, “The military does take care of you and your family, but again, it comes at a 
price” (personal communication, August 3, 2013). And Master Sergeant Mom 
explained that she has had to spend much time away from her family and friends. In her 
years of service, she has missed half of both of her daughters’ birthdays, as well as 
some wedding anniversaries. But, she contended, it has been worth it because in the end, 
the benefits outweigh the sacrifices. Her children have free health care and one day will 
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also have a free college education.  
 Despite the benefits that the servicewomen appreciated, there were still policies, 
procedures, and cultural understandings in the military that are quite constraining to 
pregnant service members. Specifically, servicewomen discussed stigmas associated 
with being a pregnant service member, the emphasis on control and hyperplanning, 
gender issues that often resulted in performing macho maternity, and the medicalization 
of pregnancy. Each of these issues is biopolitical and advances a discriminatory 
environment for pregnant service members by using women’s biological bodies to 
frame pregnancy as a problem in the (hyper)masculine military. 
 
Stigma 
Often pregnant servicewomen face a stigma that pregnancies were planned to 
avoid deployment or avoid physical readiness tests (PRT). Both beliefs exist within the 
military, and the media has helped disseminate it as well. Lundquist and Smith (2005) 
reported that in the 1980s and 1990s it was common for newspapers to perpetuate this 
stigma during the Gulf War and the Bosnia intervention, using article titles such as 
“Pregnancy Kept GI Jill Out of War,” “A Camouflage Baby Boom?,” “Sailor Pregnant 
to Avoid Tough Duty?,” and “70 GIs Leave Bosnia on Stork” (p. 2). Yet, Holt et al. 
(2011) concluded that planned pregnancies “to avoid aspects of military service” have 
not been supported by research (p. 1060). My interviews with servicewomen confirmed 
this as well. Nonetheless, rumors of this kind are often difficult to dispel, especially if 
there are a few cases where the rumors are true. In this section, I analyze interviews 
with servicewomen and argue that pregnant military women are unjustly stigmatized 
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because colleagues and superiors assume pregnancies were planned in order to avoid 
deployment. Because pregnancy deviates from what is considered a “normal” soldier’s 
bodily comportment, the stigma serves as a regulatory measure of discipline and 
discrimination. 
Most of the participants expressed their frustration with the stigma, despite 
knowing a few women who purposely planned their pregnancies to avoid deployment. 
In many cases, the stigma made an already difficult situation of an unplanned pregnancy 
even more stressful. As Natalie explained,  
On our ship, they look down on pregnancy, because they think, “Oh you girls 
just do it to get off the ship so you don’t have to go out to sea, to get out of 
deployment.” So they categorize you with that even though some people do that, 
but not everyone. (personal communication, October 26, 2013) 
 
Natalie’s pregnancy was not planned, so she waited until she was 4 months pregnant to 
tell her command about it (she had been getting prenatal treatment off base so that the 
Navy would not know). As a result, she had to stay at her job for 2 weeks to train 
someone to replace her before being transferred to her pregnancy command. During 
those 2 weeks, she heard people talking about how she got pregnant to avoid 
deployment. (She had told her command at the beginning of March and her ship was 
scheduled to deploy at the end of March.) Her pregnancy was unplanned and, 
unfortunately for her, ill-timed.  
 Jules further explained that rank also impacts the stigma, stating that 
servicewomen who get pregnant when they are rank E-5 or below, no matter what their 
age or life experience, are often treated as if they just graduated from high school. She 
elaborated that the woman’s command gets upset thinking that “she got pregnant to get 
out of deployment or she couldn’t handle it or whatever” (personal communication, 
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October 13, 2013). Jada further explicated that the stigma existed when she was 
pregnant with her first child 10 years ago, and it still existed with her third child, who 
was 2 years old at the time of the interview. She affirmed that there is a stigma 
“associated with females who get pregnant on the ship” (personal communication, 
October 14, 2013). However, she believed the timing of her third child, as well as her 
higher rank, helped avoid the stigma the third time she was pregnant. 
 In addition to being accused of trying to avoid deployment, Emily noted that 
women who had back-to-back pregnancies were criticized for trying to avoid PT tests, 
or “if the girl had gained a lot of weight, they were only getting pregnant again to avoid 
the body fat test” (personal communication, October 13, 2013). She explained that if 
soldiers are a certain body fat percentage or higher, they automatically fail the PT test, 
which can impact their military career and potential advancements. Therefore, rumors 
spread about women who get pregnant quickly after delivering, stating that the woman 
was afraid she could not lose the weight and pass the test and therefore resorted to 
pregnancy to excuse her. In conjunction with this, Emily also emphasized that if women 
want to have big families, then the military might not be the best occupation. She knew 
a woman who had six children, and people talked behind her back, accusing her of 
being a “malingerer who doesn’t want to get in shape and do the PT test” (personal 
communication, October 14, 2013). In these cases, pregnancy is problematically framed 
as an excuse or “easy way out” of having to meet the demands of the PT test, while in 
reality pregnancy is quite demanding on the body.  
These stigmas associated with pregnancy in the military carry three problematic 
assumptions. First, they rely on biopolitical beliefs that bodies can be controlled and 
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assume that all pregnancies are (and can be) planned, which contradicts many of the 
military studies cited earlier about the high rates of unplanned pregnancies and assumes 
bad intentions on the part of servicewomen. In many cases of unplanned pregnancies, 
especially when the servicewomen are single, the servicewomen enjoy their jobs and do 
not want to be relocated. This was the case with many of the interview participants, 
including Magellan and Mary. Second, the stigma relies on antiquated traditional beliefs 
about gender, such as believing that women, despite choosing to join the all-volunteer 
armed forces, do not really want to work hard and be full participants in the masculine-
dominant organization, but would prefer to have more domestic occupations and be 
stay-at-home-moms. This view also frames women as weak and lazy, wanting to take 
the “easy” way out. Of course, this assumption also brings much baggage related to 
women’s unpaid work in the home in the form of domestic and familial responsibilities, 
which, though often unpaid, are still quite time-consuming and strenuous. Finally, and 
jumping off the previous point, the assumptions underlying the stigmas imply that 
having and caring for children is less work than deploying or taking a physical fitness 
test. While it may be less risky, many would contest that it is not less work. 
 
Hyperplanning 
Second, I found that the military expects and encourages the hyperplanning of 
pregnancies, which places the needs of the military above those of servicewomen and 
treats women’s bodies as docile machines that can be strictly disciplined and regulated. 
Specifically, one of the missions of the military is to ensure combat readiness and 
fertility planning in the military is often stressed so it does not interfere with readiness 
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(Kwolek et al., 2011). In fact, Kwolek et al. (2011) emphasized that pregnant 
servicewomen have much social, political, and economic responsibility because 
“pregnancy during overseas deployment is a financial and operational burden for the 
military” and also is a “matter of public health as unintended pregnancy can negatively 
impact women's and children’s well-being” (Kwolek et al., 2011, p. 1056). Rhetorically, 
using terms like “burden” reinforces the view of pregnancy as a problem and 
perpetuates the stigmatizing of pregnant servicewomen. Therefore to avoid being 
stigmatized, women can abide by the military’s recommended hyper-family-planning. It 
became apparent in the interviews that many women had mixed feelings about the 
pressures of hyperplanning.  
In support of hyperplanning, many interview participants discussed the 
importance of scheduling pregnancies. For example, Joanna succinctly stated, “We had 
a plan” (personal communication, August 3, 2013). Additionally, those serving in the 
Navy—specifically Samantha, Ariel, Magellan, Natalie, Jules, and Jada—explained 
how the Navy is unique in planning pregnancies, even within the military. In the Navy, 
soldiers have rotations of sea duty and shore duty. The Navy expects that women will 
plan their pregnancies around shore duty, so there is not an interruption to the crew on 
the ship at sea.  
Specifically, the OPNAV Instruction 6000.1C (what servicewomen call the 
Instructions) states that service members “are expected to plan a pregnancy and/or 
adoption in order to successfully balance the demands of family responsibilities and 
military obligations” (Department of the Navy, 2007, p. 2-2). Some of the women 
interviewed were able to follow these instructions and plan their pregnancies. As a 
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result, they explained that they saw no negative impacts on their careers. For example, 
Ariel explained, “If you’re going to get pregnant, you’re supposed to do it on shore duty 
and that’s what I did” (personal communication, October 21, 2013). However, Ariel 
was also ranked as a chief when she became pregnant and had reached a point of 
retirement, so she had the dual advantage of rank and agency when it came to her 
pregnancy. Few people would likely give her a difficult time since she planned her 
pregnancy as was expected and she was of a senior rank. Additionally, because she had 
reached a point where she had served in the armed forces long enough to retire with 
benefits, if she was given a difficult time she always had the option to leave without 
owing the military any more service.  
Magellan gave an even more thorough explanation about planning as a Naval 
service person, stating,  
You are supposed to plan your children on shore rotation because when you are 
on sea duty you know you have um, a mission to protect the country. You are on 
the go. You are able to get deployed. And it would be the responsible thing to 
plan your pregnancy around the sea to shore rotation. So that’s another thing that 
us girls in the military have to deal with. (personal communication, August 28, 
2013) 
 
In Magellan’s statement, the hyperplanning of pregnancies in the Navy is highlighted 
(plan pregnancies for shore duty). Additionally, there is overlap with gender difference 
in the militarized experience since this is “another thing that us girls in the military have 
to deal with.” Her statement reflected a larger institutional understanding in the military 
that pregnancy only affects women and is a women’s problem.  
Yet, control over fertility and family planning can never be guaranteed, even 
within an organization focused on the disciplinary and regulatory functions of modern 
biopower, like the military. Indeed, Duke and Ames (2008) explained that despite all of 
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the disciplining, regulating, and controlling by the military,  
the implied docility of this arrangement in the current context—whereby the 
military conditions soldiers and sailors through discipline, training, and 
occupational socialization to be in a perpetual state of “readiness”—is 
compromised by the decidedly indocile nature of women’s bodies (Butler, 1993) 
in terms of their bodily cycles and fluctuating rates of fertility. (p. 245) 
 
The indocile nature of women’s bodies can make family planning elusive. The 
Instructions are clear about the expectations of the Navy, yet despite being told what to 
do and trying to follow the Instructions, not everyone can control their family planning. 
Although many women are able to get pregnant when they want to, an equal number of 
women struggle to get pregnant, and almost all adoptions are difficult to plan due to 
various variables, including that the birth mother may choose to keep her baby instead 
of giving it up for adoption. 
Moreover, according to a brochure by the Navy Office of Women’s Policy, 
“Pregnancy and parenthood are compatible with a naval career. . . . Navy encourages 
family planning to positively impact fleet manning and readiness, and helps ensure 
success for service members’ families and careers” (Navy Office of Women’s Policy, 
n.d., p. 1). Despite the gender-neutral terms (e.g., “service members’ families”) in this 
statement, because it is in a women’s policy brochure, readers understand it to be 
directed toward female service members. The brochure seemingly contradicts itself, 
first stating that parenthood and pregnancy are compatible with a military career, yet 
later implying that one of these events could hinder a servicewomen’s chances for 
familial and career success. Read as one statement, the implication is that any plans 
other than those that adhere to Naval schedules could mean familial and career failure, 
which puts much pressure on servicewomen.  
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 Furthermore, throughout the interviews it became apparent that getting pregnant 
on sea duty is not just poor planning, but it is quite taboo. Samantha explained that 
although her pregnancy was a surprise 2 weeks after she got married, “I was on shore 
duty anyways so it didn’t matter. . . . If you’re on a deployment and you find out you’re 
pregnant—heaven forbid that ever happens, but it’s happened before—you would be 
transferred off the ship” (personal communication, October 13, 2013). Samantha 
emphasized the importance of planning pregnancies according to the military’s schedule 
and a warning against doing otherwise. 
Yet not all participants agreed with following the military’s schedule. Natalie 
expressed frustration with the way the Navy handles pregnancies, contending, “We 
aren’t allowed to have babies when we want. Don’t tell us wait till you go to shore duty 
to have a kid. If we want to have a kid now we can do that” (personal communication, 
October 26, 2013). Jada also expressed frustration, but not as much for the control and 
planning aspects as for the stigma the military associates with pregnancies that are ill-
timed. As she recalled, she became pregnant with her first child while she was on sea 
duty, which she said was a major “no no.” Eighteen months after the birth of her first 
child, she had her second child and was on the rest of her sea duty but moving to shore 
duty, “so it wasn’t the same type of stigmatism [sic] that’s associated with getting 
pregnant while aboard a ship” (personal communication, October 14, 2013). Fortunately 
for Jada, the timing of her second pregnancy did not interfere with the military’s 
schedule.  
 The hyperplanning required by the Navy can be frustrating because many times, 
even with the best planning, unplanned pregnancies occur. For example, Natalie had a 
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miscarriage the year prior, so she and her fiancé were using two types of protection—
oral contraceptives and condoms—when she got pregnant a second time. Needless to 
say, when she found out she was pregnant they were both shocked. However, she was 
simultaneously frustrated with the seeming problem her pregnancy presented because it 
was not planned. In an organization focused on controlling all aleatory events (Foucault, 
2003), women’s bodies still prove to be unpredictable, as was exemplified in Natalie’s 
situation. This unpredictability is problematic for an organization that is to be ready at 
all times. Natalie’s case exemplifies both the indocility of the female body in trying to 
plan pregnancies as well as the disciplinary measures—in the form of stigma—that 
attempt to constrain and contain aleatory events. 
Furthermore, all of the policies seem to ignore the potential for unplanned 
pregnancies, which can place much unrealistic pressure and stress on servicewomen and 
cause greater complications, such as Natalie’s decision to wait to tell her command out 
of fear of the stigma she would face, which resulted in her relocation weeks before 
deployment. The military places very high standards on women and gives them limited 
options, expecting them to only get pregnant when planned, ignoring the potential for 
unplanned pregnancies, and only making abortion available in cases of rape, incest, or 
health endangerment (see Chapter III). With these policies, if a woman has an 
unplanned, and unwanted, pregnancy she must not only face the stigma of getting 
pregnant, but her only option is to continue the pregnancy.  
Planning a pregnancy ensures that there are the least amount of interruptions and 
issues for accomplishing the military’s mission (Biggs et al., 2009; Jacobson & Jensen, 
2011). Ultimately, the military’s expectation of hyperplanning encourages 
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servicewomen to enact what Smithson and Stokoe (2005) call “macho maternity,” or 
the idea that a woman is supposed to “arrange her pregnancy and childbirth for a quiet 
period at work” so as to “cause minimum disruption to the company for the woman not 
to be criticized” (p. 162). For many, this type of planning is not only difficult, but also 
elusive.  
 
Performing Macho Maternity 
Macho maternity plays a large role in servicewomen’s pregnancies. In this 
subsection, I argue that servicewomen enact “macho maternity” in order to negotiate the 
tension between the reality of their biological differences from men and their desire for 
complete social equality. Indeed, the gendered nature of pregnancy in and of itself is not 
that unexpected; however, as will be demonstrated below, gender in the military context 
is a unique experience, likely due to the constant conflation of sex and gender within the 
institution. While each servicewoman did not have the same experience in terms of 
gender, each interview tended to circle around two subthemes: sex and/or gender 
sameness and difference. Often servicewomen reconciled these tensions through the 
performance of macho maternity. 
Sameness. In discussions concerning sameness, servicewomen emphasized their 
equality to their male counterparts in terms of physicality, work ethic, job performance, 
and dedication. For example, regarding physicality, Magellan discussed sameness when 
it came to combat. About the recent decision to allow women in combat, she quickly 
stated, “I’ve been in combat. . . .We’ve [women] been frontline for years. This entire 
war.” She further emphasized servicewomen’s equality in terms of the physical 
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demands of combat, explaining, “I am quite capable of carrying a 200-pound man who 
is dead weight across while being shot at” (personal communication, August 28, 2103). 
Magellan’s discussion supported the longstanding “sameness” argument in feminist 
theory; that is, that men and women are fundamentally the same, and therefore equal, 
and that differences are socially constructed and not natural (for example, see Butler, 
1993, 2006; de Beauvoire, 1989; Haslanger, 2006; MacKinnon, 1987; Pateman, 1990; 
Spelman, 1988).  
Additionally, discussions of work ethic reflected the sameness argument. 
Magellan stated that she “worked up almost until the day I delivered” (personal 
communication, August 28, 2103). She further elaborated that when she was pregnant 
she worked as a medical professional (the civilian equivalent of a physician’s assistant), 
and that her commander would have to kick her out of the emergency room before she 
would volunteer to leave. Similarly, Samantha stated, “I was working up until two days 
before I had my son in the first place” (personal communication, October 13, 2103). 
And Joanna explained that even when she was put on bed rest a month before each of 
her children were born, she continued to work from home via telephone. Ariel described 
how she went to work with contractions the day she had her son. Once the contractions 
“got too bad,” she finally decided to go to the hospital to deliver her baby (personal 
communication, October 21, 2013). In each of these instances, the servicewomen were 
dedicated workers and emphasized that they did not let their pregnancies impact their 
work ethic.  
 Third, job performance was important for the servicewomen to establish 
themselves as equal to the men. When asked if gender made a difference in her 
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experience in the Army, Joanna explained, “I mean, if you’re not excelling at your 
job . . .” implying that it does not matter if one is a man or a woman, it only matters 
how one performs (personal communication, August 3, 2013). Joanna believed all 
soldiers were judged on performance, which had nothing to do with whether or not she 
was a woman. In her view, the military was gender- and sex-blind and hard workers 
were the ones rewarded, plain and simple. She explained, “I was also doing well in my 
job. I received a lot of awards for being top recruiter and things, I, I had not, it’s not like 
Joanna’s not a performer, and she’s trying to get out of work.” Joanna worked hard and 
was rewarded for it; that’s how she saw it, plain and simple.  
However, in contrast, Magellan explained how hard she fought to achieve 
equality with her male peers. As she discussed, equality was something she had to earn 
as a woman in the military, 
You know in the Navy, in the military you have to do, I feel, . . . I’ve had to do 
twice what the boys do so that they don’t point fingers and say, “Oh it’s because 
you’re pregnant that you don’t have to do this.” Or “Oh it’s because you’re a girl 
you get away with this.” Um, so, you know I feel as if I’ve always put forth 
extra effort so that I could run circles around them so that they could not say, 
“Oh you know Magellan doesn’t have to do this because she’s you know 
whatever.” (personal communication, August 28, 2013) 
 
Magellan explained how the dominant male culture of the military makes it difficult for 
women, especially pregnant women, to experience the feeling of equality due to their 
biological differences. As a result, Magellan and other participants emphasized how 
they worked hard, if not harder, than the men so that they would not be viewed as weak 
females. Interestingly, pregnancy is a time when many women experience increased 
fatigue, tiredness, soreness, aches and pains, and rapid weight gain, yet during this time 
many of the servicewomen interviewed explained how they worked even harder than 
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they had before so they would not be viewed as weak freeloaders.  
Finally, dedication to the military to prove sameness was reflected in interview 
discussions about the uniforms. This was not surprising, given that one of the ways 
masculinity is perpetuated in the military is through the uniform (Morgan, 1994). 
Attempting to mask particularities, uniforms are meant to make all soldiers—men and 
women—appear homogenous and are another example of how men, especially in the 
military, have been framed throughout history as the referent or “neutral” (de Beauvoire, 
1989a; MacKinnon, 1987). Indeed, Schneider (1997) explained that military uniforms 
visibly express “male identity more than any other form of dress” to many people and 
therefore participate in the cultural construction of masculinity (p. 184). Additionally, 
Morgan (1994) argued that “the uniform absorbs individualities into a generalized and 
timeless masculinity while also connoting a control of emotion and a subordination to a 
larger rationality” (p. 166). Consequently, when women wear a uniform, they are 
participating in the larger hegemonic order that “masculinizes” participants. This serves 
to automatically disqualify any unique embodied characteristics or experiences women 
may have. The uniforms are functional, deemphasizing and sometimes rendering 
invisible reminders of physical femininity, such as breasts and hips. 
Yet when women are pregnant, it is nearly impossible to hide a growing belly. 
To combat the visible signifier of an expanding stomach, some of the women explained 
the ways they still tried to conform to military uniform standards, despite being given 
an exception due to their pregnancies. One of the recurring issues that surfaced in 
almost every interview was whether or not servicewomen were allowed to wear tennis 
shoes as their feet and ankles swelled due to pregnancy, making their boots 
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uncomfortable to wear. Additionally, because boots are expensive, many women did not 
want to buy another size up each time their boots became too small during their 
pregnancies. For Ariel, it was important to avoid doing anything that would distinguish 
her as different. As she said, “I didn’t play the, you know, I’ve gotta wear sneakers. I 
wore my boots every day, I wore my uniform every day.” In this case, Ariel made sure 
to adhere as closely as she could to the dress code so that she would not stand out as 
violating it. Ariel also used PT clothes to show her dedication. As she explained,  
I mean, as far as PT clothes, you can wear your regular PT clothes and you can 
wear your shirt out. But I tucked it in until the day I had him and I wore my PT 
gear, and I could have went to civilian clothes at the end, but I didn’t. Kind of a 
long story, cuz I was having a hard time getting some of the other senior people 
from another Navy command I couldn’t get them to dress properly, so, I 
continued to tuck in everything and do that. (personal communication, October 
21, 2013) 
 
Even when she was pregnant, and likely could not tuck in her shirt very easily (she 
gained 70 pounds while pregnant), Ariel’s dedication to military policies meant that she 
adhered to them despite her discomfort, so as to set an (extreme) example for her peers. 
This was one way of displaying her toughness, and hence, equality, with her male peers. 
Additionally, a few women were dedicated to avoiding disruptions for their 
colleagues, so they did not immediately report their pregnancies. Magellan explained 
that she lied to her commanding officer about how far along she was so that she could 
keep on working. As she explained,  
I really, really like my job, and at twenty weeks, they take you off of the 
ambulances. Actually, I’m sorry, it’s sixteen weeks they take you off the 
ambulances, so I fibbed and I was like, “Oh, no, I just found out I was pregnant.” 
I was delayed about three, maybe four, weeks. (personal communication, August 
28, 2013) 
 
She then confessed that after she had a very bad ambulance call, one that she should not 
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have been on while pregnant, she finally fessed up to how far along she was because it 
scared her to realize how she was putting herself and her unborn baby at risk. 
In a similar story, Ariel did not tell anyone that she was pregnant until she was 4 
months along. She was going to a Senior Enlisted Academy and did not want to be 
denied the opportunity to go, so she went as if everything was normal, completing and 
passing the PRT, and transferring to a new command. She said that she had been in the 
Navy so long that many people probably just thought she was gaining weight, but did 
not suspect pregnancy.  
A prominent manifestation of the sameness mentality in these discourses 
revolving around physicality, work ethic, job performance, and dedication is macho 
maternity. Not only does the phrase refer to hyperplanning when women arrange their 
pregnancies for times when it works best with their jobs, but it also implies taking 
maternity “like a man,” or when “women feel compelled to work like men to succeed” 
(Smithson & Stokoe, 2005, pp. 160, 164). Indeed, macho maternity is an attempt to 
normalize pregnant women as much as possible, as they work to conform to notions of 
the ideal soldier while simultaneously experiencing significant physical body changes. 
In the preceding instances, servicewomen attempted to continue to work as hard as they 
did before they were pregnant. In the military, servicewomen deal with unique tensions. 
They are working hard not only because they are in the military, but, as Magellan stated, 
because they are women in the military. Despite many claims of equality and progress 
made by servicewomen, it appears that they still have to continually prove themselves 
as valuable soldiers and try and render any differences as insignificant (such as how 
Ariel continued to tuck in her PT clothes, despite gaining 70 pounds while pregnant). 
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 Examples of macho maternity are evident in statements like Magellan’s about 
working twice as hard as the men, and when Ariel said that she worked until the day 
that her son was born, and even at that point, she worked until her “contractions got too 
bad.” In yet another example, Magellan explained that, “So I worked up almost until the 
day I delivered, I worked every day and they, Commander Smith, would come in and 
kick me out of the emergency room. You know tending to patients and still trying to do 
everything everybody else is doing, with my cankles!” (personal communication, 
August 28, 2013). Despite the physical changes her body was experiencing due to 
pregnancy (in this case, swelling ankles), Magellan still worked hard to do her job, just 
like all of her peers. 
Difference. Even with the statements by many servicewomen that they were 
equal to men, there were also some essentialist statements made in the interviews that 
reiterated ideas in feminist scholarship that focus on the essential differences between 
men and women and the importance of valuing women’s experiences (Dow & Tonn, 
1993; Dubriwny, 2005; Gilligan, 1997; Grosz, 1994; Irigaray, 1985, 2000; Ruddick, 
2006; Young, 2005, 2006). In the following examples, the tension between the 
sameness and difference feminist accounts is illustrated in regard to biology, emotions, 
policies, and punishment. 
Most participants agreed that men and women are biologically different. As 
Joanna bluntly stated, “Females get pregnant” (personal communication, August 3, 
2013). Plain and simple. Yet a theme emerged in their discussions of these differences 
about how women are naturally and essentially different than men, something that is 
contradictory to the previous statements of sameness. In fact, despite her claims that 
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women have been on the frontlines for years and that she excelled at it, Magellan 
countered, “I don’t believe that women necessarily belong frontline because we’re made 
differently. I don’t think women have any business on a submarine because our parts 
aren’t made for that.” And, after explaining that she could carry a 200-pound man in a 
battle zone, she qualified it with, “Not every woman can do that” (personal 
communication, August 28, 2013). So, despite her ability to be equal to men and to 
possess the physical strength to do the same manual labor as men, Magellan still held to 
what she called her more “traditional” views that men and women are essentially 
different.  
Magellan and Jada also explained that the body armor is made to fit male bodies 
and can be quite uncomfortable for women with larger breasts. However, a closer look 
at this issue reveals it is much more complex than the gender binary offered. This 
argument rests on the assumption that because women tend to have larger breasts than 
men, body armor is discriminatory by sex. However, not all women and not all men are 
built the same. Indeed, there is significant intrasex variance. Therefore, it could easily 
be argued that smaller statured men may also be uncomfortable in the armor, and, in 
contrast, smaller breasted women may be quite comfortable wearing it. Similarly, a 
smaller man might struggle to drag a 200-pound body just as a petite woman might. 
This highlights that, although every woman or man is not the same or conforms to the 
“ideal” or “normal” soldier’s body, there should be body armor available for soldiers 
that fits multiple body types, regardless of sex. 
An additional physical issue that Samantha raised was what jobs a woman does 
and how it might affect her pregnancy. As she explained, if a woman is working in 
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HAZMAT, or in an engine room, or on a ship and falls down the stairs, there is the 
danger of a miscarriage. In these cases, women’s pregnancy physically makes certain 
jobs off limits. 
It was also argued that men and women are not only different physically, but 
emotionally. Magellan asserted that combat is  
emotionally tax, taxing. You really have to be able to compartmentalize. Which 
men do very well. Women, we’re a little more emotional. But you know when it 
comes out, it, it, the PTSD and everything, it really hits home. Not just the men, 
but boy, the women, I think um might, we’re nurturing. (personal 
communication, August 28, 2013) 
 
Her belief was that women’s more nurturing, more emotional innate characteristics 
make it so that war is much harder on them. Magellan’s comments are reminiscent of 
arguments by scholars such as Ruddick (2006) and Gilligan (1997) who argued 
women’s innate maternal characteristics are what distinguish them from men. Master 
Sergeant Mom also expressed the differences between men and women in terms of 
natural interests. When discussing the ASVAB (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery), an entrance placement exam in the military, she explained that “women don’t 
score high in mechanical,” so they are likely to be placed where there are many other 
women, such as in the medical field (personal communication, September 17, 2013). 
Interestingly, two of the 14 interview participants, Mary and Ariel, operated heavy 
machinery and worked with mostly men.  
Additionally, differences also play out in terms of policies and benefits. As Jules 
explained, there are a couple ways soldiers and sailors can increase their income: men 
get married and women have babies. In both of these cases, the Basic Allowance for 
Housing (BAH) is increased since the service member will have to live off base with 
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dependents. Jules explained that the avenues of increasing income have led to sham 
marriages, where friends get married and split the income boost. She explained that 
sometimes women get accused of getting pregnant so that they can bring in more money. 
Yet if this is true, the increase in income is not comparable to the responsibility of 
having a child in the military. It is interesting to note in Jules’ discussion the gendered 
nature of the ways to increase income. Despite being soldiers like their male 
counterparts, the general assumption is not that women can get married to boost their 
income, but rather that women will do the most traditional, essential thing women can 
do: have babies. In fact, maternity is often assumed to be the defining aspect of 
women’s lives in essentialist scholarship (see Gilligan, 1997; Ruddick, 2006). This 
belief has been part of military legislation since the Women’s Armed Services 
Integration Act of 1948, where women could only claim their husbands and children as 
dependents if they could prove that they were the chief support in families, whereas the 
wives and children of men were automatically assumed to be dependents that would 
help men draw separate pay (Murnane, 2007).   
Finally, difference was also evident in the various forms of punishment 
servicewomen faced for being pregnant. In these instances, we see the anatomo-politics 
function of biopower punishing individuals who did not discipline their bodies 
according to military expectations. As a result, some servicewomen faced negative 
responses for becoming pregnant. Whereas the aforementioned examples focused on 
how servicewomen view sex differences, the following examples reflect how the 
military uses perceived sex and gender differences to perpetuate inequities within the 
organization. For example, Magellan explained that it is common for servicewomen to 
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be graded lower on their annual evaluations for taking time off for pregnancy and 
delivery. Although “technically you’re not supposed to take into consideration” these 
leaves of absence, she said that “a lot of commands still do that, a lot of bosses still do 
that” (personal communication, August 28, 2013). Additionally, Jada recounted how her 
career was hindered by her pregnancy,  
I was a contender for Junior Sailor of the Year. And . . . my commander was 
going to release the results of the Sailor of the Year the same day that I told 
them I was pregnant. So in my heart I believe that I didn’t get the Junior Sailor 
of the Year because they found out that I was pregnant. So had I waited a week 
or so, you know, would have been a different outcome. (personal 
communication, October 14, 2013) 
 
Although there is no way for Jada to ever be certain, she believed that she missed out on 
the award because of her pregnancy, especially because she had been such an 
outstanding junior sailor.  
The career advancement issues tie into larger gender inequality issues where 
responsibility for pregnancy is placed solely on servicewomen. Duke and Ames (2008) 
explained that military pregnancies “can place a significant burden on women in terms 
of career advancement, given that policies and prevention efforts regarding sexual 
comportment in the military tend to be gender specific, rather than universally applied” 
(p. 244). For example, when servicewomen are relocated during their pregnancies and 
then on maternity leave, they could possibly be delaying their advancement, yet “the 
male sailor who was involved in the pregnancy would face minimal workplace 
repercussions” (p. 244). In addition, the scholars explained that unlike male soldiers 
who become parents, female soldiers must provide documentation that certifies 
childcare has been arranged should they be deployed. It is automatically assumed that 
women are the caretakers, so they are held accountable in a highly disciplined and 
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regulatory masculine organization to provide proof of childcare, while their male 
counterparts are not.  
Additionally, some of the women experienced punishment out of spite for being 
pregnant. For example, many of the women discussed how they were given a maternity 
uniform allowance once they became pregnant to help cover the cost of buying new 
uniforms. The uniforms are expensive, so many of them were very grateful for this. In 
most cases, the soldiers only have to purchase a couple uniforms, because they do not 
wear all of them frequently. However, Emily was ordered to buy all of the pregnancy 
uniforms. When she told her chief how expensive it would be, he told her, “You’re the 
one that wanted to get pregnant so suck it up” (personal communication, October 13, 
2013). She was frustrated and surprised by his reaction and felt that if that was the true 
sentiment, then the maternity uniform allowance should be higher. Basically, she was 
being punished by her chief for becoming pregnant. 
Furthermore, Natalie explained that 2 days after she told her commander she 
was pregnant, they held training for all of the servicewomen on the ship regarding 
pregnancy. When she asked her commander if they would also be doing training for 
men, she was told they would, but they never did. She described her exasperation, 
stating,  
Yeah, [the men] can stay on and still get more females pregnant. I was like, why 
aren’t you talking to them? We didn’t force them to do that. . . . But they don’t 
see it that way. They see it as the girls wanting to escape deployment. (personal 
communication, October 26, 2013) 
 
Natalie’s sentiment reflected that of Carol Barkalow (1991), a soldier in the Gulf War, 
from over 20 years ago. As Barkalow concluded, “Too often, the women are the only 
ones held responsible for pregnancy, not the men who helped them get that way” (para. 
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9). In these instances, the double standard of gender specificity and sexual comportment 
enforced by the military is starkly evident. Because men do not get pregnant, they are 
not disciplined or punished even if they had a role in a pregnancy, likely because the 
men’s involvement has no impact on the military’s mission and readiness. 
 
Medicalization 
Finally, I argue that the military medicalizes servicewomen’s pregnancies, 
which devalues their experiential knowledge. Medicalization serves a biopolitical 
function of normalization, which situates pregnancy as a highly regulated and routine 
medical problem that, as Gutmann (1997) asserted, is “no different than appendicitis” (p. 
21). Treating pregnancy in this fashion overlooks that for many women, pregnancy can 
be an emotional time, whether one is excited or filled with trepidation at the thought of 
bringing a child into the world. Comparing pregnancy to the inflammation of the 
appendix situates pregnancy in the realm of science and removes it from the realm of 
emotion. Indeed, medicalizing pregnancy allows it to become part of the process of 
normalization, where pregnancy is “no longer just a bodily experience that is known 
viscerally,” but becomes an objectified disciplinary process (Britt, 2001, p. 33). As Britt 
reminds her readers, when a woman participates “in the process of normalization she 
becomes a subject as well as an object of knowledge” (p. 33).  
By comparing pregnancy to a common medical problem of appendicitis, the 
discourse analogously reinforces the notion of pregnancy in the military as a problem. 
Instead of discourse that encourages the women to celebrate a pregnancy, the discourse 
focuses on how problematic it is. Furthermore, the comparison brings with it the 
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longstanding debates about whether or not a fetus is a human being. Whether one 
morally agrees with this comparison, what cannot be ignored in these circumstances is 
that if a woman finds out she is pregnant and chooses to have the baby, it is much more 
life-changing in terms of long-term day-to-day effects since the woman will now have a 
dependent under her care.  
The highly regulated and medicalized way that the military handles pregnancy 
was constantly brought up in response to the interview question asking what is different 
about pregnancy in the military. As Jules explained, “I guess the military, the military 
treats your pregnancy more like a condition I guess you could say. It’s treated just like 
all of your medical care” (personal communication, October 13, 2013). Whereas in the 
civilian world women might feel like their pregnancies are treated as something special 
and exciting, in the military Jules explained that it was just another appointment.  
Additionally, others, like Clarissa, Natalie, and Mary, described how the whole 
system is very regulated. They discussed how women have to go to medical to have an 
official pregnancy test that will be recorded in their files and sent to their chain of 
command. As such, it is their duty to tell their chain of command about their pregnancy, 
and preferably before Medical reports it so that they do not appear to be undermining 
protocol. As Clarissa explained, “I had to let my chain of command know, it was my 
duty to do so whether I wanted them to know or not” (personal communication, 
November 1, 2013). This process of recording everything to do with the pregnancy and 
disseminating it to medical and chains of command is another example of the role of 
documentation and writing play in normalization (Britt, 2001). As Foucault (1995) 
explained, when individuals come under such surveillance, they are situated “in a 
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network of writing; it engages them in a whole mess of documents that capture and fix 
them” (p. 189). Indeed, becoming pregnant in the military means one will be closely 
watched and regulated, and privacy will be nearly nonexistent.  
 Furthermore, Young (2005) explained that because medicine is viewed as a 
“curing profession” it encourages everyone, including pregnant women, to think of 
pregnancy as a “condition that deviates from normal health” and needs to be cured (p. 
47). She further explained that “the dominant model of health assumes that the normal, 
healthy body is unchanging. . . . medical conceptualization implicitly uses this 
unchanging adult male body as the standard of all health” (Young, 2005, p. 57). In an 
historically male-dominant organization like the military, these statements likely ring 
true. Because it is relatively recently that women have not been discharged from the 
service for pregnancy, it is not surprising that pregnancy is treated as a medical problem. 
Moreover, policies for miscarriages seemed to be nonexistent or inconsistent. As 
Mary and Natalie reported, the Navy treated their miscarriages more like menstruation 
than the loss of a fetus or baby. Mary remarked that all three of her miscarriages were 
treated “like a period” (personal communication, October 17, 2013). She described a 
time that a female nurse told her not to be so bothered about miscarrying because 
“many women miscarry and think it’s just their period.” Each time Mary discovered she 
was pregnant she was filled with excitement, and each time she miscarried became 
more heartbreaking and emotionally tolling. Because her miscarriages happened within 
the timespan of 6 months, it was a very emotional time for her. She explained that each 
time she miscarried, she had to go through a process to have the miscarriage confirmed 
and recorded by the Navy, once again reinforcing biopower’s reliance on regulation and 
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control through writing:  
You have to go to work first and let them know you’re going to medical and 
then go. . . . You have to see everybody, and then go to medical and go back to 
work to let them know that you’ve come back from medical and let them know 
what’s going on. . . . It’s very regulated. (personal communication, October 17, 
2013) 
 
In addition to being regulated, she explained that she wanted to take time off to recover 
and heal, yet she was required to either leave medical and go back to work, or, in the 
case of her third miscarriage, take the day off and return to work the following day. 
Young (2005) explained that in situations like this, the woman’s experience “is reduced 
in value, replaced by more objective means of observation” (p. 58). In Mary’s case, the 
social relations of her organizational setting in the military “reduce[d] her control over 
her experience” (Young, 2005, p. 56). Feeling as if she had no agency and no rights 
regarding her body and emotions, Mary expressed her frustration with the lack of 
policies regarding miscarriages. She explained that the Navy policies granted her 30 
days medical leave when she had to have an ovary removed (her doctors believed the 
cause for this procedure was likely due to her dangerous working conditions that also 
caused her three miscarriages), yet when she had a miscarriage she was not given any 
time off because there were no policies or protocol in place.  
 Natalie had a similar experience with her miscarriage the previous year. After 
miscarrying, she was required to stay on the ship because she had never told her 
command that she was pregnant in the first place. Whereas she explained that other 
women who miscarried have received 6 to 8 weeks off the ship to recover, she was told 
she had to return to the ship after she miscarried because they had no other place to 
house her due to the fact that she kept her pregnancy a secret. Again, her story 
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exemplified the lack of privacy and personal authority women have over their bodies in 
the military. It is an example of Foucault’s discussion of the hysterization of women’s 
bodies, as they are medicalized and objectified. It is also where the “techniques of 
gender” work to constantly “reiterate the polarization of the sexes” (King, 2004, p. 33).  
It has been argued that women’s bodies are disciplined even more than the 
seemingly neutral body, which Foucault discussed (Bartky, 1997; Bordo, 1997; King, 
2004; Wilcox, 2011; Young, 2005). A technology of the body, and an apparatus of 
biopower, gender constructs the body as an intelligible object, using disciplinary 
techniques to discursively construct, contain, and control women’s physical bodies, and 
an example of this is the medicalization of servicewomen’s bodies (King, 2004). As a 
result, women experience alienation because their internal processes are objectified and 
their personal experience is devalued. 
 It is interesting to note the contradictory nature of medicalization when 
contrasting the rhetoric circulating around pregnancy and that circulating around 
abortions (discussed in Chapter III). In terms of abortion, many military women have 
been fighting for abortion to be treated like a medical condition in order to gain more 
access to abortion services. However, in terms of pregnancy, many of the servicewomen 
expressed frustration that pregnancy was treated like a medical condition. In both cases, 
servicewomen are pregnant, yet the way they frame their pregnancies depends on 
whether they want to be pregnant. When they do not want to be pregnant, they want it 
framed as a medical condition; when they do want to be pregnant, they do not want it 
framed as a medical condition. In both cases, military policy and protocol treats the 
pregnancy opposite to what the servicewomen desire. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined interviews with servicewomen in conjunction 
with military pregnancy policies and procedures in order to understand how 
servicewomen communicatively construct their pregnancy experiences in the military 
and how military policies, procedures, and culture discursively shape perceptions of 
pregnancy in the military. I began by examining the history of military pregnancy 
policies in order to give a larger perspective to the interviews and current policies 
analyzed in this chapter. Then I explained that the analysis of my interviews with 
servicewomen who had maternity experiences within the military, in conjunction with 
current military policies and procedures revealed the use of four rhetorical strategies 
employed to maintain a discriminating environment for pregnant servicewomen: stigma, 
hyperplanning, macho maternity, and medicalization. Each of these strategies, I argue, 
perpetuates the understanding of pregnancy as a problem based on sex difference and 
suggests little progress has been made since court decisions such as Flores and 
Crawford in the early 1970s. Instead, servicewomen, while very appreciative of military 
benefits, acknowledged disparities based on how they are biologized by military 
policies and personnel during pregnancy, when their femaleness is quite visible.  
The interviews discussed in this chapter revealed that the tension between 
gender equality and difference is rife within the military. Servicewomen are faced with 
the reality that having a baby makes them biologically different while also fighting for 
equality in terms of career opportunities. Feminist theorists have argued that in 
philosophy the “neutral individual” is the disembodied male (de Beauvoire, 1989a; 
Pateman, 1990; Spelman, 1988) and Acker (1990) argued that in organizations, the 
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“abstract worker is the disembodied male” (p. 152). Because of the indocile nature of 
women’s bodies (Butler, 1993) and the unpredictability of women’s “bodily cycles and 
fluctuating rates of fertility” (Duke & Ames, 2008, p. 245), women have been marked 
as biologically different and often problematic in reference to the disembodied male. In 
a culture that “implicitly uses this unchanging adult male body as the standard of all 
health” (Young, 2005, p. 57), women’s constantly changing bodies are a threat. What 
became apparent through the interviews and policies was that structural issues tended to 
be blamed on individuals’ sex and gender differences. However, Liff and Conrad (1997) 
argued, “organizations not women are the problem” (p. 36, italics in original). 
Therefore the difficulties that women face with their pregnancies in the military are 
structural rather than individual problems and should be understood as such.  
 For example, structurally, it became apparent that seniority is a significant factor 
in how one manages pregnancy in the military, supporting the conclusions of Biggs et al. 
(2009). Servicewomen such as Magellan, Joanna, and Ariel, who were in the military 
for over a decade before having children, seemed to have easier pregnancy experiences. 
This can likely be attributed to the support networks that they formed throughout their 
careers, the knowledge that they gained as they moved up in rank, trial-and-error, “buy 
in” to military culture and policies, as well as watching other women experience 
pregnancy in the military. Because she understood how complicated and overwhelming 
the experience could be, Ariel made a point to help out the junior enlisted 
servicewomen as they navigated their pregnancy experiences. Additionally, both Joanna 
and Ariel were able to plan their pregnancies so that they coincided well with their work 
schedules.  
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 Yet these same women also displayed some of the most extreme versions of 
macho maternity, likely because their extended time in the armed forces had taught 
them that “‘women’ need to simply act as ‘men’ to succeed” (Taber, 2011, p. 346). 
Instead of exploring and challenging the foundational ways the military approaches 
gender and work, macho maternity affirms traditional and stereotypical assumptions. As 
many of the servicewomen I interviewed explained, they all worked hard, even showing 
up to work with labor contractions on the day they had their babies, so as to display that 
they had the work ethic of the unencumbered male warrior required of military service 
personnel. Additionally, Joanna explained that she did PT and ran until her body would 
not let her, and Ariel said that she did PT four times a week until she had her son. It 
appears that the military is primed to be an environment for what Acker (1990) called 
“biological female[s] acting as social male[s]” (p. 139).   
 In these situations, women were not valued for the diversity they brought to the 
military, but rather for their ability to conform to the male standards in place. Indeed, 
Liff and Cameron (1997) argued that situations like this do not “get to the root of 
gender inequality” because they focus on women molding themselves into patterns of 
male work, rather than “addressing the gendered nature of current organizational 
practices” (p. 36). Furthermore, Smithson and Stokoe (2005) argued that, “women’s 
bodies cannot be adapted to hegemonic masculinity; to function at the top of male 
hierarchies requires that women render irrelevant everything that makes them women” 
(p. 153). The biggest risk in these situations is that women and their diverse experiences 
may be silenced if they are forced to be the same as men, an impossible expectation 
(Smithson & Stokoe, p. 148; see also MacKinnon, 1987). Ultimately, what this research 
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reveals is that despite the increase in women serving in the military—which has the 
potential to increase the woman-friendliness of policies, procedures, and culture—
military women appear to have better experiences when they conform to or display a 
form of macho maternity that supports the status quo. 
Furthermore, despite data that show women do not miss more work than men, 
even with maternity leave (Carroll & Barkalow, 1991; “The Military Is Pregnant: 
Coping with motherhood in the armed forces,” 1979; P. J. Thomas & Thomas, 1994), 
the interviews in this chapter revealed that the stigma of missing work or relocating still 
remains for pregnant servicewomen. The concept of agency might help explain this. 
Most of the time, men miss work because of injury, and women miss work due to 
pregnancy (Carroll & Barkalow, 1991). Given this information, perhaps because men’s 
absences are work-related and women’s are constructed as personal, it seems there is a 
stigma because of the perceived choice that women have to plan their fertility, whereas 
men’s injuries are perceived as accidental and/or caused by the enemy on the frontlines. 
Of course, this reasoning carries many problematic assumptions, including the ability of 
women to have complete control in planning their fertility, something that is not always 
the case due to the unpredictable nature of women’s bodies as well as the high instances 
of rape in the military that can result in pregnancies (Britt, 2001; Duke & Ames, 2008).  
Fortunately for most of the participants in this project, support was given from 
the chain of command, although almost all of them knew of other women who had 
negative experiences. Of the different ways this could be understood, I think two in 
particular might help. First, positive experiences for pregnant women in the military 
may be more prevalent than some of the participants, like Magellan, think. Second, the 
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types of servicewomen who responded to my recruitment script may primarily be those 
who have had positive pregnancy experiences in the military and want to talk about 
them.  
As women continue to increase their representation as service personnel, 
changes are going to be necessary in terms of policies and culture. The concept of 
macho maternity reinforces that the increased number of women might not mean that 
equality is happening. Rather, as Buzzanel (1995) explained, “increased numbers of 
women are insufficient for changing organizing processes because top women had to 
behave in promotable (masculine) ways to achieve advancement” (p. 334). Instead of 
forcing women to mold to male standards, the reality of servicewomen’s multiple 
subjectivities should be recognized (Butler, 1990). Servicewomen are not one-
dimensional, and their multiple subjectivities consist of being soldiers, mothers, friends, 
wives, superiors, subordinates, the list goes on. Similarly, men, too, have multiple 
subjectivities. These multiple subjectivities mean that servicewomen may experience 
contradictory ways of thinking about equality and discrimination. For example, a 
woman may be quite conservative on issues of abortion, and yet quite radical on issues 
pertaining to sexual assault. It is not realistic (or possible) to assume all servicewomen 
think or believe the same way, even if they have experienced similar situations, like 
pregnancy. Instead, women should be recognized as having multiple subjectivities and 
be allowed the rights to manage decisions regarding their bodies based on their own 
beliefs, circumstances, and experiences. Indeed, making soldiers in the military conform 
to a strict definition and understanding of what it means to be a soldier based on biology 






In fact, compared to its civilian counterparts, the military has been a forerunner 
in dealing with racial and gender discrimination issues. . . . How, then, can 
sexual harassment still persist in military organizations to the extent we see 
today?  
– Sue Guenter-Schlesinger (1999, p. 195) 
 
Over the course of this dissertation, I have demonstrated that, although many 
U.S. military policies and procedures regarding military women appear to be 
progressive, a closer look reveals that they are actually not very supportive and/or are 
discriminatory in nature. For example, in the second chapter I looked at the problem of 
sexual assault in the military and how the new focus on increased reporting does little, if 
anything, to curb or eradicate the epidemic of sexual assault, since convictions and 
punishments for perpetrators are still elusive. In the third chapter, I explained how 
healthcare coverage of abortions in cases of rape, incest, or life endangerment, while 
important, does not significantly increase the reproductive choices for women outside 
these three circumstances. And, in the previous chapter, I discussed how, despite having 
pregnancy policies in place, many pregnant servicewomen still face negative stigma and 
discrimination.  
I began this project by asking three overarching questions. First, how are the 
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various female embodied experiences influenced by and communicated via public 
discourses—media, policies, laws, doctrines, culture, and practices—and how do 
servicewomen talk about them? Second, how does the U.S. military utilize 
representations of servicewomen’s bodies to define gender, and what are the biopolitical 
implications? In an effort to answer these questions, I drew from a critical rhetoric 
perspective and applied theoretical understandings from feminist body theory, military 
(hyper)masculinity, and biopolitics to analyze recent policies, procedures, laws, media 
representations, and interviews as they pertain to female embodied experiences within 
the context of U.S. military. First, when conflicts arise in the military that pertain to 
female embodied experiences—which I define as experiences that revolve around the 
ways the lived body encounters the world and is simultaneously discursively defined 
and valued—the so-called problem is often claimed to be rooted in biology and not the 
system. For instance, many critics of the systemic changes advocated by TIW argued 
that the problem was not with the military institution, but instead with innate biological 
characteristics of men and women (Shapiro, 2012). Furthermore, through biologizing 
the problem, women have been framed as inferior, and experiences such as pregnancy 
pathologize women as needing to be “cured.”  
The ways embodied experiences are mediated and managed influences how they 
are discursively communicated, answering my second question. Ultimately, public 
discourses such as policies, procedures, and laws communicate a discursive reality that 
is significantly different from the material reality women experience. Despite 
regulations in place to help servicewomen, the military culture still reinforces a 
discriminatory environment based in the (hyper)masculine foundation that stigmatizes 
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pregnant women, blames sexual assault victims, and constructs roadblocks to personal 
reproductive choices like abortion. For example, my analysis of pregnancy in the 
military showed that, despite a generous paid maternity leave and 100% healthcare 
coverage, servicewomen face the stigma that they are inhibiting troop readiness and the 
mission by becoming pregnant—the ultimate sigh of a lack of bodily discipline. 
Additionally, laws like the MAA, which appear to give servicewomen more 
reproductive agency actually continue to limit agency, since only therapeutic abortions 
are not only covered by insurance, but also performed at military facilities. 
All of these discursive representations have biopolitical implications for 
servicewomen, which answers the third question. For example, medicalizing pregnancy 
and closely regulating abortions conflates the public and private spheres in 
servicewomen’s lives and places personal reproductive decisions in the hands of 
lawmakers. This perpetuates the hysterization of women’s bodies (Foucault, 1976b), 
wherein the female body can be disciplined, regulated, and controlled by the State, such 
as telling women when to get pregnant (Chapter IV), and when they can and cannot 
have abortions (Chapter III). This results in a lack of agency for servicewomen over 
their own bodies. To be sure, the military does not call its policies or organization 
“biopolitical” or claime it has an agenda. But my analyses of policies, as well as 
servicewomen’s voices, revelaed that the various disciplinary and regulatory 
apparatuses in place—such as strict expectations about when to be pregnant and 
requirements to inform one’s chain of command about rape, sexual assault, abortions, 
pregnancies, and miscarraiges—point to the biopolitical nature of the institution. As it 
stands, personal decisions are anything but personal. 
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The rest of this chapter will further elaborate on these findings, and how they 
answer my research questions, as well as discuss new heuristic questions that arose 
through my analyses. In this concluding chapter, I look to accomplish four things. First, 
I summarize the previous chapters. Then, I discuss how the chapters intersect and 
interact with one another. Although it may be easy to read each chapter as its own 
distinct case study, there are important intersections between the issues, and these 
intersections contribute to a broader understanding of servicewomen’s embodied 
experiences. Next, I explain how the analyses in these chapters related to and answered 
my overarching research questions. Finally, I consider my dissertation’s critical 
contributions to communication, rhetoric, and feminist theories of the body and suggest 
potential avenues of future research.   
 
Military Sexual Assault, Abortion, and Pregnancy: A Review  
In Chapter II, I examined the persistent problem of sexual assault in the military 
and looked at how the recent documentary film, The Invisible War (TIW), rhetorically 
intervened in discourses surrounding the sexual assault epidemic in the armed forces. 
Similar to Guetner-Schlesinger’s (1999) question quoted at the beginning of this chapter, 
I asked how the problem of rape and sexual assault could be so pervasive in an 
institution that not only prides itself on discipline and order, but also is “well-
recognized for the strengths of its rules and regulations” (Katzenstein & Reppy, 1999, p. 
3). Through an examination of discourse that surrounded the release of TIW, as well as 
a bit of historical context on the past military scandals of Tailhook, Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, and the Air Force Academy, I discovered that the military, politicians, and the 
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media work to contain the problem of sexual assault and keep it out of public attention 
through three primary strategies: the conflation of sex and gender, victim-blaming, and 
red herrings. Each of these strategies was not only utilized in the past to blame 
individuals, which aided in the perpetuation of a culture of sexual assault, but continue 
to be used in the wake of TIW. As a result, the continual containment of sexual assault 
as an individual problem is the reason that the military has not seen any significant 
progress in the fight against a systemic epidemic. Instead, victims’ voices continue to be 
silenced, and the hypermasculine culture does not change. In response to this, I 
followed the lead of servicewomen who appeared in TIW, as well as legislators like 
Senator Gillibrand, and called for systemic change within the military, starting with the 
removal of disposition authority from commanders. Indeed, Rosenthal and Korb (2013) 
opined that, although making stricter policies (such as requiring commanders to be 
ranked colonel or higher to have disposition authority) is important, any changes that 
fall short of removing disposition authority from the chain of command will do little 
because commanding officers are often perpetrators, have an inherent conflict of 
interest (they are evaluated on their command climate, so reporting sexual assault 
reflects poorly on the climate), and an officer’s increased rank does not mean that s/he 
is legally trained to deal with criminals. Making significant legislative changes like this 
would be the beginning of fighting a deeply entrenched hypermasculine military culture 
that continues to perpetuate the sexual assault epidemic. 
Chapter III focused the Military Abortion Amendment (MAA) passed in January 
2013. Under this new amendment, servicewomen and military dependents may receive 
abortion healthcare coverage in the instances of health endangerment, rape, and incest. 
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Before the amendment was passed, military insurance only covered abortions in cases 
where the woman’s health was in danger if the pregnancy were carried to term. In light 
of the expanded circumstances now covered under the MAA, I examined the discursive 
understandings and perceptions taking shape in regard to the amendment through media, 
military, and politicians’ rhetoric circulating around it. I discovered that a narrative of 
progress surrounded the amendment, which utilized the ideograph of <equality> and 
celebrated servicewomen’s progress regarding abortion rights. However, a rhetorical 
history of military abortion policies displayed how the current MAA is more restrictive 
than abortion policies for service members in the 1960s through the end of the Vietnam 
War. Therefore, the new policy is not actually as progressive as it first appears, but is 
just another step in an historically regressive trajectory of military abortion policies. As 
such, instead of being granted subject positions with increased access and agency, 
servicewomen have merely been inserted into subject positions that have dominated 
general abortion discourses for years. The analysis in this chapter explained that, similar 
to the previous chapter on sexual assault, claims of progress for servicewomen’s rights 
fall short. Indeed, Maya (2012) argued that,  
To be sure, it’s a crucially important change—especially considering the high 
rates of sexual assault faced by servicewomen. But unintended pregnancy rates 
are high in the military, and the vast majority of servicewomen who need 
abortions—like their civilian counterparts who work for the federal government 
or low-income women who rely on Medicaid—will still be forced to pay out-of-
pocket. (para. 5)  
 
In response to this lack of progress, I argued that servicewomen should be granted 
agency over decisions regarding their own bodies as well as access to abortion care. If a 
woman wants to terminate a pregnancy, whether due to therapeutic or elective reasons, 
she should be able to make the decision privately and have access to a safe facility that 
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can perform that procedure. As it currently stands, the military’s biopolitical agenda 
continues to limit servicewomen from making their own reproductive choices, such as 
elective abortions. 
Finally, in Chapter IV, I looked at pregnancy in the military and interviewed 
servicewomen who had been pregnant while on active duty. I analyzed these interviews 
in conjunction with rhetorical analyses of policies, procedures, and media coverage 
regarding pregnancy in the media. This analysis revealed that many refer to pregnancy 
in the military as the “pregnancy problem,” rhetorically framing it as a negative issue 
that inhibits troop readiness. Pregnancy is positioned as such through four distinct 
strategies utilized by military personnel, policies, and culture, which include 
stigmatizing pregnant servicewomen, expecting hyperplanned pregnancies, cultivating 
macho maternity, and medicalizing pregnancies. These four strategies devalue 
servicewomen’s personal experiences by treating pregnancy as a medical condition 
(read: problem) that is ill-timed and likely planned in order to avoid required duties. 
Servicewomen often react in one of two ways to these strategies: through frustration or 
by performing “macho maternity,” wherein they attempt to take maternity like a man 
and act as if their pregnancy did not and could not possibly interfere with performing 
their regular duties (Smithson & Stokoe, 2005). The enactment of macho maternity, 
while making the pregnancy experiences of some military women easier, simply reifies 
a hypermasculine military culture that applies a one-size-fits-all model to all soldiers. 
Therefore, despite increasing numbers of women joining the armed forces, the military 
is not significantly becoming more woman-friendly, but instead rewards those women 
who can conform closely to hegemonic masculine standards of what it means to be a 
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good soldier. 
Although each of these chapters analyzed a singular major issue facing 
servicewomen today—sexual assault, abortion, and pregnancy—the issues are not 
distinct or clean-cut. Indeed, there are intersectional and interactional components to the 
topics covered in each chapter. For example, in Chapter III I discussed how the main 
impetus behind passing the Military Abortion Amendment was likely the increased 
publicity given to sexual assault in the armed forces. I argued that had sexual assault not 
been revealed to be such a widespread and ongoing problem in the military, the 
amendment likely would not have passed as quickly. Therefore, despite the discourse 
that the amendment was passed to give the servicewomen equality, I argued that it was 
likely passed in order to give women an additional tool to deal with the unprecedented 
rates of sexual assault in the military. This is important in light of my discoveries in 
Chapter II regarding the strategic containment of the sexual assault epidemic because in 
many ways the MAA is yet another form of containment of the sexual assault problem 
since women now have access to abortions for pregnancies that result from rape. Once 
again the solution to the problem has come not in the form of significant systemic 
change, but rather at the level of the individuals who now have access to abortion 
healthcare coverage due to rape.  
Additionally, Chapter IV discussed the various difficulties pregnant 
servicewomen might face while on active duty, including how the military has higher 
rates of unplanned pregnancies than the general public (Holt et al., 2011; Pittman, 2013). 
While this could be attributed to many different reasons, two in particular stand out. 
First, the high rates of rape may lead to higher rates of unplanned pregnancies. Second, 
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the military’s very own abortion policies might very well be contributing to its so-called 
pregnancy “problem” and limiting servicewomen’s abilities to hyperplan their 
pregnancies around the military’s schedule, as is expected. This is a high expectation, 
and one that many servicewomen find difficult to meet, given the high rate of 
unexpected/unplanned pregnancies within military ranks. Yet, if a servicewomen finds 
herself unexpectedly pregnant (and it is not the result of rape or incest and her health is 
not in danger), her main option is to follow through with the pregnancy (unless, of 
course, she attempts a dangerous self-abortion or is able to pay out-of-pocket for an 
abortion off base). The military does not offer any abortion care (facilities, insurance) to 
soldiers who want elective abortions. In this situation, the military’s reliance on the 
supposed docile nature of bodies perpetuates the assumption that pregnancies can be 
controlled and planned. Yet this does not leave any room for handling the high rate of 
unplanned pregnancies. Whereas most civilian women have the option of obtaining an 
abortion in such circumstances, servicewomen do not. This puts servicewomen in a 
situation where it is impossible to meet military expectations. If they become pregnant 
unexpectedly, they are not allowed to have an abortion and therefore are forced to 
contribute to the pregnancy “problem” whether they want to or not because they are not 
given the option of abortion care.  
Furthermore, a constant theme throughout the chapters was blaming women. In 
cases of sexual assault, women are often blamed for the circumstances that led to their 
assaults. In cases of abortion, opponents to the MAA drew from historical arguments 
and contended that women would make false rape accusations in order to obtain 
elective abortions. In cases of pregnancy, women were blamed for attempting to get 
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pregnant to avoid deployment or physical fitness tests. Ultimately, these instances of 
blaming are evidence of what Mitchell (1996) called the “gender lie,” which is “the 
notion that because intentions are ‘good’ and standards are ‘gender-blind,’ there cannot 
be any gendered tension in the military except in the pathological thinking of the female 
malcontent” (p. 36). Because the military does have policies and because it has made 
some changes, it is able to claim that it is making progressive steps in treating women 
well and equally. As a result, if women claim that there are still problems, despite these 
changes, it is easier to blame the women than to blame the system. In an example from 
my interviews, Emily was told she had to buy all of the military uniforms in a maternity 
size, despite the likelihood that she would not use most of them. When she questioned 
her chief about it, she was told, “You’re the one that wanted to get pregnant, suck it up” 
(personal communication, October 14, 2013). In this case, instead of reevaluating the 
ways the institution may be unreasonable, blame was placed on Emily.  
Finally, each of the chapters reiterated how a similar demographic of women is 
often the most affected when it comes to embodied experiences and the negative 
backlash against them. Often those who are at the biggest disadvantage financially, 
newly enlisted women, are also the ones who suffer the most. In terms of sexual assault 
and rape, enlisted women are targeted more often, mostly due to the power dynamics 
between a commanding officer or superior and a newly enlisted soldier. In terms of 
pregnancy, servicewomen on their first enlistments are more likely to become pregnant 
than other female soldiers (Holt et al., 2011; Pittman, 2013). And, if they do get 
pregnant, they are at the bottom of the pay scale, so paying for an abortion out-of-
pocket is not only difficult, it may not be possible. Many times enlisted soldiers come 
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from families who also do not have many financial resources, which means that 
servicewomen cannot look to their families for financial support. As a prime example, 
an anonymous soldier in Iraq explained her tight financial situation, desperately writing 
to Stand with Servicewomen, saying, 
I am in the U.S. Army in Iraq. If the Army finds out that I am pregnant they will 
kick me out, and I cannot afford for this to happen. The salary I earn supports 
my mother and my younger brother and sister. Please, please help me. I cannot 
go to the medical facilities here because I will get sent back to the States and 
face military punishment. (Stand with Servicewomen, 2012, para. 7) 
 
In this case, the soldier not only needed the access and funding for an abortion, but 
could not afford to lose her job since she was caring for three dependents. As I 
explained in Chapter III, this is what has been called the biopolitical agenda of stratified 
reproduction, wherein those who already have more privilege are also given more 
benefits, and those who already have less continue to struggle (Gaines & Davis-Floyd, 
2004; Kessler, 2009). 
 
Answering Research Questions 
These intersections, as well as the analyses in each case study, work to answer 
the overarching research questions for this dissertation. First, each spoke to my initial 
question, How are the various female embodied experiences influenced by and 
communicated via public discourses—media, policies, laws, doctrines, culture, and 
practices—and how do servicewomen talk about them? My analysis of sexual assault 
and abortion shows that the discourse surrounding each situation reflected a different 
reality than the material situations. For example, by highlighting the increase in 
reporting of sexual assault in the military, discourse framed sexual assault and rape as 
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less of a problem, or as a problem that was dramatically decreasing. Yet, this discursive 
strategy merely diverted attention away from the reality that the root of the problem—a 
hypermasculine military culture—was not changing. Indeed, if sexual assault reporting 
is up, but punishments are not, real change will be elusive. Additionally, many 
discussed the MAA as a major step in servicewomen’s equality. Yet, what this 
discourse overlooked were all the instances in which servicewomen still cannot have 
access to abortion care, such as elective abortions or in locations where there is no 
access to abortion care due to the good neighbor policy. In terms of pregnancy, despite 
generous maternity leave, free healthcare, and positive steps in military pregnancy 
policies, many servicewomen still expressed frustration with the military culture, which 
still treats pregnancy as an inconvenient logistical “problem.” 
Additionally, many female embodied experiences are managed by focusing on 
biology. Specifically, in terms of sexual assault, women and/or biological determinism 
have been blamed. Whether servicewomen were accused of being too promiscuous or 
making poor decisions, the victims have often been blamed for their own sexual assault. 
Others have argued that biology is destiny, and it is not realistic to think that men and 
women can work closely together in circumstances where men’s testosterone is elevated 
(Shapiro, 2012). This type of reasoning attempts to manage the problem by placing the 
onus on women—to make better decisions or stay out of the military altogether—
instead of looking at the deep, systemic roots of military culture. It furthermore feeds 
into the culture of hypermasculinity that believes and advocates that, “boys will be 
boys.”  
Similarly, an examination of pregnancy policies and interviews with 
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servicewomen revealed that the hypermasculine culture of the military encourages 
macho maternity in order for pregnancies to be considered unproblematic to military 
operations. Whether or not servicewomen adopt an attitude of macho maternity, one of 
the ways that the military attempts to contain the so-called “problem” of pregnancy is 
by biopolitically medicalizing pregnancies in order to frame them as a problem with a 
cure. As Jules explained, “the military treats your pregnancy more like a condition. . . . 
It’s treated just like all of your other medical care. . . . whereas the civilians from what I 
have heard, they get a lot more say in their treatment” (personal communication, 
October 13, 2013). Management through medicalization eliminates the possibility for 
servicewomen’s agency in their pregnancy experiences. 
My second question asked, How does the U.S. military utilize representations of 
servicewomen’s bodies to define gender, and what are the biopolitical implications? 
Throughout this dissertation, I contended that neither a complete biologizing of women 
(e.g., biology is destiny), nor a completely social constructivist approach is beneficial in 
understanding servicewomen’s experiences. Instead, I have argued that there must be a 
middle ground between discursive and material understandings of the body since both 
impact servicewomen’s lives and their military experiences. The way that women’s 
bodies come to be understood and valued is through discourse surrounding them. In the 
cases of pregnancy, because it is women who must physically carry the baby for 9 
months, men are not implicated, only women. The discursive understandings of 
pregnancy tend to circulate around how pregnancy is a woman’s “problem” that 
impedes on the military mission. Yet, in reality, women make up only 15% of all troops, 
so their absences may not be any more impactful than those of males due to injury or 
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sickness. However, by discursively framing pregnancy as a problem, servicewomen 
learn that the physical circumstances their bodies are undergoing are negatively valued 
by the traditionally (hyper)masculine military.  
Likewise, sexual assault victims are often viewed as only female, making it 
seem like yet another “woman’s problem.” Although recent discussions of sexual 
assault in the military have tried to remind people of the 20,000 male victims each year, 
the overwhelming understanding of rape and sexual assault as a problem that only 
pertains to women—e.g., the “Wait till she’s sober” Sexual Assault Prevention and 
Response Office campaign—discursively frames it as only a women’s issue. All of 
these discursive formations rely on women’s physical bodies to rhetorically define each 
gender and their values within the military. 
Biopolitically, framing the issues of pregnancy, abortion, and sexual assault as 
problems has allowed for the conflation of public and private so that women do not 
have complete agency over decisions regarding their own bodies, but rather are told 
“how to live” (Stormer, 2001). Indeed, each of the issues discussed in the chapters—
sexual assault, abortion, and pregnancy—are yet further examples of how the personal 
is political. Sexual assault deals with a highly violating act in which servicewomen’s 
personal lives and choices are often blamed. Abortions are highly regulated to the point 
that women cannot choose if they want an abortion, but rather must abide by military 
policies regulating them. Pregnancies are medicalized and treated as a condition, rather 
than a potentially exciting (if planned and/or desired), potentially terrifying (if 
unplanned, not desired, and/or ill-timed), and ultimately life-changing event. In each 
case, there is an increase of public interest and control in issues that pertain to women’s 
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bodies.   
 
Critical Contributions and Future Research 
The analyses in the preceding chapters not only allowed me to answer my 
research questions for this project, but also led to critical contributions to the areas of 
feminist body theory, biopolitics, and military hypermasculinity, specifically when they 
are considered together. Expanding upon research like that of Tasker (2011), which 
looked at how the inclusion of women in the military makes it a site of struggle over 
gender and power, I examined the ways that the military uses women’s biological 
bodies to normalize the regulation of women’s rights and access to agency over their 
bodies. Not only do biopolitics aid in understanding the current circumstances, but 
understanding military (hyper)masculinity reveals how a problem that is deeply 
structural can be positioned as an individual issue. For example, instead of looking at 
how a highly masculinized culture perpetuates a discriminatory environment for women, 
often women are blamed for their struggles. Additionally, my research interrogated the 
relationship between the material, lived body and the discursive ways that the body is 
formed, positioned, and valued. I examined how the physical limitations of women’s 
bodies during pregnancy have been discursively framed as problematic, and how 
women’s bodies in general have been discursively positioned as deviant, which 
continues to situate women in general as a “problem.”  
In terms of method, I drew from others who have combined interviews with 
rhetorical analysis in order to yield a more nuanced understanding of servicewomen’s 
embodied experiences (Britt, 2001; Koerber, 2013; Projansky, 2014). This method does 
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not allow for the achievement of discovering “the truth” about servicewomen’s 
experiences, but rather shows the multiplicity of experiences and how they are similar, 
different, and overlap. To be sure, themes did emerge from the interviews with 
servicewomen regarding their pregnancy experiences, but there were also contradictions 
between those who adopted macho maternity and those who did not. The interviews 
with servicewomen, combined with the rhetorical analysis of various political, legal, 
and cultural discourses within Chapter IV (and within the larger context of this 
dissertation), added another dimension to insights regarding servicewomen’s embodied 
experiences.  
Indeed, this type of theoretical analysis might lend further critical insights to 
other related topics involving gendered embodied experiences and the military, such as 
transgender people in the military, mothers in the military, and women in combat. For 
example, transgender people pose a challenge to the military, which has strict 
institutional conceptions of sex and gender, as have been discussed in previous chapters. 
Although scholars such as Kerrigan (2012) and Burks (2011) analyze discrimination 
against transgender people in the military based on the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, 
the situation becomes even more complicated in regard to agencies like the Selective 
Service System, a part of the U.S. government that collects and retains information on 
men who could potentially be drafted for military service if the situation arose. This 
agency requires that most male citizens, as well as male noncitizen immigrants, between 
18–25 years of age must register for the service. However, it becomes more 
complicated with transgender people, especially those who have undergone surgery in 
order to physically represent their desired sex/gender expression. In these cases, the U.S. 
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government does not look at the expressed and chosen gender of the person, but instead 
makes decisions based on biology. For example, the Selective Service System explains 
under its information on who must register, that “Individuals who are born female and 
have a sex change are not required to register. U.S. citizens or immigrants who are born 
male and have a sex change are still required to register” (“Who Must Register,” 2014, 
para. 11). By making policy based strictly on biology, distinctions between males and 
females are oversimplified. Using theoretical understandings from military 
(hyper)masculinity, feminist body theory, and biopolitics, an analysis that examines the 
experiences of transgender people in the U.S. military could be enlightening in terms of 
the construction of the “normal” body and the enforcement of heteronormativity. 
Additionally, with the future of the military moving toward allowing women in combat 
positions by 2016 (to be discussed further), policies like this one may have to be 
overlooked. Will/Should females have to sign up for the Selective Service as well? 
Should conscription be based on height, weight, and strength standards instead of sexed 
biology? What are the implications for transgender people? 
Furthermore, two prominent cases of transgender women recently made 
headlines, including an Army soldier and a U.S. Navy SEAL. In 2010, Army soldier 
Chelsea Manning (at the time Bradley Manning) leaked classified information to 
WikiLeaks, which resulted in her arrest, trial, and imprisonment. Yet, despite leaking 
classified documents, Manning again made headlines after she was diagnosed with 
gender identity disorder and requested that she be given hormone therapy (male-to-
female, or MTF) “as soon as possible” once she started her prison sentence (Clark, 2013, 
para. 1). Because the prison where she was to serve, Fort Leavenworth, did not offer 
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hormone therapy, Manning’s lawyer was requesting that the “needed” medical 
treatment be provided (Clark, 2013). To date, Manning is still located at the facility in 
Fort Leavenworth, as the Army’s request to have her moved to a civilian facility that 
could better treat her “gender-identity condition” was rejected by the Bureau of Prisons 
(Baldor, 2014, para. 1). Instead, Manning is to stay where she is and will be allowed to 
start dressing as a woman and possibly receive some hormone treatment. Furthermore, 
although the military allowed her to change her name from Bradley to Chelsea, she is 
still considered male for all intents and purposes by the U.S. military (Londoño, 2014). 
This is because transgender people are still barred from serving in the military as being 
transgender is considered a mental health disorder that makes one unfit for service 
(Brydum, 2012). In another case, a retired Navy SEAL came out as transgender in a 
memoir. Kristin Beck, who wrote the book, Warrior Princess, served in the Navy 
SEALs for 2 decades. The SEALs are an elite, all-male unit, and arguably one of the 
most prominent symbols of masculinity within the armed forces (Brydum, 2013). Beck 
served on the elite SEAL Team 6, the one that is famous for killing Osama bin Laden. 
Interestingly, Brown (2006) has discovered that “the military has greater incidence of 
male-to-female transsexualism than the general public” (p. 537). Therefore, analyzing 
stories of those like Manning and Beck as well as military policies and news articles 
regarding transgender people could be insightful in understanding how the military’s 
heteronormative understandings of (hyper)masculine warriors and normative bodies 
dictate what is considered abnormal and hence, problematic.  
Additionally, an analysis of servicewomen who are also mothers might be 
beneficial when examined through the lenses of military (hyper)masculinity, feminist 
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body theory, and biopolitics. Taber’s (2011) research is a good place to start, as she 
interviewed a few servicewomen who were mothers and also drew from her personal 
experience in the armed forces. Further analysis could examine how the military frames 
mothers and fathers, the experience of mothers in the military, and media 
representations of mothers in the military. First, when it comes to how the military 
understands mothers and fathers, parental responsibilities, parental leave, and military 
duties could be analyzed. What are military policies regarding parental leave after 
pregnancy? How do such policies discursively frame fathers and mothers and normative 
understandings of parenting in the military? As the number of women in the service 
continues to increase, and as the roles of men continue to change in America from 
strictly that of breadwinners (Cornish, 2014), policies that reflect women as primary 
childcare givers and men as breadwinners should shift. Second, interviews with women 
who are (or were) mothers while on active duty could be enlightening. Although Taber 
(2011) did conduct interviews for her research, her pool of participants was quite small, 
consisting of three women. I could follow up with the women I initially interviewed for 
my project, and also recruit from other sources as well, to learn about the experiences of 
mothers in the military from the mothers themselves and add an additional qualitative 
angle to my research. This, when combined with an analysis of parental policies and 
media representations could render a more nuanced understanding of mothers in the 
military. Third, an examination of media representations could be insightful. Are 
mother soldiers represented, or is it always fathers? Do we see soldiers who are 
mothers? For example, during the 2014 Super Bowl halftime show by musical artist 
Bruno Mars, soldiers appeared on screen saying hello to their families while the 
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introduction to the song “Just the Way You Are” played in the background. Although 
most of the soldiers were men dedicating the song to their wives, the final soldier was a 
woman who dedicated it to her husband and her baby, saying she would be home soon, 
concluding with an emphasized, “Muah!” as she blew a kiss. Although only one mother 
was shown among the service members in the video, it was arguably significant because 
she was not only positioned as a servicewoman, but also as a mother and a wife who 
was away from her family, quite different from traditional (media) representations of 
who constitutes the average soldier, which is often a father/husband returning home to 
his wife and child(ren).  
Finally, one of the most contested issues currently facing the armed forces is the 
plan to fully integrate women into all combat positions in the military, including 
frontline, special combat, and elite forces, by 2016 (CNN Staff, 2013). Debates 
surrounding women in combat often circulate around the different standards for men 
and women. Some argue that there should be “gender neutral standards” when it comes 
to combat positions, while others argue that there should be different standards for men 
and women (Cox, 2013b). What complicates the picture is that when people argue about 
drawing the line, those who seem to agree can at times disagree with where the line 
should be drawn. For example, in my interview with Magellan, she explained that she 
has been on the frontlines for years and that she is more than capable of dragging a 200-
pound man across a field while being shot at. Yet, she immediately followed this 
statement by saying she did not believe all women could do what she did. She 
furthermore argued that women should not be in combat because women’s “parts” are 
not made for combat and combat situations such as submarines. Although Magellan 
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sees herself as completely capable, she relies on traditional biologizing logic to explain 
why women should not serve in combat.  
Conversely, Marine Lieutenant Sage Santangelo recently wrote an op-ed piece 
in The Washington Post about her experience failing the Marines’ Infantry Officer 
Course (Santangelo, 2014). In the piece, Santangelo argued that the women who have 
failed have not failed because they cannot handle it (13 women had passed the enlisted 
infantry training course when Santangelo wrote her piece), but rather because there are 
unequal standards for men and women. She argued that having lower standards for 
female soldiers sets women up for failure. Santangleo further acknowledged what she 
called the biologically based advantages and disadvantages to male and female bodies 
(such as how the average man has more upper body strength than the average woman) 
and argued that a training program that works to balance these disadvantages and 
advantages is the key to the future success of females in the Marines. Santangelo, like 
others, called for the same standards to be applied to all soldiers, especially in roles that 
require high levels of fitness and strength, where exceptions to the standards could be 
quite costly (Cox, 2013a).  
The argument for one minimum standard is strong because one cannot predict 
what fellow soldiers one might have to drag across a battleground while wearing a 
heavy Kevlar vest, helmet, and a gun. Yet, at the same time, I would argue that there 
should still be exceptions to biological situations such as pregnancy. Hence, I am 
personally conflicted in matters pertaining to women and combat. In this area, my 
feminist belief in equality conflicts with what I see as biological reality. Different 
people have different bodies, so it makes sense to have one standard that both men and 
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women have to meet, and that in reality, some men and some women will fail. Yet, this 
standard should not be applied to pregnant servicewomen; they should be allowed to 
continue serving, but in a different location that is safe for pregnancy.  
What my personal conflict reveals is that these issues are quite complex and 
complicated. They are not clean-cut because not all women are the same, whether it is 
in terms of physicality, personal beliefs, or family planning. Therefore, understanding 
the term “equality” is difficult. What does it really mean? Does it mean that everyone 
should be treated the same? What is “the same”? What happens when it comes to 
pregnancy? Pregnancy is a material, physical condition that cannot be ignored, and if it 
is ignored harm could come to the woman and/or the fetus. Additionally, many pregnant 
women physically experience increased fatigue, sickness, and nausea as a result of 
pregnancy and increased and changing hormone levels. Based on my research thus far, I 
argue that there should be one standard for combat for all soldiers, with the exception of 
pregnant soldiers. Based on biological factors, pregnant women in certain contexts 
should remain exceptions until after their pregnancy. 
The goal of this dissertation is not to come up with a definitive answer to the 
material/discursive debates in feminist body studies. Because liberty is different to each 
person, I argue throughout this dissertation that it is important to take into consideration 
servicewomen’s experiences and opinions (Campbell, 1973). These opinions may not 
only be different, but also contradictory. For example, I discussed in Chapter III how 
servicewomen who want the right to abortion care desire that abortion be considered a 
basic medical procedure, not an exceptional procedure. This, they argue, allows women 
access to abortion care without the moral controversy surrounding it. However, on the 
 222 
other hand, many of the servicewomen interviewed in Chapter IV wanted pregnancy to 
be considered more than just a “medical condition,” which is then framed as a problem 
that must be “cured.” In these instances, servicewomen argued that their pregnancy 
experiences were devalued. These arguments are contradictory because in terms of 
abortion access servicewomen would like pregnancy to be considered as a medical 
condition, yet servicewomen who desire for their pregnancies to result in the birth of a 
baby do not want to be viewed as having a medical condition. Instead of focusing on 
whether or not abortion or pregnancy is a medical condition, it would be better to give 
servicewomen agency to decide for themselves what is best for their lives and bodies 
and what type of care they want. As it currently stands, servicewomen’s personal bodily 
agency is primarily dictated by military policies and procedures.  
In other circumstances, it seems clear what directions should be taken. For 
example, in Chapter II, I analyzed the epidemic of sexual assault in the military and 
discussed the various forms of legislation that have passed throughout history in 
attempts to curb and/or eradicate instances of intramilitary sexual assault. However, my 
analysis showed that the legislation has not and is not working because it does not deal 
with military culture. Specifically, the (hyper)masculine military culture is overlooked. 
If the military ignores hypermasculinity in its policy changes, the cause of the ongoing 
epidemic of sexual assault will continue to be missed, and efficacious policy will 
continue to be elusive. In this case, passing the correct type of policy (and I argue there 
is a correct type of policy) will likely change the future, and the policy changes that are 
needed are not just superficial but are also cultural. Like many of the women in The 
Invisible War explained, commanders must be removed from making decisions in 
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sexual assault cases and consistent punishment of perpetrators must happen if the 
epidemic is to be eradicated (Dick, 2012; Winerip, 2013).  
Indeed, keeping disposition authority within the chain of command will never 
lead to significant cultural changes. As Rosenthal and Korb (2013) reported,  
Commanders need to know that their troops can carry out directed orders in the 
most stressful conditions. But there is a difference between enforcing discipline 
and addressing criminality. Trained legal and law enforcement professionals 
should always address criminal behavior; that is the only way to ensure that the 
victim and defendant's rights to justice and due process are protected. (p. 28) 
 
Due to conflicts of interest (whether because they are friends with the perpetrator and/or 
want to maintain a reputation of an orderly command environment), lack of legal 
training, and/or the commanding officer is the assaulter, commanding officers are not 
equipped or qualified to make legal decisions. And, too often, their decisions have life-
changing impacts on victims. For example, Jessica Hinves, a former Air Force airman 
who was assaulted, recounted that, “They had a chain of command at my old squadron 
where the guy that raped me was still stationed. He had only been in command for four 
days, and he made a decision over legal to stop the case” (Dick, 2012). And, as 
mentioned earlier, Kori Cioca explained that all of the higher-ups in her chain of 
command were drinking buddies with her rapist. Therefore, despite claims like that of 
former SAPRO director Hertog, that commanders “do what the right thing is to do,” too 
many victims’ stories of injustice say otherwise (Dick, 2012). Of course, other issues, 
such as abortion, pregnancy, and women in combat, get much more complicated 
because the biological materiality can come into conflict with gendered equality.  
 My assertions about needed changes that would benefit servicewomen may 
initially appear to contradict my alignment with Foucault’s understanding that history is 
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not necessarily progressive. Yet, like McLaren (2012) and other feminist scholars, I 
argue that “Foucault’s work is engaged in social criticism that advocates social and 
political change” (p. 36). McLaren further argued that Foucault’s social criticism, or 
skepticism and suspicion, were linked to hope that social change is possible and that 
such criticisms can serve as a means of social and political intervention. Following this 
line of thought, my ultimate objective in this dissertation has not been only to criticize 
the military and scrutinize its policies, but to illuminate issues pertaining to female 
bodies in the armed forces in order to show how they are currently constituted and how 
















Key:  Pseudonym ● Date of interview ● Location ● Medium of interview 
 Participant description when interviewed 
 
● Joanna ● August 3, 2013 ● Utah ● In person ● 
Joanna was an Army veteran who had reached the rank of E-7. A 42-year-old Caucasian 
divorced mother of two boys, ages 9 and 11, she is laid back, candid, and laughs easily. 
Both of her pregnancies were planned. 
 
● Magellan ● August 28, 2013 ● Nevada ● Skype ● 
Magellan was a friendly and forthright 39-year-old single mother of an 11-year-old 
daughter. Serving in the Navy, she was 407 days away from being able to retire and 
begin working in the civilian sector. Her pregnancy was unplanned. 
 
● Master Sergeant Mom ● September 17, 2013 ● United Kingdom ● Skype ● 
Master Sergeant Mom was a 35-year-old Caucasian mother of two daughters, ages 6 
and 4. Recently divorced, she was an E-7 in the Air Force. She is knowledgeable and 
talkative, and talks quickly, eager to share her experience with others. She recently 
earned a Master’s degree in public administration. Both of her pregnancies were 
planned.  
 
● Ivette ● September 22, 2013 ● Texas ● FaceTime ● 
Ivette was a 29-year-old married mother of two children: an 8-year-old and an almost-2-
year-old. She was no longer in the Air Force, but was still in the Air National Guard and 
was hoping to get back to active duty in the summer of 2014. When she left the Air 
Force, she was an E-5. She identified her ethnicity as Mexian/Guatemalan. Both of her 
pregnancies were planned. 
 
● Samantha ● October 13, 2013 ● East Coast ● Skype ● 
Samantha had a 5-year-old son at the time of our interview and was separated from her 
son's father. She was a matter-of-fact Caucasian 25-year-old E-5 in the Navy. Her 
pregnancy was unplanned. 
 
● Jules ● October 13, 2013 ● East Coast ● Skype ● 
Jules was an E-5 servicewoman in the Navy who had served for 6 years. She was a 24-
year-old Caucasian mother of two, who had recently separated from her children’s 
father. Despite frustrating circumstances surrounding her second pregnancy, she was 
positive, informed, and direct. Both of her pregnancies were unplanned.  
 
● Emily ● October 13–14, 2013 ● Unknown ● Email ● 
Emily was unable to Skype or talk on the phone, so multiple emails were exchanged 
with questions and answers. At the time of communication, she was an E-6 in the Navy. 
She was a married Caucasian 30-year-old mother of two children, one who was 4 years 






● Jada ● October 14, 2013 ● Mississippi ● Skype ● 
Jada was a married African American mother of three children, ages 12, 10, and 2. She 
is straightforward and well informed. She is serving in the Navy, and at the time of the 
interview was ranked an E-7 chief. Her husband was about to retire from the Navy, and 
she was still planning on serving. Her first pregnancy was unplanned, and the other two 
were planned. 
 
● Mary ● October 17, 2013 ● California ● Skype ● 
Mary was a 37-year-old divorced Native American Navy veteran who had reached the 
rank of E-6 after serving for almost 18 years. She was friendly and open. She had three 
unplanned pregnancies that all resulted in miscarriages. 
   
● Ariel ● October 21, 2013 ● California ● Skype ● 
A confident 40-year-old Caucasian E-8 servicewomen at the time of the interview, Ariel 
had almost served 22 years in the Navy. Her son was 17 months old, and she also had 
two stepchildren, ages 6 and 16, with her husband. Her pregnancy was planned. 
 
● Sydney ● October 22, 2013 ● California ● Skype ● 
Sydney was a soft-spoken, 22-year-old African American E-4 sailor in the Navy at the 
time of our interview. She had been in the Navy for 3 years, and her baby was 7 months 
old. She was single. Her pregnancy was unplanned.  
 
● Natalie ● October 26, 2013 ● West Coast ● Skype ● 
Natalie was a quiet African American mother of a 3-month-old daughter. She was a 26-
year-old E-5 Naval servicewoman at the time of the interview. She had been in the 
Navy for 3 years and was single, although she was engaged to the father of her baby. 
Her pregnancy was unplanned. 
 
● Clarissa ● October–November, 2013 ● California ● Email ● 
Clarissa communicated via email since the government shutdown in October 2013 
made it difficult for her to find time to be able to Skype. She was an E-5 Air Force 
servicewoman with three children, ages 12, 6, and 5. She was a married 34-year-old 

























• When you first found out you were pregnant, who did you tell in your different 
circles of family, friends, and the military?  Why did you choose those people to 
share with? 
 
• What reactions did you get from family, friends, co-workers, and supervisors 
when you told them you were pregnant? 
 
• What do you think may be different about your pregnancy experience in the U.S. 
military compared to a civilian pregnancy experience?  What do you think may 
be the same? 
 
• What type of support did you receive from your peers and supervisors?  What 
type of support was offered by your military organization or unit?  Of the 
support offered or given, what kind of support was most useful and meaningful 
to you? 
 
• Did your branch of the U.S. military have any specific policies or protocol 
regarding pregnancy?  If so, how did you find out about them?  How did they 
apply to you and how did you use them during and after your pregnancy?  
 
• What surprised you or was unexpected about your pregnancy experience as a 
servicewoman? 
 
• Did you attend any childbirth or prenatal care classes?  [If answer is “yes,” 
probe about how they found out about it, who provided it, and their overall 
experience.  If answer is “no,” probe about reasons for not participating in 
classes] 
 
• If one of your fellow servicewomen confided in you that she was pregnant, what 
advice would you give her?  [If difficulty answering, follow up with, “What 
types of things would you suggest are important for her to do early in her 
pregnancy and along the way, either related to the military or in other situations?  
What types of things would you suggest that she avoid, either related to the 
military or in other situations?”] 
 
• Is there anything else about your experience as a pregnant servicewoman that 
you’d like to talk about with me?  Something I haven’t touched on that you 
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